Gerhard Minnameier

Developmental progress in ancient Greek ethics

Starting from a neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning, major moral-cognitive advancements are reconstructed from the historical development of ancient Greek ethical philosophy. Kohlbergs stage theory is basically retained and supplemented by a developmental logic which allows us to (re)construct moral stages from their respective predecessors. This logical or dynamical approach, however, yields a new stage taxonomy, which is significantly different from and more detailed than Kohlbergs. Applying the new approach to ancient Greek ethics nine distinct stages within the historical process can be made out and analysed. As far as the argument and the available historical evidence go, the real historical development appears to be well accommodated by the suggested theory.

Ethics and economics, friends or foes? An educational debate

This paper reviews an ongoing debate about moral standards for vocational education in German speaking countries. At the centre of the controversy is the question of universalistic versus domain‐specific moral orientations, namely the question of whether business people ought to develop different moral points of view in different situations (such as ‘private’ versus ‘professional’). Of pivotal importance in this context is also a prominent ethical approach (by Karl Homann, a philosopher in the tradition of liberal economists) which serves as a foundation for those who advocate domain specificity and which is strongly criticized by their counterparts. This approach is also presented, since the author believes that it does not entail all of what its protagonists claim. Moreover, as argued in the last section, the purported dichotomy of universalism versus domain specificity may even be entirely overcome. The point is that Homanns ethics perhaps do not fit into the framework of Kohlbergs six stages and mig...This paper reviews an ongoing debate about moral standards for vocational education in German speaking countries. At the centre of the controversy is the question of universalistic versus domain‐specific moral orientations, namely the question of whether business people ought to develop different moral points of view in different situations (such as ‘private’ versus ‘professional’). Of pivotal importance in this context is also a prominent ethical approach (by Karl Homann, a philosopher in the tradition of liberal economists) which serves as a foundation for those who advocate domain specificity and which is strongly criticized by their counterparts. This approach is also presented, since the author believes that it does not entail all of what its protagonists claim. Moreover, as argued in the last section, the purported dichotomy of universalism versus domain specificity may even be entirely overcome. The point is that Homanns ethics perhaps do not fit into the framework of Kohlbergs six stages and might therefore be reconstructed as entailing moral segmentation. However, it is well accommodated by a more comprehensive stage taxonomy suggested by the author.

Situationsspezifität moralischen Denkens und Handelns – Befunde, Erklärungen und didaktische Orientierungen

Wirkliche Moral zeigt sich in den Augen vieler – und auch fur Klaus Beck – in Prinzipientreue, d.h. in der Einhaltung moralischer Regeln, auch und gerade dann, wenn es dem Urteilenden Opfer abverlangt, und in der gleichen bzw. gleichartigen Beurteilung moralrelevanter Sachverhalte. Im Lichte der Theorie der Entwicklung des moralischen Denkens nach L. Kohlberg bedeutet das vor allem, dass moralische Probleme stets gemas ein und demselben Prinzip reflektiert und entschieden werden, namlich dem, das der aktuell hochsten erreichten Urteilsstufe entspricht.

A cognitive approach to the ‘happy victimiser’

The happy victimiser phenomenon has puzzled many researchers in the field of moral development. After having learnt and internalised what is morally right and wrong, young children tend to attribute positive feelings to observed models of their age who explicitly harm other children. This has been mainly explained as a lack of moral motivation or an insufficiently developed moral self. On both accounts, happy victimising is seen as an educational problem and understood in terms of a gap between moral judgement and moral action. Against this view an alternative interpretation is suggested, namely to understand the happy victimiser as a particular form of moral reasoning, to the effect that there is no gap (at least not between moral judgement and moral motivation). From an educational point of view this relativises the whole HV problem. Consequences concerning the proper role of a ‘moral self’ as well as educational implications are discussed.

