Laurie Johnson

Disaster and Recovery: Processes Compressed in Time

The study of postdisaster recovery is in its infancy, and there is as yet no body of theory to guide researchers (Alesch 2005; Smith and Wenger 2007; Olshansky and Chang 2009). Few researchers have conducted in-depth research of recovery processes following more than one disaster (e.g., Haas et al. 1977; Rubin 1985; Comerio 1998; Phillips 2009; Alesch et al. 2009; Olshansky et al. 2006; Olshansky and Johnson 2010), which has further impeded the development of theory for postdisaster recovery phenomena. This is an important issue, for very practical reasons. In recent years, the world has experienced numerous disastrous events, each of which has displaced hundreds of thousands of families from their homes and killed tens of thousands of people. The most recent of these are the earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011, the devastating earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, and the floods that overwhelmed Pakistan in the summer of 2010. Each such disaster devastates households and communities, requires contributions of billions of dollars from around the world, and requires a strategy for rebuilding homes, livelihoods, and urban systems. A more organized framework for studying—and learning from—recovery processes following such disasters would help to guide local, national, and international agencies in more effectively organizing for and implementing long-term recovery. Recovery involves residents rebuilding homes or seeking new accommodations, businesses repairing and surviving lean times, utilities and public agencies repairing infrastructure and facilities, and households learning to cope with new stresses. These multiple layers of recovery processes provide fruitful research opportunities for urban planners, engineers, political scientists, public administration scholars, sociologists, economists, architects, and others, all relying on theories grounded in their own disciplines. The question is, other than the causative circumstances, is there anything fundamentally different about urban redevelopment, public finance, organization of public institutions, and social and economic problems when the subject of study is in a postdisaster environment? We posit that the key characteristic that distinguishes postdisaster conditions from normal times is time compression. Stated simply, the postdisaster environment consists of a compression of urban development activities in time and in a limited space, a phenomenon that we refer to as time compression. Furthermore, time compression affects different aspects of recovery processes in different ways, thereby changing their relationships compared to normal times. For example, processes of physical construction, financial transactions, social capital formation, and institution building compress unequally in time. The place of disaster thus becomes different from other places in new ways. Researchers describe numerous characteristics of postdisaster recovery, with time compression being one of them (e.g., Haas et al. 1977; Quarantelli 1999; Olshansky and Chang 2009). We argue, however, that time compression is an important overarching characteristic, and that it provides a key to understanding recovery. Time compression explains most of what we know that distinguishes postdisaster recovery processes from similar processes in normal times. This paper offers a conceptual framework to help scholars and recovery professionals of all disciplines think more clearly about how the recovery environment distorts their normal disciplinary lenses. We first explain how time compression works, using examples from the field of urban development and planning. Next we describe how differential compression helps to explain some of the more challenging aspects of urban reconstruction following disasters. Next, several examples illustrate how well-known recovery phenomena can be explained as symptoms of time compression. Finally, we suggest how the concept of time compression can be used to improve planning processes and institutional design following disasters. In the conclusion, we suggest how scholars and practitioners in disciplines other than our own might also find the time-compression concept to be useful.

Longer View: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans

Problem: Catastrophic disasters like Hurricane Katrina disrupt urban systems, economies, and lives, and pose huge problems for local governments and planners trying to organize and finance reconstruction as quickly and effectively as possible. Purpose: This article aims to summarize the key planning challenges New Orleans faced following the August 29, 2005 flooding in order to identify lessons planners can apply following future disasters. Methods: In this case study we sought to observe key decisions about the recovery as they unfolded. Collectively, we spent months in New Orleans in 2005, 2006, and 2007, and interviewed leaders of all the planning efforts to date. One of us played a lead role in the design and execution of the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), and all observed and/or participated in neighborhood-level planning activities. Results and conclusions: We agree with previous findings on post-disaster recovery, confirming the importance of previous plans, citizen involvement, information infrastructure, and external resources. We also observe that the recovery of New Orleans might have proceeded more effectively in spite of the inherent challenges in post-Katrina New Orleans. Many local difficulties are a result of the slow flow of federal reconstruction funding. Despite this, the city administration also could have taken a more active leadership role in planning and information management earlier; the citys Office of Recovery Management has since improved this. On the positive side, the Louisiana Recovery Authority has been a model worth emulating by other states. Takeaway for practice: Planning can inform actions as both proceed simultaneously. Had New Orleans planners not felt so compelled to complete plans quickly, they might have been more effective at providing reasoned analysis over time to support community actions and engaging a broader public in resolving difficult questions of restoration versus betterment. A center for collecting and distributing data and news would have better informed all parties; this remains an important need. Research support: We received support from the Mid-America Earthquake Center, the Public Entity Risk Institute, and the New Orleans Community Support Foundation.

Securing Tohoku's Future: Planning for Rebuilding in the First Year Following the Tohoku-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami

One year after the Tohoku-oki earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011, many coastal communities in Japans Tohoku region show little progress in rebuilding. Yet as this paper explains, localities, along with affected prefectures and the national government, have been embroiled in a complex, iterative planning process that has involved scientific modeling of future tsunami risk scenarios, difficult decisions about future land uses and funding for reconstruction, and the creation of new polices, programs, and institutions. Taking time to plan conflicts with the urgency to rebuild, but it also provides an opportunity to reflect local needs and to coalesce on a shared vision for rebuilding. While Tohokus future still remains uncertain, these planning efforts may ultimately lay the foundation for a successful and efficient recovery. Conversely, they may cause unnecessary delays that only exacerbated the regions already fragile economy and community well-being.

