Jane M. O. Sharp

What is to be Done

It is now time to turn from theory to a brief consideration of practice—to ask the question, if something like the analysis given in the preceding chapters is correct, then what, if anything, does it demand that we do? At the end of chapter one, it was pointed out that, considered analytically, Holt’s works consist of three main components. First, they contain a positive or constructive account of what he considers the ‘best learning’, the sorts of conditions that promote such learning, and the sorts of conditions that are hostile to it. Secondly, they contain a critique of education, which is justified by appeal to the foregoing account of ‘best learning’. And thirdly, they contain a range of practical strategies, aimed at mitigating the problems of education (especially compulsory schooling) and maximising the opportunity of acquiring the ‘best learning’. This third component was of great significance to Holt. Although there is a sense in which Holt’s work is ‘utopian’, in that it criticises some foundational cultural assumptions and envisages a possible society that exists nowhere, he is, at the same time, a deeply practical, realistic thinker. He does not offer airy plans for grand social reconstruction, addressed to nobody in particular; rather, he tries to answer the question of what can be done by us, here and now. In the words of one of his book titles, he wants to answer the question: What do I do Monday?

Rethinking western policy in the Balkans

If the western democracies are to forge a more effective policy in the Balkans, they must first learn from the mistakes they committed in the 1990s. These include: the failure to heed early warning and invest in conflict prevention strategies; the failure to punish and isolate Slobodan Milosevic, the main perpetrator of ethnic cleansing throughout former Yugoslavia; the failure to back western diplomacy with credible military force; and the failure to build consensus within the western security community about long‐term goals in the region. Four sets of recommendations are offered for generating a sustainable peace in the Balkans. The first is to clarify the principles on which policy will be based, emphasising that respect for human rights and the rule of law must take priority over sovereignty and territorial integrity of rogue states which threaten international peace and security. The second is to isolate and punish aggressive nationalists and nurture alternative leaders who are non‐nationalistic demo...

Soviet Approaches to Arms Control

Sceptics of East-West detente in general, and of negotiated arms control in particular, often suggest that the Soviet leadership engages in arms control diplomacy merely to lull the West into a false sense of security. They claim that nothing has changed since V. I. Lenin dismissed Western pacifists as ‘useful idiots’ and embraced a policy of multilateral disarmament primarily to disarm the capitalist bourgeoisie.1

CFE and the Baltic Rim

This chapter explores the different interests of the Baltic Rim states in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Four states — Denmark, Germany, Poland and Russia — are parties to CFE, as are all members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Finland and Sweden, both neutral and non-aligned throughout the Cold War, are not parties to CFE. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as member states of the former Soviet Union, were part of the CFE regime from Treaty signature in November 1990 until they achieved independence from Moscow in late 1991. At that time the United States insisted that the three Baltic states opt out of the Treaty. In retrospect the 1991 Baltic opt-out looks misguided, although at the time only Poland and Hungary raised any objections.

Europe's Nuclear Dominos

As long as the United States continues to play a leading role in NATO, the incentive for European powers to acquire independent nuclear weapons is virtually zero. Most European power, however, have relatively sophisticated nuclear establishments and could easily manufacture nuclear explosives if they judged that their security required an independent capability. They might judge so if the United States pulls out of Europe and out of NATO. It is the opinion of the author that if the United States withdraws, and if France and Britain insist on maintaining their current status as independent nuclear weapons powers, they will encourage proliferation by example. The likelihood of different countries deciding to manufacture nuclear weapons under these cicumstances is evaluated. The future of NATO is assessed. The conclusions of and future structure of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) is discussed. The impact of United Nations involvement in preventing proliferation is evaluated. Recommendations are proposed for the utilization of existing organizations to deter proliferation in Europe.

Problems and Prospects for Negotiations on Short-Range Nuclear Forces

Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) have been in the process of modernizing their nuclear forces in Europe since the 1950s when American and Soviet forces were first deployed there. Parallel with these changes in the weapons stockpiles have been various proposals for arms control and for nuclear weapon-free zones; usually made by the WTO to pre-empt the latest NATO deployments. The two alliances did not field symmetrical nuclear arsenals since they were dealing with different security needs. This makes arms control very difficult unless, as was the case with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, an entire category of weapons can be eliminated and equal ceilings set at zero. This would be the preferred option of WTO, but NATO leaders consider retention of some nuclear weapons in Europe necessary to compensate for the geographical advantages of WTO. NATO used to claim that its nuclear weapons were to compensate for overwhelming superiority in WTO conventional forces, but since an agreement arising from the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) could set equal ceilings on key elements of both side’s forces, the rationale for nuclear weapons has changed. This point is repeated several times in the Comprehensive Concept Document published at the NATO summit held on 29–30 May 1989.

Reshaping NATO nuclear policy

Dependence on U.S. nuclear protection has trapped NATO in a cycle of conflicting anxieties. The solution lies in strengthening the Alliance politically, while reducing reliance on the nuclear component of deterrence.

Arms control priorities

Will the Reagan administration support a new arms control dialogue? The author argues that it is possible.