Jennifer A. Whitson
University of Texas at Austin
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Publication
Featured researches published by Jennifer A. Whitson.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | 2008
Adam D. Galinsky; Joe C. Magee; Deborah H. Gruenfeld; Jennifer A. Whitson; Katie A. Liljenquist
Although power is often conceptualized as the capacity to influence others, the current research explores whether power psychologically protects people from influence. In contrast to classic social psychological research demonstrating the strength of the situation in directing attitudes, expressions, and intentions, 5 experiments (using experiential primes, semantic primes, and role manipulations of power) demonstrate that the powerful (a) generate creative ideas that are less influenced by salient examples, (b) express attitudes that conform less to the expressed opinions of others, (c) are more influenced by their own social value orientation relative to the reputation of a negotiating opponent, and (d) perceive greater choice in making counterattitudinal statements. This last experiment illustrates that power is not always psychologically liberating; it can create internal conflict, arousing dissonance, and thereby lead to attitude change. Across the experiments, high-power participants were immune to the typical press of situations, with intrapsychic processes having greater sway than situational or interpersonal ones on their creative and attitudinal expressions.
Science | 2008
Jennifer A. Whitson; Adam D. Galinsky
We present six experiments that tested whether lacking control increases illusory pattern perception, which we define as the identification of a coherent and meaningful interrelationship among a set of random or unrelated stimuli. Participants who lacked control were more likely to perceive a variety of illusory patterns, including seeing images in noise, forming illusory correlations in stock market information, perceiving conspiracies, and developing superstitions. Additionally, we demonstrated that increased pattern perception has a motivational basis by measuring the need for structure directly and showing that the causal link between lack of control and illusory pattern perception is reduced by affirming the self. Although these many disparate forms of pattern perception are typically discussed as separate phenomena, the current results suggest that there is a common motive underlying them.
Current Directions in Psychological Science | 2009
Aaron C. Kay; Jennifer A. Whitson; Danielle Gaucher; Adam D. Galinsky
We propose that people protect the belief in a controlled, nonrandom world by imbuing their social, physical, and metaphysical environments with order and structure when their sense of personal control is threatened. We demonstrate that when personal control is threatened, people can preserve a sense of order by (a) perceiving patterns in noise or adhering to superstitions and conspiracies, (b) defending the legitimacy of the sociopolitical institutions that offer control, or (c) believing in an interventionist God. We also present evidence that these processes of compensatory control help people cope with the anxiety and discomfort that lacking personal control fuels, that it is lack of personal control specifically and not general threat or negativity that drives these processes, and that these various forms of compensatory control are ultimately substitutable for one another. Our model of compensatory control offers insight into a wide variety of phenomena, from prejudice to the idiosyncratic rituals of professional athletes to societal rituals around weddings, graduations, and funerals.
Psychological Science | 2013
Adam D. Galinsky; Cynthia S. Wang; Jennifer A. Whitson; Eric M. Anicich; Kurt Hugenberg; Galen V. Bodenhausen
We present a theoretical model of reappropriation—taking possession of a slur previously used exclusively by dominant groups to reinforce another group’s lesser status. Ten experiments tested this model and established a reciprocal relationship between power and self-labeling with a derogatory group term. We first investigated precursors to self-labeling: Group, but not individual, power increased participants’ willingness to label themselves with a derogatory term for their group. We then examined the consequences of such self-labeling for both the self and observers. Self-labelers felt more powerful after self-labeling, and observers perceived them and their group as more powerful. Finally, these labels were evaluated less negatively after self-labeling, and this attenuation of stigma was mediated by perceived power. These effects occurred only for derogatory terms (e.g., queer, bitch), and not for descriptive (e.g., woman) or majority-group (e.g., straight) labels. These results suggest that self-labeling with a derogatory label can weaken the label’s stigmatizing force.
Psychological Bulletin | 2015
Mark J. Landau; Aaron C. Kay; Jennifer A. Whitson
People are motivated to perceive themselves as having control over their lives. Consequently, they respond to events and cognitions that reduce control with compensatory strategies for restoring perceived control to baseline levels. Prior theory and research have documented 3 such strategies: bolstering personal agency, affiliating with external systems perceived to be acting on the selfs behalf, and affirming clear contingencies between actions and outcomes within the context of reduced control (here termed specific structure). We propose a 4th strategy: affirming nonspecific structure, or seeking out and preferring simple, clear, and consistent interpretations of the social and physical environments. Formulating this claim suggests that people will respond to reduced control by affirming structured interpretations that are unrelated to the control-reducing condition, and even those that entail otherwise adverse outcomes (e.g., pessimistic health prospects). Section 1 lays the conceptual foundation for our review, situating the proposed phenomenon in the literatures on control motivation and threat-compensation mechanisms. Section 2 reviews studies that have demonstrated that trait and state variations in perceived control predict a wide range of epistemic structuring tendencies, including pattern recognition and causal reasoning. We posit that these tendencies reflect a common desire for a structured understanding of ones environment. Accordingly, a new meta-analysis spanning the reviewed studies (k = 55) revealed that control reduction predicts nonspecific structure affirmation with a moderate effect size (r = .25). Section 3 reviews research on individual differences and situational moderators of this effect. The discussion addresses the interplay of compensatory control strategies and practical implications.