Situational moral adjustment and the happy victimizer

In this study we examine the possibility that the happy victimizer phenomenon (HVP), which is generally thought to be restricted to a specific period in middle childhood, also appears among adults. In contrast to other studies that explain the HVP as a lack of moral motivation or an insufficiently developed moral self, we propose to explain HVP in terms of a specific moral stage, i.e., a specific kind of moral reasoning. In particular we identify HV-typical moral reasoning with a sub-form of Kohlberg Stage 2. Adult usage of this moral stage is then explained in terms of situation-specificity. We also try to elaborate the idea of situational adjustment and to reveal the processes of activation and usage of previously acquired moral stage principles. Our empirical study shows that adults use HV-typical principles in specific situations.

Abduction, Induction, and Analogy

Analogical reasoning has been investigated by philosophers and psychologists who have produced different approaches like “schema induction” (Gick and Holyoak) or the “structure-mapping theory” (Gentner).What is commonplace, however, is that analogical reasoning involves processes of matching and mapping. Apart from the differences that exist between these approaches, one important problem appears to be the lack of inferential precision with respect to these processes of matching and mapping. And this is all the more problematic, because analogical reasoning is widely conceived of as “inductive” reasoning. However, inductive reasoning - in a narrow and technical sense - is not creative, whereas analogical reasoning counts as an important source of human creativity. It is C. S. Peirce’s merit to have pointed to this fact and that induction can merely extrapolate and generalize something already at hand, but not the kind of reasoning that leads to new concepts. Indeed, inventive reasoning is usually identified with abduction, and consequently abduction should play at least some role in analogy. Peirce has claimed that analogy is a compound form of reasoning that integrates abduction and induction, but the intriguing question is still, how these two inferences are to be reconstructed precisely. In the proposed paper I hold that analogical reasoning can indeed be analyzed in this way and that this helps us to reach a much more precise and differentiated understanding of the forms and processes of analogical reasoning. In particular I hold that (at least) two forms of analogical reasoning have to be distinguished, because they represent different inferential paths. The underlying inferential processed will be explicated in detail and illustrated by various examples.

Moral Aspects of Professions and Professional Practice

Professions are usually defined as occupations that require expert training at an academic level and are built on a set of standards that have to be met by members of a given profession. These standards not only apply to certain kinds of expert knowledge that are expected of professionals but also ethical standards in relation to the usage of this expert knowledge. However, apart from possible failures to meet these requirements, professionals, like anybody else, normally do not always act according to one guideline alone. Their actions are rather tuned to different situational cues. The article explores what kind of situations can be distinguished on a theoretical basis, how far such differentiations are acceptable or even appropriate and where they are not, and how situational adaptation works. The paper ends with deriving implications for professional practice and vocational education and training.

Deontic and Responsibility Judgments

Judgments of responsibility are considered a key component of moral functioning beyond mere deontic judgments. Contrary to most of those concerned with moral “responsibility”, “motivation”, “identity” and the like, the present paper argues that these commitment-yielding processes are part and parcel of moral judgment as such, rather than an obscure additional moral component.

The Inferential Construction of Knowledge in the Domain of Business and Economics

It is almost a truism, today, that knowledge is not just “picked up” from the world, but rather knowledge is actively constructed. Yet the precise meaning and functioning of “active construction” is anything but clear.

Wissen und Können im Kontext inferentiellen Denkens

„Wissen ist Macht — nichts wissen macht auch nichts.“ So lautet ein altbekannter Sponti-Spruch (in lockerer Anlehnung an Francis Bacon), der im Rahmen der aktuellen Diskussion um Wissensanwendung nicht nur eine eigentumliche Geltung zu erlangen, sondern sogar noch eine Verscharfung zu erfahren scheint. Zum einen erwerben Menschen nach der Theorie des „tragen Wissens“ (vgl. z.B. Renkl, 1996; Gruber & Renkl, 2000) zwar in Bildungseinrichtungen eine Menge prinzipiell brauchbaren Wissens, schaffen es aber nicht, dieses Wissen fruchtbar in die Praxis beruflicher oder erer Tatigkeiten umzusetzen. Dieter Euler (1996) hat das einmal auf die griffige Formel gebracht: „Denn sie tun nicht, was sie wissen“ (S. 350). Wissen ist also offenbar nicht per se gleich „Macht“.