Mary Lea Killian

Emergence of Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus in the United States: clinical signs, lesions, and viral genomic sequences

During the 10 days commencing April 29, 2013, the Iowa State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory received the first 4 of many submissions from swine farms experiencing explosive epidemics of diarrhea and vomiting affecting all ages, with 90–95% mortality in suckling pigs. Histology revealed severe atrophy of villi in all segments of the small intestines with occasional villus-epithelial syncytial cells, but testing for rotaviruses and Transmissible gastroenteritis virus (Alphacoronavirus 1) were negative. Negative-staining electron microscopy of feces revealed coronavirus-like particles and a pan-coronavirus polymerase chain reaction (PCR) designed to amplify a conserved region of the polymerase gene for all members in the family Coronaviridae produced expected 251-bp amplicons. Subsequent sequencing and analysis revealed 99.6–100% identity among the PCR amplicons from the 4 farms and 97–99% identity to the corresponding portion of the polymerase gene of Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) strains, with the highest identity (99%) to strains from China in 2012. Findings were corroborated at National Veterinary Services Laboratories using 2 nested S-gene and 1 nested N-gene PCR tests where the sequenced amplicons also had the highest identity with 2012 China strains. Whole genome sequence for the virus from 2 farms in 2 different states using next-generation sequencing technique was compared to PEDV sequences available in GenBank. The 2013 U.S. PEDV had 96.6–99.5% identity with all known PEDV strains and the highest identity (>99.0%) to some of the 2011–2012 Chinese strains. The nearly simultaneous outbreaks of disease, and high degree of homology (99.6–100%) between the PEDV strains from the 4 unrelated farms, suggests a common source of virus.

Novel Eurasian Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A H5 Viruses in Wild Birds, Washington, USA, 2014

Novel Eurasian lineage avian influenza A(H5N8) virus has spread rapidly and globally since January 2014. In December 2014, H5N8 and reassortant H5N2 viruses were detected in wild birds in Washington, USA, and subsequently in backyard birds. When they infect commercial poultry, these highly pathogenic viruses pose substantial trade issues.

Influenza A Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Virus Infection in Domestic Cat

Influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus continues to rapidly spread worldwide. In 2009, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection in a domestic cat from Iowa was diagnosed by a novel PCR assay that distinguishes between Eurasian and North American pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus matrix genes. Human-to-cat transmission is presumed.

Hemagglutination Assay for the Avian Influenza Virus

The hemagglutination (HA) assay is a tool used to screen cell culture or amnioallantoic fluid harvested from embryonating chicken eggs for hemagglutinating agents, such as type A influenza. The HA assay is not an identification assay, as other agents also have hemagglutinating properties. Live and inactivated viruses are detected by the HA test. Amplification by virus isolation in embryonating chicken eggs or cell culture is typically required before HA activity can be detected from a clinical sample. The test is, to some extent, quantitative [1 hemagglutinating unit (HAU) is equal to approximately 5-6 logs of virus]. It is inexpensive and relatively simple to conduct. Several factors (quality of chicken erythrocytes, laboratory temperature, laboratory equipment, technical expertise of the user) may contribute to slight differences in the interpretation of the test each time it is run. This chapter will describe the methods validated and used by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for screening and identification of hemagglutinating viruses.

Characterization of Low-Pathogenicity H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses from North America

ABSTRACT Wild-bird surveillance in North America for avian influenza (AI) viruses with a goal of early identification of the Asian H5N1 highly pathogenic AI virus has identified at least six low-pathogenicity H5N1 AI viruses between 2004 and 2006. The hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes from all 6 H5N1 viruses and an additional 38 North American wild-bird-origin H5 subtype and 28 N1 subtype viruses were sequenced and compared with sequences available in GenBank by phylogenetic analysis. Both HA and NA were phylogenetically distinct from those for viruses from outside of North America and from those for viruses recovered from mammals. Four of the H5N1 AI viruses were characterized as low pathogenicity by standard in vivo pathotyping tests. One of the H5N1 viruses, A/MuteSwan/MI/451072-2/06, was shown to replicate to low titers in chickens, turkeys, and ducks. However, transmission of A/MuteSwan/MI/451072-2/06 was more efficient among ducks than among chickens or turkeys based on virus shed. The 50% chicken infectious dose for A/MuteSwan/MI/451072-2/06 and three other wild-waterfowl-origin H5 viruses were also determined and were between 105.3 and 107.5 50% egg infective doses. Finally, seven H5 viruses representing different phylogenetic clades were evaluated for their antigenic relatedness by hemagglutination inhibition assay, showing that the antigenic relatedness was largely associated with geographic origin. Overall, the data support the conclusion that North American H5 wild-bird-origin AI viruses are low-pathogenicity wild-bird-adapted viruses and are antigenically and genetically distinct from the highly pathogenic Asian H5N1 virus lineage.

