Karen Evelyn Hauge

Representing Others in a Public Good Game

In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives. We present the results from a laboratory experiment that compares decisions made by individuals in inter-individual public good games with decisions made by representatives on behalf of their group in inter-group public good games. Our main finding is that contribution behavior differs between individuals and group representatives, but only for women. While men’s choices are equally self-interested as individuals and group representatives, women make less self-interested choices as group representatives.

Sustaining cooperation through self-sorting: The good, the bad, and the conditional

In four public-good game experiments, we study self-sorting as a means to facilitate cooperation in groups. When individuals can choose to join groups precommitted to charity, such groups sustain cooperation toward the group’s local public good. By eliciting subjects’ conditional contribution profiles, we find that subjects who prefer the charity groups have higher average conditional contribution levels but do not differ with respect to the slope of their profiles. The majority of subjects in both group types are conditional cooperators whose willingness to contribute is stimulated by generous group members but undermined by free-riders. Charity groups thus seem better able to sustain cooperation because they attract a greater number of more generous individuals, triggering generous responses by conditional cooperators.

Moral Opinions are Conditional on the Behavior of Others

In social dilemmas individual behavior creates external effects on others. In such situations, a persons opinions concerning right and wrong might influence his behavior. Understanding moral opinions therefore is important. This paper reports on an experiment which shows that moral opinions are conditional on the behavior of others. This is demonstrated by the finding that a large majority of subjects in a public good game experiment report personal normative beliefs that increase with the actual contributions made by group members. This finding is important for the design of policies attempting to sustain public good provisions.