Cecilia Albin

Can NGOs enhance the effectiveness of international negotiation

This article discusses when and how NGOs succeed in making positive contributions to international negotiations, in ways that governments are not able or willing to do as well alone. Among the factors favoring substantial NGO involvement are appeal to the interests of participating governments, possession of needed expertise, effective lobbying, framing of issues as wider global or human concerns and public mobilization over these, and plentiful funding. Seven types of NGO activities relating to negotiation are identified: problem definition, agenda setting, and goal setting; enforcement of principles and norms; provision of information and expertise; public advocacy and mobilization; lobbying; direct participation in the formulation of international agreements; and monitoring and other assistance with compliance. Despite the increased presence and activism of NGOs on the international stage, however, their participation in negotiating fora remains largely unofficial, ad hoc, or subjected to the preferences of national governments. A principled and cautious expansion of the opportunities for NGOs to participate in international negotiations could enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of their outcomes.

Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars

This article explores relationships between procedural justice (PJ) in the negotiation process, distributive justice (DJ) in the terms of negotiated agreements, and their durability in cases of civil war. Adherence to PJ principles was found to correlate strongly with agreements based specifically on the DJ principle of equality. Agreements were also found to be more durable when based on equality, but not when based on other DJ principles. The equality principle accounted for the relationship between PJ and durability irrespective of differences between the parties in power. Further examination suggested that two types of equality in particular—equal treatment and equal shares—were associated with forward-looking agreements and high durability. The findings suggest that durability is served by including equality in the terms of agreements, and that PJ helps (but does not guarantee) achieving such agreements.

Negotiating international cooperation: global public goods and fairness

Global public goods (GPGs) are vital to human welfare and security worldwide. Yet often they suffer from under-provision and free-riding, and are not accessible or beneficial to everyone. They illustrate starkly problems of collective action. This article examines multilateral negotiations in which countries seek agreement on the terms for collaboration in providing GPGs. It argues that common obstacles to an effective agreement concern justice and fairness issues, which arise from the earliest phase when the agenda is set to the final stage of securing implementation and compliance. Drawing on recent negotiation practice, it proposes a framework and a set of strategies for how such issues could be tackled.

Rethinking Justice and Fairness : The Case of Acid Rain Emission Reductions

A major problem in managing and ultimately resolving many environmental issues, transboundary and global in particular, is how to tackle the fundamental questions of distributive justice and fairness involved.1 Little systematic reflection and research have been devoted to these issues. The problem of acid rain is a prime example. Strategies to abate acid rain must, among other requirements, be viewed as fair and just if they are to be politically accepted, implemented and honoured in the long term. Research and actual negotiations in this area to date have, by contrast, focused almost exclusively on the generation and analysis of emission reduction strategies which are effective in economic and, more recently, environmental terms. Indeed, under leading proposals for emission reductions in Europe based on

Procedures matter: Justice and effectiveness in international trade negotiations

International negotiators have faced repeated stalemates in a number of significant areas. Justice issues are at the heart of the matter in many cases, as vividly illustrated by trade negotiations, particularly at the multilateral level. Yet, issues of justice have received limited attention in research on trade negotiation. This article asks: do trade negotiators who take justice principles into account arrive at more effective agreements? Specifically, it explores relationships between two types of justice during the negotiation process — procedural and distributive justice — and the effectiveness of outcomes (agreements) in 22 cases of bilateral and multilateral international trade negotiation. It evaluates the impacts of these types of justice on negotiation effectiveness. The results from analyses clearly demonstrate that procedural justice plays a central role in contributing to effective outcomes in both bilateral and multilateral trade cases. The correlations between procedural justice and effectiveness are very strong, and significantly stronger than between distributive justice and effectiveness. Moreover, distributive justice impacts upon effectiveness only when procedural justice principles are observed. These findings contribute knowledge about factors that enhance effective outcomes in international negotiations. They extend earlier work on justice in peace agreements and fill a gap in the research literature. They also provide advice for negotiators, and add important questions to the future research agenda.

The Role of Justice in Negotiation

This chapter discusses the role of justice in negotiation between rival parties and the durability of peace agreements. It draws on research about group negotiation processes and agreements to end civil wars, mostly during the early 1990s. Hypothesized relationships between the presence and importance of distributive justice (DJ) in the agreements, and their durability, were first explored with multiple methods (see also the chapter by koeszegi and Vetschera, this volume). The difficulty of the conflict environment was shown to have the strongest impact on durability. However, the DJ principle of equality was found to reduce the negative impact of difficult environments. An emphasis on equality was also associated with more forward-looking agreements, which were found to be more durable than those that were backward looking. (See also the chapters by Nurmi, Klamber, Kilgour and Hipel, Turel, and Yuan, this volume for modeling approaches to issues of justice and fairness.) Next, the presence and importance of procedural justice (PJ) were examined in the negotiation processes that led to the signing of the peace agreements. Significantly more durable agreements occurred when a process based on PJ led to agreements that emphasized equality. This focus on process is similar to the analyses conducted by the authors chapters (See also the chapter by Koeszegi and Vetschera, Kersten and Lai, this volume). A close examination of how the equality principle was applied revealed that agreements based on provisions of equal treatment and/or equal shares were particularly durable. The chapter concludes with a discussion of tactics used by third parties to produce durable agreements, and lessons for policy.

