Dyhia Belhabib

Euros vs. yuan: comparing European and Chinese fishing access in West Africa.

We compare the performance of European Union (EU) and Chinese fisheries access agreements with West African countries in terms of illegal and unreported fishing, economic equity, and patterns of exploitation. Bottom-up re-estimations of catch reveal that the EU (1.6 million t•year-1) and China (2.3 million t•year-1) report only 29% and 8%, respectively, of their estimated total catches (including estimated discards whenever possible) from West African countries between 2000 and 2010. EU catches are declining, while Chinese catches are increasing and are yet to reach the historic maximum level of EU catches (3 million t•year-1 on average in the 1970s-1980s). The monetary value of EU fishing agreements, correlated in theory with reported catches, is straightforward to access, in contrast to Chinese agreements. However, once quantified, the value of Chinese agreements is readily traceable within the African economy through the different projects they directly cover, in contrast to the funds disbursed [to host governments] by the EU. Overall, China provides resources equivalent to about 4% of the ex-vessel value [value at landing] of the catch taken by Chinese distant-water fleets from West African waters, while the EU pays 8%. We address the difficulties of separating fees directly related to fishing from other economic or political motivations for Chinese fees, which could introduce a bias to the present findings as this operation is not performed for EU access fees officially related to fishing. Our study reveals that the EU and China perform similarly in terms of illegal fishing, patterns of exploitation and sustainability of resource use, while under-reporting by the EU increases and that by China decreases. The EU agreements provide, in theory, room for improving scientific research, monitoring and surveillance, suggesting a better performance than for Chinese agreements, but the end-use of the EU funds are more difficult, and sometime impossible to ascertain.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing: The Case of West Africa

This paper assesses illegal fishing in West Africa, one of the regions most affected by Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU) in the world. The catch, the economic loss and the amount recovered through Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) are calculated based on a reconstruction method, and the information made available through national MCS units, between 2010 and 2016 in an effort to assess the effectiveness of surveillance efforts in the region. Results show considerable loss of revenues for Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea and Sierra Leone, estimated at 2.3 billion USD annually, while a minimal amount of 13 million USD is recovered through MCS. In addition, this paper finds that countries touched by the Ebola crisis (Guinea and Sierra Leone) drive a tremendous increase in the loss generated by illegal fishing. However, further analysis shows that the overall severity of illegal fishing, as defined by a range of types investigated here, declines as the fines against the most severe forms of IUU fishing increase. Finally this study finds that Sierra Leone and The Gambia have the highest scoring MCS systems, and were the countries where the most offenders are caught and charged with the highest fines, while Senegal’s new legislations which improved MCS during 2015 does not appear to show on the scoring results. This study finds that illegal fishing amounts the equivalent of 65% of the legal reported catch from West Africa and poses serious concern for food security, and the economy in the region.

Marine Fisheries Catches in Ghana: Historic Reconstruction for 1950 to 2010 and Current Economic Impacts

Ghana has a long fishing tradition, including industrial fishing. After many of the countries where Ghanaian fleets were actively fishing declared an Exclusive Economic Zone in the 1980s, the distant-water fleet of Ghana returned to its home waters, precipitating a collapse of some local stocks. While official catches reported to the FAO document this decline, the catches of other sectors (artisanal, subsistence, and recreational fishing) were not reported, their contribution to the livelihoods of Ghanaians was simply not documented, and their impact on fish stocks overlooked. Herein, total catches were estimated at 20.8 million tonnes between 1950 and 2010 compared to 11.8 million tonnes reported to the FAO. Subsistence catches, notably from coastal lagoons represented the bulk of unreported catches and seemed to have increased overall during this period, while the artisanal and large-scale sector catches decreased. Furthermore, the economic contribution of artisanal fisheries to Ghana is declining mainly due to use of non-sophisticated technology and activities of industrial fisheries making already poor communities poorer while industrial (particularly tuna) fisheries are increasing their profitability margin due to high technology being adopted and operating in less exploited parts of the continental shelf of Ghana. Accurate catch statistics and a better understanding of the contribution of the marine fisheries sector are needed for sustainable management of the fishing industry in Ghana and its contribution to the Ghanaian economy.

Recreational fisheries economics between illusion and reality: The case of Algeria

Recreational fishing is often perceived as harmless when it comes to fisheries management, and its impact often estimated to surpass the economic outcomes of e.g. large-scale fisheries. Recreational fisheries are often an indication of political stability and sound ecosystem management. However, despite a high economic impact, the economic costs on traditional and small-scale commercial fishers is yet to be known. This paper answers the question of how unregulated recreational fisheries could rather generate a loss to an economy, and cause unfair competition with existing commercial sectors using the example of Algeria. This paper assesses catches and economic value of recreational fisheries in Algeria, and finds that over 6,000 tonnes reach commercial markets annually, competing directly with the small-scale artisanal sector, while selling recreationally caught fish is still illegal. The paper further finds that the public is thereby deprived—through lost tax, licence income and landed value of

Tax havens are the tip of the iceberg

45 million US annually.

