Kai Oppermann

National Role Conceptions, Domestic Constraints and the New ‘Normalcy’ in German Foreign Policy: the Eurozone Crisis, Libya and Beyond

German foreign policy can fruitfully be analysed through the lens of a modified two-level framework which identifies three interdependent drivers behind government decision making: the expectations of Germanys international partners, domestic constraints and the national role conceptions of decision-makers. In recent years, the configuration of these three drivers has witnessed a two-fold change. First, there has been a nascent shift towards the role conception of Germany as a ‘normal ally’. Second, the domestic context of German foreign policy has become more politicised and contentious. In consequence, Germanys current foreign policy tends to attach relatively less weight to the expectations of its allies, to be more driven by domestic politics – and to be altogether less predictable. The widely criticised approaches of the Merkel government to the Eurozone crisis and to the NATO mission in Libya, in turn, accord to this pattern and stand for the new ‘normalcy’ in German foreign policy.

Telling stories of failure: narrative constructions of foreign policy fiascos

ABSTRACT The contribution introduces narrative analysis as a discourse analytical method for investigating the social construction of foreign policy fiascos. Based on insights from literary studies and narratology it shows that stories of failure include a number of key elements, including a particular setting which defines appropriate behaviour; the negative characterization of agents; as well as an emplotment of the ‘fiasco’ through the attribution of cause and responsibility. The contribution illustrates this method through a narrative analysis of German media reporting on Germanys abstention in the United Nations Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 in March 2011 regarding the military intervention in Libya.

The politics of discretionary government commitments to European integration referendums

The article develops a two-dimensional typology of political reasons for governments to pledge referendums on European integration when they are not obliged to do so: the first dimension is about the political level at which the strategic use of referendum pledges is targeted and it distinguishes between domestic and European reasons; the second dimension attends to the strategic mode of governments when pledging EU referendums which can either be about avoiding political losses (the defensive mode) or about realizing political gains (the offensive mode). In combination, the typology yields four ideal types of reasons for governments to commit to EU referendums: the depoliticizing; plebiscitary; red-line; and internationalist EU referendum pledges. In the empirical analysis, the article applies this typology to classify 28 cases of discretionary government commitments to EU referendums and it presents the findings of an expert survey that has been conducted for this purpose.

Patterns of Junior Partner Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments

Research Highlights and Abstract The main contribution of this article is that it: Introduces a distinction between different pathways for junior partner influence on the foreign policy of coalition governments; Provides nuanced insights into the effects of coalition government on foreign policy as well as on the causal mechanisms behind these effects; Contributes to the ‘unpacking’ of coalitions and the analysis of coalition governance more generally; Features a comparative analysis of the current coalition governments in the United Kingdom and Germany. This article contributes to research on the foreign policy influence of junior partners in coalition governments. In particular, it takes up the call to pay greater attention to different patterns and pathways of such influence. To this purpose, this article distinguishes two types of coalition set-ups for foreign policy making. In the first type, junior partners hold one or more departments in the foreign policy executive, and their foreign policy influence rests on the powers that controlling ministries in the field brings. In the second type, junior partners do not hold any department in foreign affairs, and their influence comes from their ability to constrain the discretion of the senior partner in foreign policy. The article exemplifies its theoretical contentions in comparative case studies on the current coalition governments in Germany and the UK, which represent the first and second type respectively.

Die öffentliche Meinung als Katalysator für transatlantische Kooperation und Konflikte

„Kaum ein anderer Begriff in den Sozialwissenschaften last sich so wenig eindeutig oder auch nur in einem Kernbereich ubereinstimmend definieren wie jener der offentlichen Meinung.“1 Die unuberschaubare Anzahl von Definitionen und Verwendungen des Begriffs kann an dieser Stelle nicht diskutiert werden.2 Wir verstehen unter offentlicher Meinung (public opinion) die Aggregation von individuellen Einstellungen und Meinungen zu Gegenstanden, die von offentlichem Interesse sind und politischen Entscheidungen unterliegen konnen Diese Meinungen und Einstellungen konnen mittels reprasentativer Umfragen empirisch erhoben und gemessen werden. Die Begriffe Meinung und Einstellung werden haufig synonym verwendet, obwohl sie einen unterschiedlichen Gehalt haben. Hinzu tritt oft noch die bedeutungsgleiche Verwendung der Begriffe Einstellungen und Werte, die ebenso vielfaltig definiert werden konnen wie jener der offentlichen Meinung.3

Blair and the European Union

The perception of British ‘awkwardness’ in European affairs can be explained in part by the antipathy of successive governments to supranational forms of integration, by a certain ‘style’ of negotiation which is a product of the European Union (EU) policy-making process within government, and by the failure to construct a supportive domestic consensus (Allen, 2005, p. 131–2). The aim of this chapter is to address each of these explanatory variables in turn, exploring the extent to which the Blair government has sought to challenge them and so define a new direction for British European policy. It does so by analysing and assessing Labour’s record in office under Blair across three core legacies, each of which corresponds to the three variables identified above: the policy legacy, structural legacy, and political legacy.

Studying fiascos: bringing public and foreign policy together

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The Politics of Avoiding Referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon

Abstract After the defeat of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in the French and Dutch referendums, governments across Europe had little appetite for popular votes on the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, nine of the ten countries which were committed to (or had held) referendums on the TCE got around such votes on Lisbon. The article investigates how it was possible for governments in these nine countries to avoid putting the treaty to the people despite the precedent set by the TCE. It will be argued that three factors were crucial in this regard: first, the European-level collusion between governments; second, domestic political changes during the ‘period of reflection’: and third, governing strategies of depoliticising the decisions against referendums. Thus, the politics of avoiding referendums could only succeed due to the interplay between the determined agency of governments at the European and domestic levels and auspicious domestic contexts of ratification.

Das gespaltene Königreich. Die politischen Hintergründe und Ursachen des „Brexit“-Referendums

The “in-or-out” referendum on Britain’s EU membership on 23 June 2016 has returned a narrow majority for “Brexit”. This result brings to the fore deep divisions within British society and has aggravated the current crisis of European integration. It has also plunged Britain into a period of political, economic and constitutional uncertainty. This article sheds light on the political context and the main drivers of the British vote to leave the EU. The discussion will begin with exploring the political rationale behind calling the referendum in the first place. The focus will then shift to the European negotiations about Britain’s demands for EU reform in the run-up to the vote. Finally, the article will analyse the main long- and short-term explanatory factors for the referendum outcome.

Argumentationsmuster zur krise in der eurozone. Eine analyse von debattenbeiträgen der regierung Merkel im Bundestag 2009-2012

The European sovereign debt crisis is widely perceived by the German public as a dangerous threat and has great potential for domestic political mobilisation. The German Federal Government, therefore, faces particular pressures to explain and justify its crisis policy in the public arena. An important instrument for this purpose is the speeches of government representatives in the German Bundestag, which can be understood as a strategic discourse in order to affect the framing of government policy in the broader public debate. Against this background, this article examines the parliamentary discourse about the Euro zone crisis of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government between 2009 and 2012. The analysis points to five basic lines of argument, which speak to the attempt of the Federal Government to maintain sufficient domestic leeway to pursue its preferred policy in the crisis.