Setting the Table for Success - or Failure? : Agenda Management in the WTO

Abstract How does the agenda management process influence the effectiveness of multilateral trade talks in the World Trade Organization (WTO)? How can the all-important agenda be shaped so as to enhance the prospects of an agreement being reached? How the agenda is managed directly affects the negotiation process which follows and the eventual outcome. Yet researchers have paid little attention to the particular dynamics and challenges of agenda management in large-scale multilateral negotiations, and actual practice points to several weaknesses. This article proposes that the complexity of the agenda in multilateral talks needs to be managed and reduced in procedurally just ways if a successful outcome (agreement) is to result. It develops an analytical framework of agenda management in multilateral negotiations and conducts a structured focused comparison to explain the differences in outcomes of two rounds of WTO negotiations: the failure of the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference and the success of the 2004 Geneva negotiations in reaching an agreement. The findings support the proposition that a successful outcome depends in part on reducing agenda complexity and that this needs to be achieved in procedurally acceptable (if not just) ways.

Bargaining over Weapons: Justice and Effectiveness in Arms Control Negotiations

This article explores the relationship between justice and effectiveness in bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations. A set of hypotheses, derived from earlier research about the impacts of procedural and distributive justice on negotiation outcomes is evaluated. The sample consists of twenty cases, ten bilateral and ten multilateral. The results of statistical analyses show strong effects of procedural justice on the effectiveness of bilateral, but not multilateral, negotiations. Further analyses indicate that the effects are largely accounted for by half of the bilateral cases. Case-by-case analyses reveal some of the conditions that explain the correlation between pj principles and effective outcomes. Distributive justice correlated with more substantial agreements in the multilateral cases. Reasons for the limited effects of procedural justice on multilateral outcomes are discussed. The article concludes with more general implications and suggestions for further research.

Explaining Conflict Transformation: How Jerusalem Became Negotiable

How can intractable conflicts become negotiable after decades of bloodshed and disagreement? The question is addressed using two lenses—one conceptual, the so-called conflict transformation approach set out in the research literature, and one empirical, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem. The article discusses turning points in the transformation of Jerusalem from an intractable dispute to an intensively negotiated issue with the contours of a possible agreement emerging. It examines how far the conflict transformation approach helps to explain this critical development, as well as how Jerusalem points to areas in need of further development. The conflict over Jerusalem has become tractable through profound structural and relational change. However, this change is not necessarily permanent. A useful approach to conflict transformation needs to illuminate underlying causes better, and be able to explain relapses into intractability.

Securing the peace of Jerusalem: on the politics of unifying and dividing

For a long time the intractable nature of the Jerusalem problem ensured that it was persistently swept under the rug in Middle East peace negotiations. Indeed, the widespread belief has been that the dispute over the city’s future political status cannot be settled until most other issues in the Israeli–Arab conflict have been resolved. Under the terms of the Oslo Declaration of Principles signed in September 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to settle the thorny issue of Jerusalem in the final stage of permanent status negotiations. The Oslo Declaration of Principles, based on the secret Israel–PLO talks in Norway, established a staged approach and a timetable for reaching a permanent settlement. First, the interim negotiations would result in Israeli military withdrawal from Jericho and the Gaza Strip, the transfer of power to a nominated Palestinian National Authority, and the beginning of a five-year transitional period of Palestinian self-government under this Authority. Secondly, the Palestinians would elect a Council and achieve early ‘empowerment’ (self-government) in five spheres in the rest of the West Bank. Thirdly, the permanent status negotiations — to cover Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, refugees, security arrangements and borders, among other issues — would commence by the start of the third year of the interim period, and the resulting final settlement would take effect at the end of the interim phase. The negotiations leading to the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in May 1994 achieved the first objective. The signing of the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement (also termed Oslo II and the Taba Agreement) in September 1995 set the stage for a partial implementation of the second goal: Palestinians gained full control over six main West Bank towns and administrative responsibility for almost the entire Palestinian West Bank population. A Palestinian Council was elected in January 1996.