Christian Koboldt

Strategic Power in the European Union

In this paper we propose a new method to evaluate the distribution of power between decision-making bodies in the European Union. Conventional methods that measure the voting power of players, such as the Banzhaf, Johnston, Holler and Shapley-Shubik indices, are insufficient for this purpose. They take no account, in an endogenous way, of the differences in the abilities of players to affect the outcome of decision-making, which are a result of the existence of political institutions. We propose a different way to measure decision-making power based on the distance between a players ideal point and the equilibrium outcome of a game. While all previous indices are based on cooperative game theory, the index developed in this paper is based on non-cooperative game theory, which has been the dominant thrust of theoretical politics and economics in the last years. The new index is applied to legislative procedures in the European Union.

Policymaking, Comitology and the Balance of power in the European Union

Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties of the different procedures laid down in the comitology decision, i.e., the European Councils decision on procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. Furthermore, it addresses the question of how the balance of power is determined by this decision.

Intellectual Property and Optimal Copyright Protection

Copyright protection, or more generally, intellectual property rights, can be regarded as a means for the stimulation of production of information goods. This paper analyses the basic problem of production and dissemination of information and the role of copyright protection as an incentive for the producers of creative works. Using a simple model, it is shown that not only a cause for limiting the extent of copyright protection does exist, but that also an argument for a minimum level of protection can be found. Even optimal copyright protection, given the restriction that production and dissemination of information goods has to be co-ordinated by a market mechanism, however, does not lead to a first-best (allocatively efficient) solution. Hence, the judgment that copyright protection is the best solution to the basic problem can be grounded only on a comparative institutional approach.

Transport, Welfare and Externalities

This book discusses a paradigm shift for dealing with the internalization of external costs in transport. Crucial to the analysis is the insight that the polluters are not the only cost drivers; both pollutees and the state can also contribute to reducing social costs. The authors show that applying the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle (CCAP) instead of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) can lead to substantial welfare improvements.

Replacing the Polluter Pays Principle with the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle

Contents: 1. Introduction 2. The Pigovian Tradition and the Polluter Pays Principle 3. The Coasian Revolution 4. Reaching Efficiency: Coase versus Pigou 5. Replacing the Polluter Pays Principle with the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle 6. Beyond Efficiency: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Principles 7. Case Studies 8. The Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle and the European Transport Policy 9. Conclusions References

Consistent planning, backwards induction, and rule-governed behavior

This paper argues that with regard to sequential choice problems the set of assumptions that are necessary for the process of planning to be logically consistent may make the notion of rational dynamic consistency an unacceptable prescription for choice. In this sense, motivational limits to rationality may arise, adding to the inability of making consistent plans an unwillingness to engage in planning consistently. A different notion of planning, centered around the notion of self-commitment and rule-governed behavior may appear to be a more natural solution to optimal sequential choice.