Jörg Meibauer

Truth Value Talk Without Quotation

A side issue in the general philosophy of language and linguistics, but a central issue in formal semantics and meta-logic has been whether in case a language is able to express semantic properties (like truth) at all, these should be expressed by predicates or by operators. If a semantic property is expressed by a predicate the expression (typically an eternal sentence) having this property has to be quoted. If a semantic property is expressed by an operator which modifies a sentence to yield another sentence no quotation is needed. Unfortunately there are problems in the way of naively extending a language with semantic expressions. According to Tarskis Theorem a language containing the expressive resources of arithmetic cannot – on pains of inconsistency – also contain its own truth predicate. According to theorems due to Montague and Thomason even languages below the expressive power of arithmetic which use truth operators will be inconsistent, once the truth operator obeys some simple axioms characteristic of truth (value) talk. These theorems seem to exclude a language able to deal with its own semantics, a truly semantic universal language. Natural languages, however, seem to be able to deal with their own semantics. And they seem to yield some antinomies like the Liar by way of their expressive power. The scenery changes once paraconsistent logics are used as tools in modelling semantics. In as much as antinomies/contradictions are allowed within paraconsistent semantics and logics one may reconsider the use of truth predicates and truth operators in ones formal language and modelling. In relation to the other papers in this volume it might be helpful to be precise on the point to be established. The argument does not try to show that all quotation marks can be dropped in a language: talking about the syntactic properties of a word or sentence (like: morpheme is disyllabic) requires quotation devices (i.e. quotation marks or Gödel numbers). The argument does not even show that all semantic quotation marks can be dropped. The focus is on quotation in relation to assignments of true , false and other semantic values of sentences/statements. Given a Davidsonian approach to meaning and reference an account of truth provides a theory of the core semantic concepts, so having a quotation free theory of truths goes a long way towards a quotation free semantics. Nevertheless there may still be a need …

Methoden des empirischen Arbeitens in der Linguistik

Nicht alle Fragen, die man sich als Linguistin stellt, sind nur mit empirischer Forschung zu beantworten. Angenommen, Sie wurden wissen wollen, ob im Deutschen das pradikative Adjektiv — wie etwa in den romanischen Sprachen, vgl. die Beispiele in (1) — flektiert wird, so konnen Sie sich sicher auf Ihr eigenes Sprachvermogen als kompetenter Sprecher des Deutschen verlassen. Sie betrachten also ein paar Satze mit pradikativen Adjektiven wie in (2). n n(1) n nCe lecteur est intelligent/Cette lectrice est intelligente/Nos lecteurs sont intelligents. n n n n n(2) n nDieser Leser ist klug/Diese Leserin ist klug (*kluge)/Unsere Leser sind klug (*kluge). n n n n n n nDabei konnen Sie feststellen, dass hier das Adjektiv nicht flektiert wird. Vorsichtshalber uberprufen Sie noch, ob klug denn uberhaupt flektierbar ist (manche Adjektive wie lila z. B. werden ja von vielen Sprechern des Deutschen nicht flektiert), aber da es fur Sie eindeutig die kluge Leserin und die klugen Leser heist und es keinerlei Anlass fur die Annahme gibt, dass sich das bei irgendeinem kompetenten Sprecher des Deutschen anders verhalt, ist die Frage beantwortet, ohne dass man eine reprasentative Auswahl von Sprechern des Deutschen hatte befragen oder endlose Textkorpora durchsuchen mussen.