Christopher P. Twomey

Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-intervention

In analyses of China’s military modernization, it has become increasingly common to describe China as pursuing a “counter-intervention” strategy in East Asia. Such a strategy aims to push the United States away from China’s littoral, forestalling the United States’ ability to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan or in disputes in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, such a military strategy is consistent with a purported broader Chinese goal to displace the United States from its traditional regional role, including Washington’s support for global norms such as freedom of navigation in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and partnerships with long-standing treaty allies. Characterizations of China’s military strategy as counter-intervention are attributed not to the assessments of outside observers but instead to the actual writings of Chinese strategists themselves. Put simply, China is said to characterize its military strategy as counter-intervention. According to the 2012 edition of the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military power, “For China, ‘counter-intervention’ refers to a set of operationally-defined tasks designed to prevent foreign (e.g., U.S.) military forces from intervening in a conflict…China employs anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons in support of this broader counter-intervention strategy—a strategy not bound by a set geographic area or domain” (emphasis added). 1 Likewise, a noted defense

Perspectives on Sino-American strategic nuclear issues

PART I: THEORETIC PERSPECTIVES ON DANGERS IN SINO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS Introduction: Dangers and Prospects in Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Relations C.Twomey Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Nuclear Crisis Management and their Implications for U.S.-Chinese Relations D.Welch PART II: COMPARING NATIONAL VIEWS ON STRATEGIC CONTEXT, NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITIES, AND DOCTRINES U.S. Perspective on the Strategic Context of Nuclear Weapons M.May Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Context of Nuclear Weapons P.Zhenqiang Confronting Gathering Threats: U.S. Strategic Policy M.Nacht Chinas New Leadership and Strategic Relations with the United States J.Qingguo U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and Beyond J.Wirtz Chinese Nuclear Policy: The Future of Minimum Deterrence Y.Yunzhu PART III: REGIONAL CHALLENGES AND THREAT REDUCTION POLICIES East Asias Nuclear Future Y.Yi Sino-Indian Strategic Relations S.Dingli The Challenge of a Nuclear North Korea S.Snyder Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy G.Guoliang Informal Arms Control and Mutual Contingent Restraint B.Roberts Comparing Perspectives: Dangers to Avoid, Prospects to Develop C.Twomey

Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security

Two separate strands of political science literature have reinvigorated the study of culture in international security in recent years through their methodological rigor and empiric accuracy: constructivism and organizational theory. It is important to recognize, though, that these literatures speak to particular roles of culture in strategic studies – and not those roles studied in the strategic culture literature. Indeed, that literature has not been as successful as the other two, suffering from over-determined predictions, empirical failures, and an unresolved debate about epistemology. Thus, there is a perplexing lacuna in the centre of this field: a weak core of cultural analysis in international security coupled with stronger works at the periphery. There are two reasons for this. One the one hand, organizational cultures tend to be more unified than the myriad strains in all national cultures. On the other, constructivism looks primarily to explain – and less often to predict – identity. Traditional strategic culture work suffers the worst of both worlds, striving for explanatory power but having to grapple with multiple, competing cultures, and so is weaker than either of the other schools. While culturally aware scholarship of specific political institutions and social actors of specific cases should be encouraged, policymakers and scholars should not expect much distinctive predictive utility from the strategic culture literature per se.

NUCLEAR STABILITY AT LOW NUMBERS

Chinese writings on the workings of nuclear stability, deterrence, and coercion are thin and politicized. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean, from direct and inferential evidence, rather pessimistic conclusions regarding Chinese views of nuclear stability at low numbers. While China has been living with low numbers in its own arsenal for decades, today it views missile defense and advanced conventional weapons as the primary threat to nuclear stability. More generally, China views nuclear stability as wedded to political amity. Because none of these would be directly addressed through further US and Russian arsenal reductions, China is unlikely to view such reductions as particularly stabilizing. While there is little in Chinese writing to suggest lower US and Russian numbers would encourage a “race to parity,” there are grounds to worry about China becoming more assertive as it gains confidence in Beijings own increasingly secure second-strike forces.

Asia's Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Asia Policy Assembly in Washington, D.C., on June 17–18, 2010.

Domestic Factors Could Accelerate the Evolution of China's Nuclear Posture

This brief discusses how domestic factors could influence Chinas evolving nuclear deterrent.

Comparing Perspectives: Dangers to Avoid, Prospects to Develop

The previous chapters present perspectives on strategic nuclear issues between the United States and China that at times differ widely, although some interesting areas of commonality do exist. Overall, it is clear that most analysts see some grounds for concern in the nuclear relationship itself. These worries are compounded when potential differences in national interest are considered on issues such as the status of Taiwan, normalization of Japan, evolution of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances, and other U.S. partnerships in the region (Singapore, Philippines, etc.). This is a dangerous combination: instability in strategic affairs and potential conflicts of national interest. The latter is a challenging one to address, and this chapter does not attempt to do so. However, there are aspects of the strategic instability that can be addressed, and it is here that analysts and policymakers ought to focus their attention.

Dangers and Prospects in Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Relations

Sino-American nuclear relations have the appearance of a deep, abiding stability. There is no overt arms race between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, and since 1998 they have maintained an agreement not to target their nuclear weapons at each other. The two sides cooperate on important counterproliferation policies, such as the Six-Party Talks that address the North Korean nuclear program. Their militaries also have participated in a number of joint exercises in the past year.

Balancing Identity and Reality

As Kang’s thinking evolves, I hope that he will devote more attention to the political consequences of deeper and closer economic relations with China (pp. 66–67). China has emerged as the number one or number two trading partner of virtually every country in East Asia. From the perspective of any one of those countries, this trade dependence with China is asymmetrical because China possesses all the leverage. 3is worries some experts in the U.S. military community. I argue elsewhere, however, that despite this asymmetry economic dependence is in fact mutual. 3ough any trade partner may be expendable, China is dependent on other Asian countries as a group to supply materials and parts, facilitate technology transfer, and create wealth and in4uence, thereby bolstering the government’s legitimacy.7 3is mutuality is quite consistent with Kang’s views. Adding to a growing scholarly interest in regions as pillars of global order, Kang’s thesis should stimulate fundamental questions regarding the complex interaction between the global system, the behavior of regional powers, and local responses. 3is reviewer came away from the book persuaded more 5rmly than ever that East Asian countries have developed a regional order that is both stable and su6ciently 4exible to adapt to—and in4uence—a rising China. 3e burden of proof has now shi7ed to those who argue that Asia’s stability is 4eeting.