Jannis Bischof

The Effects of IFRS 7 Adoption on Bank Disclosure in Europe

With the endorsement of IFRS 7, which became effective in 2007, the European regulation of bank disclosures has substantially changed. Using a sample of 171 banks from 28 European countries, I analyze the effect of the standards first-time adoption on disclosure quality. I find that disclosure quality has generally increased both in financial statements and in risk reports but that the focus of disclosures has shifted from market risk exposures to credit risk exposures. The effect of the first-time adoption strongly varies across countries. These variations can be explained by differences in the enforcement and interpretation of IFRS 7 by national banking supervision. Using supervisory practices in Denmark, Italy and the UK as representative examples, I distinguish between an interventionist and a non-interventionist approach. The findings suggest that it is not only the content of IFRS 7 but also the enforcement of the standard that accounts for the increase in disclosure quality. With respect to the enforcement of bank disclosures, the results therefore support recent proposals by the De Laroisière High Level Expert Group to harmonize financial supervision within the EU.

Mandatory Disclosure, Voluntary Disclosure, and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from the EU Bank Stress Tests

We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks’ sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one-time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following periods and, through the shift in the voluntary disclosure equilibrium, increases the liquidity of banks’ shares. First, we find that the timing and content of different mandatory disclosure events helps explain the levels of stress-test banks’ voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk. Second, although the bid-ask spreads of stress test participants generally increased after the mandatory stress test in 2011, our results suggest that the decrease in market liquidity is entirely attributable to those stress-test participants that did not commit to voluntarily maintaining the disclosures of sovereign risk exposure.

Interpreting the European Union’s IFRS Endorsement Criteria: The Case of IFRS 9

Abstract EU Regulation requires that any international accounting standards (International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS) and interpretations (IFRIC) pronounced by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) meet three sets of criteria before they become binding for EU-based companies: a ‘true and fair view’ criterion, a list of qualitative criteria, and a ‘European public good’ criterion. During the endorsement process, EU institutions evaluate each standard or interpretation’s compliance with these three criteria. Nevertheless, despite plenty of past endorsement decisions, there is still disagreement about a unanimous interpretation of the criteria in the literature. In this study, we interpret all three criteria against the background of European accounting law and academic accounting research. Then, the paper illustrates for the case of the new IFRS 9 standard on accounting for financial instruments how these criteria can be applied in the endorsement practice. We conclude that the standard cannot reasonably be rejected on grounds of the IAS Regulation. We also explain that the vagueness of the endorsement criteria and the inherent discretion in the eventual endorsement decision help maintain the EU’s political influence on the IASB’s standard-setting ex ante.

A Tale of Two Regulators: Risk Disclosures, Liquidity, and Enforcement in the Banking Sector

This paper examines how a regulatory design with multiple supervisory agencies translates into firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. We exploit the fact that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking regulation (Pillar 3 of the Basel II accord), but that different regulators start enforcing the rules at different points in time. We find that banks substantially increase their formal risk disclosures upon the adoption of Pillar 3 even if they already had to comply with the same requirements under IFRS 7. Regulators facing stronger institutional competition and with more supervisory powers and resources are stricter in imposing the written rules while, in turn, firms fearing regulatory scrutiny or market pressures are more forthcoming in following the rules. However, formal compliance with the disclosure requirements does not necessarily convert into more transparent reporting. Liquidity and returns-based tests show that the materiality of the enhanced risk disclosures for investors was concentrated around Pillar 3 adoption and associated with the content of certain disclosure items.

Why Did Politicians Intervene in the Fair Value Debate? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Political economy explains the behavior of politicians by regulatory capture and by ideology. Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Prior evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests explains these interventions. Politicians tend to view accounting regulation as a technical issue where ideological views play a minor role. However, many accounting rules directly lead to economic or social consequences, such as income distribution or private-sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician’s ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and also explains a politician’s stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent political debates about fair value accounting during the financial crisis and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bail-outs and top-management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, political connections to special interests remain the most dominant force.