Hannes Rösler

Policy Options for Progress Towards a European Contract Law. Comments on the issues raised in the Green Paper from the Commission of 1 July 2010, COM(2010) 348 final

In its position paper on the Commission’s Green Paper on policy options for a European contract law (COM (2010) 348 final, 1 July 2010), the Max Planck Working Group welcomes initiatives to overcome the fragmentary and inconsistent state of contract law in Europe. However, the Working Group criticizes that the Commission did not sufficiently consider the issue of the legislative competence of the EU. At present, an optional instrument (opt-in) drafted as a Regulation (option 4) and based on Art. 352 TFEU seems to be the preferable option. Such an instrument raises a number of questions regarding its choice and its area of application which have been addressed by the Working Group. An optional instrument should be granted a broad scope of application, including both B2B and B2C contracts, domestic contracts, intra-Union cross-border contracts as well as contracts with parties resident in third states. Its scope should neither be limited to cross-border contracts nor to contracts concluded online. However, the recommendation of the Institute is subject to an evaluation of the substantive quality of the instrument which is not yet available. In this regard, an important preparatory work for any future European contract law, i.e. the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), has already been criticized by some members of the Working Group. Also, any legislative initiative should be preceded by a proper review of the existing acquis and should be coordinated with the current work on a Consumer Rights Directive.This article is published in this Research Paper Series with the permission of the rights owner, Mohr Siebeck. Full-text Rabel Journal articles are available via pay-per-view or subscription at IngentaConnect, a provider of digital journals on the Internet.

Schutz des Schwächeren im Europäischen Vertragsrecht – Typisierte und individuelle Unterlegenheit im Mehrebenenprivatrecht

It is a permanent challenge to realize the freedom of contract objective effectively, rather than merely guaranteeing it formally. Indeed, nineteenth century private law already provided certain mechanisms to guarantee the protection of this ‘material’ freedom of contract. Meanwhile, a consensus has been reached on the need for a private law system that also provides real opportunities for self-determination. An example of this can be found in EU consumer law. Admittedly, this law is, for reasons of legal certainty, constrained both in personal and situational terms, and by certain formal requirements. However, the new rules against discrimination are dominated by approaches that focus strongly on the protection of the individual. They are supplemented by national provisions that in particular form a counterweight to certain individual weaknesses. The autonomy of national law in this field can be explained by the different traditions that underlie the ‘social’ contract law in the Member States. The differences are especially apparent in relation to public policy, the bona fide principle and the breach of an obligation before or at the time of contracting (culpa in contrahendo). They represent yet another argument against an undifferentiated leap from partial to full harmonization of contract law.

Court of Justice of the European Union

These recommendations follow on from the adoption on 25 September 2012 in Luxembourg of the new Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (OJ L 265, 29.9.2012, p. 1). They replace the information note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling (OJ C 160, 28.5.2011, p. 1) and reflect innovations introduced by those Rules which may affect both the principle of a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice and the procedure for making such a reference.