Genotype patterns of contemporary reassorted H3N2 virus in US swine

To understand the evolution of swine-origin H3N2v influenza viruses that have infected 320 humans in the USA since August 2011, we performed a phylogenetic analysis at a whole genome scale of North American swine influenza viruses (n = 200). All viral isolates evolved from the prototypical North American H3 cluster 4 (c4), with evidence for further diversification into subclusters. At least ten distinct reassorted H3N2/pandemic H1N1 (rH3N2p) genotypes were identified in swine. Genotype 1 (G1) was most frequently detected in swine and all human H3N2v viruses clustered within a single G1 clade. These data suggest that the genetic requirements for transmission to humans may be restricted to a specific subset of swine viruses. Mutations at putative antigenic sites as well as reduced serological cross-reactivity among the H3 subclusters suggest antigenic drift of these contemporary viruses.

Continual Reintroduction of Human Pandemic H1N1 Influenza A Viruses into Swine in the United States, 2009 to 2014

ABSTRACT The diversity of influenza A viruses in swine (swIAVs) presents an important pandemic threat. Knowledge of the human-swine interface is particularly important for understanding how viruses with pandemic potential evolve in swine hosts. Through phylogenetic analysis of contemporary swIAVs in the United States, we demonstrate that human-to-swine transmission of pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) viruses has occurred continuously in the years following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and has been an important contributor to the genetic diversity of U.S. swIAVs. Although pandemic H1 and N1 segments had been largely removed from the U.S. swine population by 2013 via reassortment with other swIAVs, these antigens reemerged following multiple human-to-swine transmission events during the 2013-2014 seasonal epidemic. These findings indicate that the six internal gene segments from pH1N1 viruses are likely to be sustained long term in the U.S. swine population, with periodic reemergence of pandemic hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) segments in association with seasonal pH1N1 epidemics in humans. Vaccinating U.S. swine workers may reduce infection of both humans and swine and in turn limit the role of humans as sources of influenza virus diversity in pigs. IMPORTANCE Swine are important hosts in the evolution of influenza A viruses with pandemic potential. Here, we analyze influenza virus sequence data generated by the U.S. Department of Agricultures national surveillance system to identify the central role of humans in the reemergence of pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza viruses in U.S. swine herds in 2014. These findings emphasize the important role of humans as continuous sources of influenza virus diversity in swine and indicate that influenza viruses with pandemic HA and NA segments are likely to continue to reemerge in U.S. swine in association with seasonal pH1N1 epidemics in humans.

Swine-to-Human Transmission of Influenza A(H3N2) Virus at Agricultural Fairs, Ohio, USA, 2012

Local health care providers should be alerted to the possibility of human infection with variant influenza A viruses, especially during fairs.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses and generation of novel reassortants,United States, 2014–2015

Asian highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) viruses spread into North America in 2014 during autumn bird migration. Complete genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of 32 H5 viruses identified novel H5N1, H5N2, and H5N8 viruses that emerged in late 2014 through reassortment with North American low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses.

Molecular evidence for interspecies transmission of H3N2pM/H3N2v influenza A viruses at an Ohio agricultural fair, July 2012

Evidence accumulating in 2011–2012 indicates that there is significant intra- and inter-species transmission of influenza A viruses at agricultural fairs, which has renewed interest in this unique human/swine interface. Six human cases of influenza A (H3N2) variant (H3N2v) virus infections were epidemiologically linked to swine exposure at fairs in the United States in 2011. In 2012, the number of H3N2v cases in the Midwest had exceeded 300 from early July to September, 2012. Prospective influenza A virus surveillance among pigs at Ohio fairs resulted in the detection of H3N2pM (H3N2 influenza A viruses containing the matrix (M) gene from the influenza A (H1N1) pdm09 virus). These H3N2pM viruses were temporally and spatially linked to several human H3N2v cases. Complete genomic analyses of these H3N2pM isolates demonstrated >99% nucleotide similarity to the H3N2v isolates recovered from human cases. Actions to mitigate the bidirectional interspecies transmission of influenza A virus between people and animals at agricultural fairs may be warranted.