Assessing Guinea Bissau's Legal and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries and the Surveillance Efforts to Tackle Them

To the Editor — Galaz et al.1 present a compelling analysis demonstrating the key role of tax havens in facilitating environmentally damaging economic activities, including illegal fishing. Within fisheries, Galaz et al. point out that 70% of the known vessels implicated in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing are, or have been, flagged under a tax haven jurisdiction. Their study highlights important policy implications: tax havens need to disclose beneficiary ownership and to stop practices that, in effect, subsidize environmental degradation. We suggest that the use of tax havens is just one of many methods used to conceal illegal fishing activities. To illustrate this, we studied more than 2,800 offending vessels listed in the Criminal Record of Fishing Vessels database over the period from 2002 to 2018 (incomplete year). This database records all fishing vessels (and over 900 associated seafood companies) that have been caught, observed and/or sanctioned for engaging in any form of illegal activity worldwide (including IUU fishing), obtained from governmental records (public and confidential), geospatial fishing operations analysis, media reports and community informants. We found that less than 2% of fishing vessels caught or observed specifically engaging in IUU activities were flagged in tax haven jurisdictions at the time of the offence, and only 11% of the total number of offending vessels belonged to companies whose address was listed within a tax haven jurisdiction, as defined by Galaz and colleagues. This large discrepancy between Galaz et al. reporting that 70% of IUU vessels are flagged to tax haven jurisdictions and our results (only 2%) stems from Galaz et al. relying on the list of blacklisted vessels by regional fisheries management organizations and the vessels for which a purple notice was issued by the International Criminal Police Organization (209 vessels), whereas the Criminal Record of Fishing Vessels includes all vessels that were caught or identified as involved in IUU within national, regional and high seas jurisdictions, whether or not they were blacklisted (2,800 vessels) and their associated companies or owners (900 companies). Investigations of IUU fishing vessels indicate multiple practices that do not systematically involve tax havens, such as diversion2, flag hopping3 and transshipments4. It is likely that some IUU operators use yet further practices to conceal their activities, including acquisition of new assets (vessels, seafood companies, quota and licences) in areas with open markets5, multiplication of subsidiaries in non-taxhaven jurisdictions6, multiple layers of vessel management6, mislabelling of fish, increased transshipments at sea4, and shifting fishing operations to new areas. Preventing the reflagging of fishing vessels to tax havens will complicate some IUU operations, but it will not address many of the other incentives that can contribute to diversion techniques. For example, much of the reflagging or flag hopping of IUU vessels is motivated by the tax credits provided by non-tax-haven jurisdictions. Complementary policy measures should thus generate costs to vessel owners that outweigh the profits from illegal fishing activities7, such as through higher and more drastic sanctions8,9, and removal of subsidies from fishing fleet owners, including beneficial owners earning profits but hiding their ownership and identity to avoid taxation and criminal liability10. Additional measures should also seek to block highseas trade and transshipment routes of trade post-capture5, implement measures preventing IUU vessels from landing and laundering their catches through ports in countries that are signatory to the Port State Measures Agreement11, and more comprehensively list vessels, companies and beneficial owners involved in illegal fishing activities. ❐

China's distant-water fisheries in the 21st century

Fisheries in Guinea Bissau contribute greatly to the economy and food security of its people. Yet, as the ability of the country to monitor its fisheries is at most weak, and confronted with a heavy foreign fleet presence, the impact of industrial foreign fleets on fisheries catches is unaccounted for in the region. However, their footprint in terms of catch and value on the small-scale sector is heavily felt, through declining availability of fish. Fisheries in Guinea Bissau are operated by both legal (small-scale and industrial), and illegal (foreign unauthorized) fleets, whose catches are barely recorded. In this paper, we assess catches by both the legal and illegal sector, and the economic loss generated by illegal fisheries in the country, then attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) of Guinea Bissau’s fisheries. Two main sectors were identified through official reports and a literature review, the large-scale (industrial) sector, which between 2011 and 2017 included exclusively catches by foreign owned and flagged vessels, and catches by the small-scale sector, which remain largely unmonitored in official statistics. We use the available data on the number of legal and illegal vessels and/or fishers, and their respective catch per unit of effort to estimate catches, and we analyze monitoring outcomes against the registered industrial and artisanal fleets. We find that of the legal industrial vessels, 20% were linked to criminal activities in the past 7 years. These activities range widely from using an illegal mesh size, to fishing in a prohibited area, to labor abuse and drug trafficking. Overall, total small-scale and industrial catches were estimated at 370,000 t/year in 2017, of which less than 2% is ever reported to the FAO. Small-scale catches represented 8% of the total catch, and this contribution was found to be declining. Industrial fisheries generate over

Fisheries catch misreporting and its implications: The case of Senegal

458 million US, or which

Still catching attention: Sea Around Us reconstructed global catch data, their spatial expression and public accessibility

75 million US is taken illegally, falling under the category trans-national fisheries crimes. The slight negative relationship between the number of monitoring days at sea illegal catches suggests increasing MCS efforts may play an important role in reducing illegal fishing in the country.