Rechtswahlfreiheit im Internationalen Scheidungsrecht der Rom III-Verordnung

Deutsche Zusammenfassung: Der Grundsatz der Parteiautonomie hat mit der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1259/2010 (Rom III-VO) auch das europaische Scheidungskollisionsrecht erreicht. Bedeutsam ist das wegen des Verbreitungsgrades grenzuberschreitender Familiensachverhalte, anhaltend hoher Scheidungsraten sowie des Fortbestehens von betrachtlichen sachrechtlichen Unterschieden. Dieser Beitrag widmet sich den Beweggrunden der Hinwendung zur Parteiautonomie, v.a. aber dem nicht zu unterschatzenden Klarungsbedarf.Vor Gerichten wird wegen der objektiven Anknupfung haufiger die lex fori zur Anwendung gelangen, denn ohne Rechtswahl kommt nach Art. 8 Rom III-VO das Recht des gemeinsamen gewohnlichen Aufenthalts oder unter Umstanden des letzten gemeinsamen Aufenthalts der Eheleute zur Anwendung. Das ist der intendierten Integrationswirkung der Verordnung geschuldet, aber auch den Vorzugen des lex fori-Ansatzes, was etwa dem englischen Recht entgegenkommt. Jedoch ist es fraglich, ob die lex fori stets den Interessen der Parteien entspricht, denn das Aufenthaltsprinzip (bei gleichzeitigem Zurucktreten des recht strikten Staatsangehorigkeitsprinzips) schafft einige Rechtsunsicherheit. Diese Unklarheiten konnen die Parteien durch eine nach Art. 5 Rom III-VO vorrangige Rechtswahl selbst uberwinden. Auf diese Weise lasst sich das Kontinuitatsbedurfnis der Parteien aufrechterhalten. Das Rechtswahlprinzip der Verordnung erweist sich als bedeutender Baustein des EU-IPR – auch wenn „Rom III“ nur auf die teilnehmenden Mitgliedstaaten Anwendung findet. Auserdem bleiben erstaunlich viele Fragen offen, wovon einige hier wie folgt beantwortet werden: Die VO ist nicht nur fur gerichtliche oder behordliche Trennungen, sondern auch fur Privatscheidungen einschlagig. Auserdem ist sie nach uberzeugender Auffassung prinzipiell auch auf gleichgeschlechtliche Ehen anwendbar, wobei die Beurteilung der Frage dem nationalen Recht uberlassen ist (siehe Art. 13 Var. 2 Rom III-VO). Umstritten ist, ob nach Art. 5(1)(d) Rom III-VO die lex fori auch abstrakt wahlbar ist, was hier bejaht wird, wenn die Ehegatten sich hinreichend konkret informiert haben und sie die Staaten eingegrenzt haben und auch der in Betracht kommende Staat dazu zahlt. Die Rechtswahl von Mehrstaatern ist nicht begrenzt auf effektive Staatsangehorigkeit, auch wenn das nationale Recht das vorschreibt. Aus dem Erfordernis der Verordnung, dass eine Rechtswahl die Rechte und die Chancengleichheit der Ehegatten nicht beeintrachtigen darf, wird die Pflicht der mitgliedstaatlichen Gerichte hergeleitet, im Rahmen von Art. 6 Rom III-VO auch eine Inhaltskontrolle nach berufenem Recht vorzunehmen. Unterstrichen wird auserdem die Bedeutung von Art. 10 Rom III-VO, der sich zur Losung von Geschlechterdiskriminierungen etwa nach islamischem Recht anbietet.English Abstract: The principle of private autonomy has reached European conflict of laws in divorce matters with Regulation (EU) No. 1259/2010 (Rome III). This is relevant due to the degree of cross-border family matters, the persistently high divorce rates and the considerable differences as to the substantive laws that continue to exist. This article addresses the motives behind the movement to party autonomy, but above all it considers a need for clarification that should not be underestimated.Due to the objective connecting factor, courts will apply the lex fori more frequently. In the absence of a choice of law, Art. 8 Rome III Regulation declares applicable the law of the common habitual residence or in certain circumstances that of the last common residence of the spouses. This is owing to the integration effect intended by the Regulation but is also due to the advantages of the lex fori approach, which approximates English law. However, it is doubtful whether the lex fori always meets the interests of the parties as the principle of habitual residence (resulting in a simultaneous departure from the quite strict citizenship principle) creates some uncertainty. These ambiguities can be overcome by the parties’ primary right to choose the law under Art. 5 Rome III Regulation. In that way, the continuity needs of the parties can be accommodated.The principle of free choice of law contained in the Regulation is an important component of the international private law of the European Union even though Rome III applies only to participating Member States. In addition, surprisingly, many questions remain open. Some are answered as follows. The Regulation is relevant not only for judicial or administrative decisions, but also for private divorces. That the Regulation applies, in principle, to same-sex marriages also seems compelling, though the assessment of the question is left to national law (see Art. 13 Rome III Regulation). It is disputed whether under Art. 5(1)(d) Rome III Regulation the law of the forum can also be chosen abstractly. This is affirmed here so long as the spouses have informed themselves to a sufficient and specific degree and have narrowed down the electable states – and the state in question belongs to that group. The choice of law by people with multiple citizenship is not limited to the effective citizenship even if that is prescribed by national law. From the requirement of the Regulation that a choice of law shall not prejudice the rights and equality of the spouses, it is derived that national courts are under an obligation to review the content in the context of Art. 6 Rome III Regulation. The article also emphasizes the importance of Art. 10 Rome III Regulation, which is ideal for resolving gender discrimination issues such as those arising under Islamic law.Acknowledgement: This article is published in this Research Paper Series with the permission of the rights owner, Mohr Siebeck. All full-text Rabel Journal articles are available via pay-per-view or subscription at IngentaConnect, a provider of digital journals on the Internet.

The Right to Refer to the European Court of Justice—Should it be Limited to the Courts of Last Instance?

This paper speaks against a restriction of the right to reference the European Court of Justice. Lower instance references are essential for the development of Union law. Many important legal policy decisions have been derived from references from lower instance courts. References by lower courts can also counterbalance possible scepticism towards EU law at higher Member States’ courts. The current system can intervene at an early stage for false interpretations. It is argued that this is also in the interests of the parties.

Arglist im Schuldvertragsrecht – Zum Schnittfeld von vorsätzlicher und fahrlässiger Fehlinformation

///. Ausdruckliche Sanktionierung der Arglist im Einzelnen 1. Anfechtbarkeit der Willenserklarung a) Willensherrschaft als Ausgangspunkt b) Fristen 2. Haftungsverlangerung a) Arglist im System der allgemeinen und besonderen Verjahrungsregeln b) Wertungskonsistenz der Verjahrungsreform 3. Nichteingreifen von Ausschlussgrunden a) Unkenntnis des Glaubigers b) Ausnahme vom handelskaufrechtlichen Erfordernis der Mangelruge c) Haftungsausschluss und -begrenzung 4. Haftungsbegrundung 5. Zwischenergebnis: Normativer Stellenwert der Arglist