Ewa Roszkowska

Application of fuzzy TOPSIS to scoring the negotiation offers in ill-structured negotiation problems

In this paper we analyze the applicability of the TOPSIS method to support the process of building the scoring system for negotiation offers in ill-structured negotiations. When discussing the ill-structured negotiation problem we consider two major issues: the imprecisely defined negotiation space, and the vagueness of the negotiators preferences that cannot be defined by means of crisp values. First we introduce the traditional fuzzy TOPSIS model showing the alternative ways of normalizing the data and measuring the distances, which allows to avoid the problem of ranking reversals. Then we formalize ill-structured negotiations using a model which allows the negotiation problem to be defined in a simplified way by means of the aspiration and reservation levels only. Such a definition requires changes in the traditional fuzzy TOPSIS algorithm the development of a mechanism for scoring the offers that fall outside of the negotiation space defined independently and subjectively by the negotiator. We propose three different approaches to handle this problem, that keep the scoring system stable and unchanged throughout the whole negotiation process.

Inaccuracy in Defining Preferences by the Electronic Negotiation System Users

In this paper we analyze how preferences are defined by negotiators in electronic negotiations if a SAW-based negotiation offer scoring system is used. We analyze a dataset of the Inspire electronic negotiation system, containing the transcripts of bilateral negotiation experiments and study how the negotiators use the preferential information provided in the case description and map it into a system of issues and options ratings in the discrete negotiation problem. We measure the accuracy of the preference systems by comparing the user-defined scoring systems with the reference ideal ones that stem directly from precise initial graphical information. Two notions of accuracy are used: (1) ordinal accuracy which measures if the negotiators followed the ranking order only; and (2) cardinal accuracy, defined by means of an original formula that takes into account weighted normalized distances between the negotiator’s own system and the reference scoring one.

Generalized Game Theory’s Contribution to Multi-agent Modelling

The paper is divided into three parts: In section 29.1 of the paper, Generalized Game Theory (GGT) is outlined, and its applications in formalizing key social science concepts such as institutions, social relationships, roles, judgment, and games are presented. Institutions operate as a type of social algorithm, organizing and regulating agents playing different roles as they engage in deliberation and judgment activities and make and implement collective decisions. Section 29.2 of the paper will present simple multi-agent simulation models and selected results of the simulation. Section 29.3 will briefly outline an agenda for societal research based on the application of GGT to explaining and managing problems of insecurity and social disorder in multi-agent systems. In the GGT perspective, the problem of security can be formulated in terms of regulating a system and its agents, and dealing with social disorder and crisis.

Defining Preferences and Reference Points – A Multiple Criteria Decision Making Experiment

In this paper we study how do the decision makers proceed in analyzing the multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem. Based on the results of the questionnaire-based experiment, we investigate how do they define the reference points in the decision problem and specify their preferences. We also study what kind of problems do they encounter while analyzing such a multiple criteria decision making problem. Finally, we consider what MCDM methods could be used to fit the decision makers way of analyzing the preferences and conducting the decision process.

SAW-Based Rankings vs. Intrinsic Evaluations of the Negotiation Offers – An Experimental Study

In this paper we discuss the issue of evaluating the negotiation offers represented in a form of the complete packages and the negotiators’ consistency in scoring such packages. We analyze the results of an experiment, in which the negotiators were asked to build the ranking of fourteen negotiation offers and then compare it with two predefined rankings obtained by means of SAW method. We verify how do the negotiators evaluate these SAW-based rankings and how they correspond to the negotiators’ intrinsic ones. We discuss then both the negotiators’ consistency in defining their preferences and the applicability of some formal methods in supporting them in such a definition.

Distributive Justice: From Steinhaus, Knaster, and Banach to Elster and Rawls — The Perspective of Sociological Game Theory

Abstract This article presents a relatively straightforward theoretical framework about distributive justice with applications. It draws on a few key concepts of Sociological Game Theory (SGT). SGT is presented briefly in section 2. Section 3 provides a spectrum of distributive cases concerning principles of equality, differentiation among recipients according to performance or contribution, status or authority, or need. Two general types of social organization of distributive judgment are distinguished and judgment procedures or algorithms are modeled in each type of social organization. Section 4 discusses briefly the larger moral landscapes of human judgment – how distribution may typically be combined with other value into consideration. The article suggests that Rawls, Elster, and Machado point in this direction. Finally, it is suggested that the SGT framework presented provides a useful point of departure to systematically link it and compare the Warsaw School of Fair Division, Rawls, and Elster, among others.

