Michael S. Chase

Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States

Abstract The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding ‘minimalist’ nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that Chinas growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US–China conflict over Taiwan.

China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States

This article examines the modernization of Chinas nuclear missile force and assesses the implications for the U.S.

The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China's Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting

Abstract Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the conventional missile component of the Peoples Liberation Armys Second Artillery Force (SAF) has emerged as a centerpiece of Chinas accelerating military modernization program. The conventional missile force has grown in size and sophistication, and China has developed a doctrine for its employment. Chinese military publications emphasize that it plays an increasingly important role in deterrence and warfighting. In particular, Chinese sources underscore its role in achieving information dominance, air superiority, and sea control as well as countering third-party intervention. Chinas development of advanced conventional missile capabilities highlights the growing vulnerability of fixed bases and surface ships. Moreover, organizational tendencies, could fuel dangerous escalation. In response to these challenges, the United States must adapt its traditional approach to military operations and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.

At the Dawn of Belt and Road: China in the Developing World

China has always viewed itself as a vulnerable underdeveloped country. In the 1990s, it began negotiating economic agreements and creating China-centric institutions, culminating in the 2000s in numerous institutions and ultimately the Belt and Road Initiative. The authors analyze China’s political and diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with the Developing World and discuss specific countries that are most important to China.

Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, Volume II: Trends in Force Projection Against Potential Adversaries

This volume describes nine warfighting scenarios to test whether the anti-access and area-denial threat to U.S. force projection is growing more severe in critical regions. The potential adversaries in the scenarios are China, Russia, and Iran. The scenarios describe plausible U.S. and adversary military actions based on common understanding of current operational capabilities and approaches.

Domestic Factors Could Accelerate the Evolution of China's Nuclear Posture

This brief discusses how domestic factors could influence Chinas evolving nuclear deterrent.

Chinese Perceptions of and Responses to US Conventional Military Power

ABSTRACT Chinese analysts view the US military not only as a model for emulation but also as a serious threat given its strengths in high tech weapons and equipment, power projection, and unparalleled ability to conduct information-intensive joint combat operations. Yet they also see many of the capabilities the US military relies upon to execute these operations – most notably forward bases, space capabilities, and computer networks and information technology systems – as potentially vulnerable to disruption. Accordingly, China has developed capabilities designed to deter or counter US military intervention in areas close to China. This poses two interrelated challenges for the United States: maintaining its military advantage in an era of rapid technological change and preserving deterrence against growing Chinese ambitions in Asia.

Overview of People's Liberation Army Air Force "Elite Pilots"

Abstract : This report draws on a wide variety of Chinese primary sources to provide an overview of how the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) selects and trains what it calls its elite fighter pilots. To date, the PLAAF has identified three groups of pilots as elite pilots. The first group comprises 33 pilots who have won the annual Golden Helmet competition at the Dingxin Test and Training Base in Gansu province since 2011; Chinese military media reports describe the Golden Helmet as the supreme contest among Chinese fighter pilots. The second group comprises pilots who belong to the PLAAFs Bayi (also called August 1st) Aerobatics), which was created in 1962 and has used the J-10 multirole aircraft since 2009. The third group comprises six Su-30 attack pilots, including one Golden Helmet winner, who competed in Russias Avodarts 2014 competition for the first time. While each of the three groups compete using existing flight procedures, the lessons learned are reviewed extensively for ways to change existing tactics and combat methods. For example, one of the most important lessons learned has been the PLAAFs desire to move toward less scripted training, which Chinese sources typically refer to as ziyou kongzhan and translates as unrestricted air combat or free air combat training. Additionally, official Chinese media reports on the PLAAFs Golden Helmet competition, its participation in the Russian Avodarts competition, and the Bayi Aerobatics Teams participation in air shows in Russia in 2013 and Malaysia in 2015 appear to reflect a desire on the part of the PLAAF to project a more open and confident image at home and abroad. Finally, in 2014, the PLAAF implemented a Golden Dart competition to identify elite ground attack and bomber crews.