Felippe Clemente

Technical efficiency in Brazilian citrus production

The purpose of this study was to analyze the technical efficiency of citrus producing properties in Sao Paulo state, in 2009 and 2010. For this, producers were interviewed; non–parametric data envelopment analysis approach was applied to calculate levels of technical efficiency, and an econometric approach was applied to establish technical efficiency determinants. The results showed that a great part of Sao Paulo citrus producing properties works inefficiently and the variables that mostly contribute to increase efficiency are “producer schooling “ and “experience as rural producer”.

Tax evasion in Brazil: the case of specialists

The purpose of this paper is to use the instrumental game theory to understand the behavior of the front agents tax evasion and tax authority in Brazil.,In order to analyze the taxpayer’s behavior before the Brazilian tax system and tax actions aimed at reducing tax evasion, the authors developed a theoretical model based on the payoffs of Graetz et al. (1986) and increased with situations proposed by Siqueira (2004), Lipatov (2006) and Oliveira (2011).,Considering the cases with and without specialists, the main results show that in high dropout situation, penalize taxpayers with high fines or deprivations of liberty may not be as effective. Another result of the analysis is that the audit and inspection costs played an important role in driving the equilibrium system.,One limitation of this study is to consider how the exogenous tax authorities earnings (Federal Revenue of Brazil and Federal Police) and not as a function of the goals and certain enforcement policies for each public body.,The authors suggest the following policy: investing in tax inspectors and unbureaucratic the authorities of the cost structure become a more effective tool to combat non-compliance with tax obligations that the intensity of the penalties imposed by the act of evading.,This paper contributes to the literature insofar as it models for the first time, using game theory, the behavior of the evading agent and the tax authority in Brazil.

Tax Evasion in Brazil and the Institutions to Control

Brazilian tax evasion is very high. Tax evasion cause many problems for economics as budget realization, income distribution and not allocation of productive resources. The tax authority and the government have tried developing mechanisms for down the tax evasion agent action. But, the problem in Brazil is not having a real and security database about tax evasion. This paper is a first effort for try to measure and to identify tax evasion in Brazil. Despite efforts to the fight against crimes pension Brazil faces several problems regarding the decreased levels of tax evasion in the country, the main structural nature such as soft laws, lack of skilled labor, inefficient methods of preventive combat and academic research.