Jacob Heim

Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese Adventurism under Austerity

Even as events in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine have captured the attention of U.S. foreign policy elites, the United States faces key questions about its military position in Asia. In the face of growing Chinese power, can the United States continue to provide a credible deterrent in Asia without either bankrupting itself or pursuing risky strategies that raise new questions about crisis stability? While other security issues remain important, none will have a more fundamental effect on the U.S. military budget or the way the United States does business overseas. Basic precepts of U.S. foreign and security policy are under debate. Notable commentators have recently argued that U.S. forward defenses in Asia are no longer viable and that the United States should transition to a less engaged strategy of “offshore balancing.” Others have countered that the right combination of new technologies and offensive systems might yet restore U.S. dominance. While we welcome the new debate, neither of the most prominent alternative approaches is advisable. The United States requires a new strategy, one that does more to assure U.S. partners than offshore balancing but that is also affordable and does not rely on a vulnerable hair-trigger offensive posture. Fortunately, the United States could realize such a strategy, though it would require significant diplomatic efforts as well as a variety of military adjustments.

Domestic Factors Could Accelerate the Evolution of China's Nuclear Posture

This brief discusses how domestic factors could influence Chinas evolving nuclear deterrent.

The Foundations of Operational Resilience Assessing the Ability to Operate in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Environment: The Analytical Framework, Lexicon, and Characteristics of the Operational Resilience Analysis Model (ORAM)

Abstract : In the face of growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges, the United States must posture airpower to accomplish missions while under intense and persistent attack. In other words, U.S. air forces must have operational resilience: the capacity to withstand attack, adapt, and generate sufficient combat power to achieve campaign objectives in the face of continued, adaptive enemy action. Although several analytic efforts at RAND and elsewhere have studied selected elements of Air Force base resilience, little has been done to determine how potential adversaries could tailor their attacks for greatest effect in negating U.S. airpower capabilities or to assess a wide range of potential resilience improvements to evaluate trade-offs between them and identify which one or combination of measures would result in the most resilient force posture, theater-wide. Given this gap, the U.S. Air Force asked the RAND Corporation to develop a logical framework for assessing Air Force operational resilience in an A2/AD environment. Specifically, RAND was given four objectives: (1) identify the fundamental strategic assumptions about the emerging geostrategic environment as they relate to operational resilience and emerging A2/AD threats, (2) develop a lexicon of resilience-related terms and definitions that could serve as a standard for use across the analytical community, (3) develop an analytical framework for evaluating the potential impacts of alternative attacks on U.S. air forces, theater-wide, and the potential benefits of a wide range of approaches for improving operational resilience, singularly and in combination, in the face of those attacks, and (4) employ the foregoing assumptions and tools in an exploratory analysis to gain insights into approaches for improving Air Force operational resilience within the context of efforts to rebalance the Joint Force in the Asia-Pacific region.