Social Psychological and Personality Science | 2012
Cynthia S. Wang; Jennifer A. Whitson; Tanya Menon
Lacking control causes illusory pattern perception, but does culture influence the patterns people perceive? Different cultural contexts invite distinct types of control, with people from Western cultures emphasizing primary control methods (i.e., personal agency) and people from East Asian cultures emphasizing secondary control methods (i.e., adjustment to surroundings). Four experiments suggest that cultural differences in primary versus secondary control orientation shape the patterns people perceive within horoscopes. When lacking (vs. possessing) control, Westerners are relatively more likely to rely on horoscopes that help them understand themselves, whereas East Asians are relatively more likely to rely on horoscopes that help them understand others. The authors isolate underlying mechanisms, demonstrating that, following loss of control, people high on primary control rely on self-focused horoscopes and people high on secondary control rely on horoscopes about friends. Thus, cultural differences in primary versus secondary control create unique signatures in pattern perception.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations | 2010
Denise Lewin Loyd; Katherine W. Phillips; Jennifer A. Whitson; Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt
We examine how the status and speech style of experts impacts how they are perceived and their level of influence. In our experiment we manipulate whether high-status and low-status experts share their expert knowledge using a more or less powerful style of speech, and find that experts are more liked, more influential, and engender more confidence when they express themselves in a manner congruent with their status (i.e., high status with powerful speech and low status with powerless speech). We further show that liking acts as a mediator between congruence and influence. This study suggests that experts with low-status characteristics who want to be influential should ensure that their expertise, a marker of high status, is known to the listener before engaging in powerful styles of speech.
Psychological Inquiry | 2012
Adam D. Galinsky; Jennifer A. Whitson; Li Huang; Derek D. Rucker
Travis Proulx and Michael Inzlicht offer an intriguing and ambitious model that seeks to parsimoniously capture the full range of meaning threats and the many psychological mechanisms that people use to cope with those threats. In this commentary, we articulate both our agreements and our disagreements with their meaning maintenance model (MMM). In general, we find the model both compelling and intriguing, and we find promise in several of its core assertions. However, we believe the current model, like any incipient model, has yet to incorporate some critical core constructs. In addition to sharing our views in this commentary, we raise questions that future theoretical and empirical work could pursue to offer greater clarification and lead to a more complete model.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | 2018
Jennifer A. Whitson; Joongseo Kim; Cynthia S. Wang; Tanya Menon; Brian D. Webster
We examine when and why people subscribe to conspiratorial beliefs, suggesting that promotion focus reduces conspiratorial perceptions by activating a sense of personal control. Study 1 established that individuals primed with promotion focus are less likely to perceive conspiracies than those in a baseline condition. However, individuals primed with prevention focus and those in a baseline condition did not differ in their levels of conspiratorial beliefs. Study 2 demonstrated that soldiers higher in promotion focus were less likely to endorse conspiracy theories because of their heightened sense of control; this relationship did not emerge for soldiers higher in prevention focus. Study 3 found that conspiratorial beliefs increased when individuals primed with promotion focus recalled personal control loss, whereas those primed with prevention focus were unaffected by personal control loss. Using measures and manipulations of regulatory focus and personal control, we establish when and why promotion focus reduces conspiracy theories.
Current Directions in Psychological Science | 2017
Cynthia S. Wang; Jennifer A. Whitson; Eric M. Anicich; Laura J. Kray; Adam D. Galinsky
Stigma devalues individuals and groups, producing social and economic disadvantages through two distinct but reinforcing processes: direct discrimination (e.g., a White person not hiring a Black person based on race) and stigma internalization (e.g., women believing men are more qualified for leadership positions). We review strategies that individuals can use to not only cope with but also challenge their stigma. We discuss how attempts to escape stigma can be effective at the individual level but may leave the stigma itself unchanged or even reinforced. We then identify two ways individuals can reappropriate and take ownership of their stigma to weaken it: reframing and self-labeling. Reframing highlights stereotypic characteristics as assets rather than liabilities—for example, framing stereotypically feminine traits (e.g., social intelligence) as essential for effective negotiations or leadership. Self-labeling involves referring to oneself with a group slur. We discuss ways to utilize these reappropriation strategies as well as how to handle potential pitfalls.