Philip Zelikow

Misreading the public : the myth of a new isolationism

Do American policymakers really know what the American public wants in U.S. foreign policy? Through extensive interviews with members of the policy community, the authors reveal a pervasive belief --especially in Congress --that, in the wake of the cold war, the public is showing a new isolationism: opposition to foreign aid, hostility to the United Nations, and aversion to contributing U.S. troops to peacekeeping operations. This view of the public has in turn had a significant impact on U.S. foreign policy. However, through a comprehensive review of polling data, as well as focus groups, the authors show that all these beliefs about the public are myths. The public does complain that the United States is playing the role of dominant world leader more than it should, but this does not lead to a desire to withdraw. Instead people prefer to share responsibility with other nations, particularly through the UN. The authors offer explanations of how such a misperception can occur and suggest ways to improve communication between the public and policymakers, including better presentation of polling data and more attention by practitioners to a wider public.

Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. But todays terrorists, be they international cults like Aum Shinrikyo or individual nihilists like the Unabomber, act on a greater variety of motives than ever before. More ominously, terrorists may gain access to weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas weapons, and even computer viruses. Also new is the worlds dependence on a nearly invisible and fragile network for distributing energy and information. Long part of the Hollywood and Tom Clancy repertory of nightmarish scenarios, catastrophic terrorism has moved from far-fetched horror to a contingency that could happen next month. Although the United States still takes conventional terrorism seriously, as demon strated by the response to the attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, it is not yet prepared for the new threat of catastrophic terrorism.

Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT

In this era of globalization, it is easy to forget that todays free market values were not always predominant. But as this history of the birth of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) shows, the principles and practices underlying our current international economy once represented contested ground between U.S. policymakers, Congress, and Americas closest allies. Drawing on historical and theoretical work in a variety of fields and tapping archives in the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, Thomas Zeiler weaves a complex story of diplomacy, negotiation, and politics that uncovers the roots of our current economic ideology.

The pivotal states : a new framework for U.S. policy in the developing world

Since 1945, American foreign policy has enjoyed a record of overall success when dealing with friends of foes among the great powers. But the American record is mixed in handling the rest - the many nations that are not allies, enemies or rogue states. For most of this period the Cold War set the framework for US relations with these countries. But now there is no framework, and except for occasional humanitarian interventions and trade initiatives, no real policy. The foreign policy framework proposed here assumes that of the worlds 140 developing states, there is a group of nine pivotal states whose futures are poised at critical turning points, and whose fate will strongly affect regional and even global security. These nine states are the ones upon which the United States should focus its scarce foreign policy resources. In these essays, the authors explore Americas strategy towards the pivotal states and the implications for its foreign policy.

Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis

A penetrating study of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis examines the workings of American decision-making and foreign policy.

The Cold War's Endgame and German Unification: (A Review Essay)@@@A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity.@@@Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft.

Preface Key Players Introduction: Solving the German Problem When Did the Cold War End? Revisiting the German Question The Fall of Ostpolitik and the Berlin Wall The Goal Becomes Unification The Process Becomes the Two Plus Four The Design for a New Germany Friendly Persuasion The Final Offer Germany Regains Its Sovereignty Epilogue: Germany Unified and Europe Transformed Notes Index

Correspondence: Sins of Commission? Falkenrath and His Critics

In response to Richard Falkenrath’s critique of The 9/11 Commission Report, we would like to make three points.1 First, his criticisms, which have mostly to do with whether the commission’s recommendations oow from the narrative of 9/11, are well taken. While some of the recommendations do stand essentially on their own, Falkenrath is reacting fairly to an overly abbreviated summary of them. The original outline of the report envisioned ave chapters of systemic diagnosis, not just two. The commission concluded that the attendant detail would interest only Washington insiders.2 The commission also tried to avoid a “Hickam Field fallacy.” In response to Pearl Harbor, one could offer a policy recommendation not to line up planes on the runway at Hickam Field anymore. If all policy recommendations simply react to past foibles, they will defeat, in an imaginative sense, the previous attack. They may not really defeat the next one. Thus our investigation, as it reconstructed a historical narrative (about which, Falkenrath’s comments are gratifyingly complimentary), also yielded an opportunity for broader diagnoses of a disordered system. Policy recommendations oow from looking at the present and future, not just at the unreplicable past. Second, Falkenrath’s critique makes too little allowance for the circumstances in which the report was composed. Keeping peace within a large and diverse staff and avoiding the appearance of partisan tilt sometimes required muting interpretation. While no factual conclusion was ever watered down, the report often does not tell readers how to weigh those facts, and some readers—Falkenrath among them—feel frustrated that the commission did not instruct the American people to agree with their preconceptions. The fact that ave Republicans and ave Democrats endorsed such a long and complex report without dissent about a single line is important. We live in a period of venomous partisanship, matched probably only by the early national period

Sins of Commission? Falkenrath and His Critics

In response to Richard Falkenrath’s critique of The 9/11 Commission Report, we would like to make three points.1 First, his criticisms, which have mostly to do with whether the commission’s recommendations oow from the narrative of 9/11, are well taken. While some of the recommendations do stand essentially on their own, Falkenrath is reacting fairly to an overly abbreviated summary of them. The original outline of the report envisioned ave chapters of systemic diagnosis, not just two. The commission concluded that the attendant detail would interest only Washington insiders.2 The commission also tried to avoid a “Hickam Field fallacy.” In response to Pearl Harbor, one could offer a policy recommendation not to line up planes on the runway at Hickam Field anymore. If all policy recommendations simply react to past foibles, they will defeat, in an imaginative sense, the previous attack. They may not really defeat the next one. Thus our investigation, as it reconstructed a historical narrative (about which, Falkenrath’s comments are gratifyingly complimentary), also yielded an opportunity for broader diagnoses of a disordered system. Policy recommendations oow from looking at the present and future, not just at the unreplicable past. Second, Falkenrath’s critique makes too little allowance for the circumstances in which the report was composed. Keeping peace within a large and diverse staff and avoiding the appearance of partisan tilt sometimes required muting interpretation. While no factual conclusion was ever watered down, the report often does not tell readers how to weigh those facts, and some readers—Falkenrath among them—feel frustrated that the commission did not instruct the American people to agree with their preconceptions. The fact that ave Republicans and ave Democrats endorsed such a long and complex report without dissent about a single line is important. We live in a period of venomous partisanship, matched probably only by the early national period Correspondence: Sins of Commission?

A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

PrefaceAbbreviationsPt. IThe Division of EuropeCh. 1A Spheres of Influence Peace?3Ch. 2Toward the Rubicon34Ch. 3The Test of Strength66Pt. IIThe Nato SystemCh. 4The Making of the NATO System95Ch. 5Eisenhower and Nuclear Sharing146Ch. 6An Alliance in Disarray201Pt. IIIThe Cold War PeaceCh. 7The Politics of the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960251Ch. 8Kennedy, NATO, and Berlin283Ch. 9A Settlement Takes Shape352Sources and Bibliography403Index419

America and the Muslim Middle East: Memos to the President

This book begins with a general overview of what a president needs to understand about the Muslim world, then moves to specific exemplars, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. It includes commissioned papers and summary points from a meeting of the Aspen Strategy Group, at which group members and invited guests came together to discuss the background and context, as well as the operational policy challenges of the U.S. government. This is the first of the Aspen Policy Books , a series of books devoted to topics of public policy prepared by the Aspen Strategy Group, the foreign and defense policy program of the Aspen Institute.