Transforming Governance: How National Policies and Organizations for Managing Disaster Recovery Evolved Following the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 Canterbury Earthquakes

Large-scale disasters simultaneously deplete capital stock and services which then requires many complex rebuilding and societal activities to happen in a compressed time period; one of those is governance. Governments often create new institutions or adapt existing institutions to cope with the added demands. Over two years following the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, governance transformations have increasingly centralized recovery authority and operations at the national level. This may have helped to strengthen coordination among national agencies and expedite policy and decision making; but the effectiveness of coordination among multiple levels of government, capacity building at the local and regional levels, and public engagement and deliberation of key decisions are some areas where the transformations may not have been as effective. The Canterbury case offers many lessons for future disaster recovery management in New Zealand, the United States, and the world.

Recovering from the ShakeOut Earthquake

Recovery from an earthquake like the M7.8 ShakeOut Scenario will be a major endeavor taking many years to complete. Hundreds of Southern California municipalities will be affected; most lack recovery plans or previous disaster experience. To support recovery planning this paper 1) extends the regional ShakeOut Scenario analysis into the recovery period using a recovery model, 2) localizes analyses to identify longer-term impacts and issues in two communities, and 3) considers the regional context of local recovery. Key community insights about preparing for post-disaster recovery include the need to: geographically diversify city procurement; set earthquake mitigation priorities for critical infrastructure (e.g., airport), plan to replace mobile homes with earthquake safety measures, consider post-earthquake redevelopment opportunities ahead of time, and develop post-disaster recovery management and governance structures. This work also showed that communities with minor damages are still sensitive to regional infrastructure damages and their potential long-term impacts on community recovery. This highlights the importance of community and infrastructure resilience strategies as well.

The evolution of the federal role in supporting community recovery after U.S. disasters

Problem, research strategy, and findings: The process of long-term recovery, if done well, can minimize post-disaster disruption, address problems that existed before the disaster struck, and improve the future resilience of a community. The U.S. government, however, historically has lacked a systematic approach to supporting community recovery. This study describes the history of federal policies for supporting community recovery after disasters, with particular attention to the roles of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). We conclude by considering the new National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). This historical review suggests that the federal government needs to emphasize the following: providing resources for community recovery planning; facilitating increased flows of information after disasters; streamlining FEMA assistance to public agencies; explicitly working to reduce the barriers between FEMA and HUD; and incorporating equity into recovery policies. Recovery policies also need to include incentives to achieve substantive goals of rebuilding in a way that is sustainable, equitable, cost-effective, and timely, and that reduces the chances of future disasters. Takeaway for practice: Local community planners can draw several lessons from this historical account. First, they should become aware of the various post-disaster programs now, before disaster strikes. Second, knowledge of post-disaster policies and programs will enable planners to use them creatively and effectively if disaster strikes. Third, in the midst of reconstruction, planners need to continually seek opportunities to promote betterment and resilience to natural hazards.

Rebuild Fast but Rebuild Better: Chile's Initial Recovery Following the 27 February 2010 Earthquake and Tsunami

The Chilean earthquake and tsunami disaster of 27 February 2010 impacted 12 million people in 900 cities and towns, causing more than US

Coseismic Tectonic Surface Deformation during the 2010 Maule, Chile, M w 8.8 Earthquake

30 billion in losses. This paper considers how the national government responded to the challenges of coastal and urban reconstruction, and examines the actions taken in the housing, land use mitigation planning, insurance, and risk reduction management sectors. The Chilean government utilized a mixed decentralized model for recovery management with strong direction from the national-level ministries and subnational planning and housing efforts at the regional and municipal levels. The national recovery plan guiding principles are used in this paper as a framework for progress. In 12 months, a series of temporary shelter villages and a system of recovery housing subsidies were established; risk-based land use plans were conducted in various coastal areas; a finance plan was adopted; changes to the national emergency management agency were made; and rapid payment of insurance claims were completed. Conflicts did arise related to the speed of housing recovery support, expropriation of land sites as future tsunami protection barriers, and extent of public participation in recovery plan making.

Three Years After a Mega-disaster: Recovery Policies, Programs and Implementation After the Great East Japan Earthquake

Tectonic deformation from the 2010 Maule (Chile) Mw 8.8 earthquake included both uplift and subsidence along about 470 km of the central Chilean coast. In the south, deformation included as much as 3 m of uplift of the Arauco Peninsula, which produced emergent marine platforms and affected harbor infrastructure. In the central part of the deformation zone, north of Constitución, coastal subsidence drowned supratidal floodplains and caused extensive shoreline modification. In the north, coastal areas experienced either slight uplift or no detected change in land level. Also, river-channel deposition and decreased gradients suggest tectonic subsidence may have occurred in inland areas. The overall north-south pattern of 2010 coastal uplift and subsidence is similar to the average crestal elevation of the Coast Range between latitudes 33°S and 40°S. This similarity implies that the topography of the Coast Range may reflect long-term permanent strain accrued incrementally over many earthquake cycles.

Improving Tsunami Resiliency: California’s Tsunami Policy Working Group

Since March 11 2011, the national government of Japan has invested significant resources to aid recovery in the Tohoku region, devastated by the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) and tsunami. Thus far, 25 trillion yen (approximately US