John M. Deutch

Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. But todays terrorists, be they international cults like Aum Shinrikyo or individual nihilists like the Unabomber, act on a greater variety of motives than ever before. More ominously, terrorists may gain access to weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas weapons, and even computer viruses. Also new is the worlds dependence on a nearly invisible and fragile network for distributing energy and information. Long part of the Hollywood and Tom Clancy repertory of nightmarish scenarios, catastrophic terrorism has moved from far-fetched horror to a contingency that could happen next month. Although the United States still takes conventional terrorism seriously, as demon strated by the response to the attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, it is not yet prepared for the new threat of catastrophic terrorism.

A Nuclear Posture for Today

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a dramatic geopolitical shift that should have led to major changes in the nuclear posture of the United States. The policy reviews undertaken by the Clinton administration in 1994 and the Bush administration in 2002, however, led to only minor alterations. As a result, the United States lacks a convincing rationale for its current nuclear force structure and for the policies that guide the management of its nuclear weapons enterprise. The end of the Cold War did not mean that the United States could eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. Their existence is a reality, and the knowledge required to make them is widespread. But over the last decade, the nature of the nuclear threat has fundamentally changed, from large-scale attack to the use of one or a few devices by a rogue nation or subnational group against the United States or one of its allies. Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons—by slowing the spread of nuclear capabilities among states, assuring that nuclear devices do not get into the hands of terrorist groups, and protecting existing stockpiles—has thus become as high a priority as deterring major nuclear attacks. Unfortunately, the current U.S. nuclear posture does not reflect this shift. Washington still maintains a large nuclear arsenal designed for the Cold War, and it fails to take into account the current impact

Making the world safe for nuclear energy

Just as nuclear energy seems poised for a global comeback, nuclear weapon threats grow in Iran and North Korea. The security risk from expanding nuclear energy programmes could potentially be contained by the commercial provision of nuclear-fuel services. Countries that already possess uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities could guarantee client countries with cradle-to-grave nuclear fuel services. The guarantee, backed by governmental or international entities, could persuade governments to abstain from building their own fuel-cycle facilities. Decisions to reject such an arrangement, which provides direct economic benefit and relieves waste management challenges, would spotlight a governments intentions and invite a coordinated international response. Iran and Brazil present crucial early tests.

Assessment of research needs for oil recovery from heavy-oil sources and tar sands☆

We have reviewed and evaluated the U.S. programs on oil recovery from heavy oil sources and tar sands. These studies were performed in order to provide an independent assessment of research areas that affect the prospects for oil recovery from these sources. This paper summarizes our findings and research recommendations.

The Decision to Modernize U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The issues surrounding the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) modernization decision are addressed. Consideration is given to both Rail Garrison MX and the mobile Midgetman system. The central thesis of this article is that the flexibility and survivability ofthe mobile Midgetman makes this system the preferred choice for the future. A discussion of likely alternative courses of action is included-that is, doing nothing, deploying less (the current Bush Administration compromise proposal), placing Midgetman in silos, and deploying MX in multiple silos.