The Multi-Criteria Negotiation Analysis Based on the Membership Function

Abstract In this paper we propose a multi-criteria model based on the fuzzy preferences approach which can be implemented in the prenegotiation phase to evaluate the negotiations packages. The applicability of some multi-criteria ranking methods were discussed for building a scoring function for negotiation packages. The first one is Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) technique which determines the sum of the partial satisfactions from each negotiation issue and aggregate them using the issue weights. The other one is Distance Based Methods (DBM), with its extension based on the distances to ideal or anti-ideal package, i.e. the TOPSIS procedure. In our approach the negotiators preferences over the issues are represented by fuzzy membership functions and next a selected multi-criteria decision making method is adopted to determine the global rating of each package. The membership functions are used here as the equivalents of utility functions spread over the negotiation issues, which let us compare different type of data. One of the key advantages of the approach proposed is its usefulness for building a general scoring function in the ill-structured negotiation problem, namely the situation in which the problem itself as well as the negotiators preferences cannot be precisely defined, the available information is uncertain, subjective and vague. Secondly, all proposed variants of scoring functions produce consistent rankings, even though the new packages are added (or removed) and do not result in rank reversal.

Supporting Ill-Structured Negotiation Problems

The negotiation is a complex decision-making process in which two or more parties talk with one another in afford to resolve their opposing interests. It can be divided into consecutive stages, namely: pre-negotiation phase involving structuring the problem and the analysis of preferences, the intention phase involving the iterative exchange of offers and counter-offers, and the postoptimization phase aiming at the improvement of the agreement obtained in the intention phase. In this chapter, we focus on the analysis of negotiators\({^\prime }\) preferences in ill-structured negotiation problems. We employ the modified FTOPSIS approach and the AHP method for determining the negotiation offers\({^\prime }\) scoring system, which allows for the easy evaluation of both the incoming offers as well as the packages under preparation. The imprecision and vagueness of the packages and option\(\text {s}{^\prime }\) descriptions is modeled by the fuzzy triangular numbers. The Analytic Hierarchy Process is used to derive the negotiation issue weights instead of directly assigning such values to the issues (a classic approach). The FTOPSIS method is used to build the final scoring system allowing for the evaluation of any potential negotiation package. The whole process of negotiation supported by the approach we proposed is illustrated with an numerical example.

Legitimacy versus effectiveness: procedural governance integrating expertise and social acceptance of collective decisions

This article develops the earlier analyses of the Pareto multiagent problematique concerning collective choice situations, where members of a group, community or society, having diverse values, beliefs, and other predispositions, are faced with alternative allocations, institutional arrangements, or states of the world and may collectively choose a particular allocation, institutional arrangement or state of the world if they can agree on the choice. This type of multi-value governance situation is increasingly prevalent not only at political and societal levels, but also at the level of many enterprises, for instance, those advocating corporate social responsibility and working on economic as well as social and environmental goals. The article builds on research that has identified institutionalized governance mechanisms, which resolve conflicts of inefficient or nonoptimal states and disequilibria. In other words, Pareto optimization problems, in the face of general non-unanimity or conflict regarding the outcomes among involved actors, can be resolved.The approach, based on Sociological Game Theory (SGT), has developed specifi c models of adjudication, negotiation, and democratic procedure and investigated their legitimacy bases, the limits of such societal procedures, and the accomplishment of societal effi ciencies through such procedures. The re-conceptualization of the “Pareto problematique” is based on a general principle of “legitimation of collective choices”. Such collective choices are likely to be accepted by the majority or key agents (such as government agencies, businesses, NGOs, and so on) in the society. However, legitimacy does not guarantee effectiveness. On the one hand, it creates social order and sustainable society, on the other hand, a process legitimized by one or more of the societal legitimizing procedures may nonetheless lead to highly ineffective (or “ineffi cient”) outcomes, even catastrophes. There is no guarantee that legitimate collective choices are the best or right choices (this critique also applies to Pareto’s approach, as we have pointed out elsewhere). In general, effective choices, whether legitimate or not, require the application of relevant or appropriate knowledge (often, multiple types of knowledge are required). Overcoming the dilemma of gaining social acceptance and achieving knowledge-based technical effectiveness requires dual (or multiple) governance systems. This article identifies and analyses the governance structures and procedures, which bring systematic knowledge to bear on collective choice problems. Many contemporary forms of collective decision-making entail mobilizing and applying expertise, such as technical and scientific, economic, organizational, legal, and cultural knowledge, and combining these with legitimizing procedures to gain acceptance of collective decisions and, thereby, accomplish social equilibria. A few models of such integrative governance systems are identified and discussed in the article.

Can the Holistic Preference Elicitation be Used to Determine an Accurate Negotiation Offer Scoring System? A Comparison of Direct Rating and UTASTAR Techniques

In this paper we study the prenegotiation process of eliciting the negotiators’ preferences and building the negotiation offer scoring system. We analyze how the agents build the formal and quantitative scoring systems based on the preferential information provided by their principals. The results of the bilateral negotiation experiment conducted in Inspire negotiation system are analyzed, in which the simple direct rating technique (SMARTS-like approach) is implemented to evaluate the negotiation problem and build scoring systems. The concordance of such scoring systems with the principal’s preferences was determined using the cardinal and ordinal inaccuracy measures. Then for each agent the scoring system was determined using UTASTAR method based on the same preference structures subjectively declared for direct rating. Finally, the inaccuracy of scoring systems obtained by means of both methods was compared.