Brian Efird

From War to Integration: Generalizing Power Transition Theory

Generalizing the dynamics implied by power transition theory, we characterize the structural conditions that lead nations to initiate conflict or choose to integrate. The relationship between changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction are used to identify the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. Empirical tests for the last two centuries confirm the strength and robustness of this characterization. In addition, long term assessments of Pax Britannica, the Cold War, and Chinas potential challenge to the United States in this century are used to illustrate the precision of these findings. The fundamental implication is that structural conditions provide the preconditions for conflict and cooperation, but decision makers have leeway in advancing policies that eventually lead to either war or peace.

Negotiating peace in Kosovo

We systematically analyze and forecast key developments before and during the Kosovo Crisis. Prior to the air campaign, we anticipated the breakdown of negotiations at Rambouillet and the subsequent initiation of hostilities. Without Russia as a mediator, we predicted that Milosevic would engage in military activity and strengthen his domestic control. As the war was being waged, we took a second look at settlement opportunities. Russia was identified as the key mediator needed to reach a settlement We show that a European‐led settlement offered promising prospects for peace. Finally, we demonstrate that the settlement achieved after the air war was not much different than the settlement that could have been achieved at Rambouillet The settlement on Kosovo offers only short‐term stability. To gain long‐term stability, the Serbians must either agree to the existing ethnic makeup in Kosovo or allow it to be partitioned. Otherwise, conflict in this region will likely revive.

The Political Future of Afghanistan and Its Implications for US Policy

This paper provides a forecast of the likely consequences of ongoing US military activity in Afghanistan, and assesses the implications of a change in the current US policy toward that nation. We use a game theoretic, bounded rationality model, called the Expected Utility model, to analyze the stability of the political and economic systems in Afghanistan, given both the domestic and international context. We undertook two analyses, one in December 2001 and a second in June 2002. Thus far all forecasts appear to be in line with our observations on the current sequence of events. Furthermore, we found that a continued, robust US military presence in Afghanistan is necessary to assure political and economic stability. Without continued, substantial US support for the current regime, it is likely that an Islamic dictatorship, with the potential to support terrorist activities, will replace the current semi-democratic system.