Michael Minkenberg

The radical right in public office: Agenda‐setting and policy effects

International comparisons of new radical right‐wing parties usually focus on differences in electoral fortunes, party organisations and leadership. This article uses a different angle by focusing on public policy impact and the role these parties play in the parliamentary and executive arenas. The research is driven by the hypothesis that under the conditions of stable democracy, holding office produces a net result in a ‘taming effect’ on radical right‐wing actors rather than a sharp ‘right turn’. Evidence f rom four countries (Germany, France, Italy and Austria) shows that parliamentary presence alone does not result in policy effects. When the radical right holds executive office, a ‘right turn’ occurs primarily in cultural policies. Overall, real effects of radical right‐wing politics occur largely as a result of the interaction between the radical right and established actors ‐regardless of the radical rights assuming power.

Religion and Public Policy Institutional, Cultural, and Political Impact on the Shaping of Abortion Policies in Western Democracies

This article addresses the relationship between religion and politics in liberal democracies from a public policy angle. The analysis shows that contrary to the general secularization thesis, there is a visible religious impact on public policy, but it varies according to what measure of secularization is used. Confessional heritage (Catholicism versus Protestantism) and cultural values (levels of religiosity) are better predictors than institutional differentiation or political mobilization. When confessional heritage is held constant, the institutional impact increases. It is not surprising that Catholic countries produce less than fully liberal abortion policies, but the most restrictive abortion policies are found in those Catholic countries where high levels of religiosity persist. Moreover, a strong presence of religious parties is not associated with restrictive abortion policies, but in all countries with moderate to high levels of religiosity and with strong Christian Democratic parties and only there, moderate or “distress” models of abortion exist.

The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti‐modernity

FIFTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF FASCISM AND THE END OF THE Second World War, right-wing radical movements and parties are part of the political normalcy in many Western democracies. In the face of the twentieth-century experiences of fascism and state socialism, and their failures, this stubborn persistence seems at the same time anachronistic and frightening. While there is no shortage of explanations and interpretations of this phenomenon in an evergrowing body of literature, most studies focus on national trends and derive their criteria from country-specific histories and discourses. Serious comparative scholarship on the radical right is still in its infancy. This article is a plea for more comparative research on rightwing radicalism at the turn of the century. It begins by highlighting the three central dimensions of the problem. First, one must state that contemporary right-wing radicalism is an international phenomenon. Thus, more than before, comparative studies are needed both to analyse the international quality and to specify the nation-specific characteristics of the radical right in each country. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that contemporary right-wing radicalism is a modern phenomenon. It has undergone a phase of renewal, as a result of social and cultural modernization shifts in post-war Europe. Thus it is only vaguely connected with previous versions. Terms like ‘fascism’ or ‘neo-fascism’ which suggest a historical continuity from Munich to Molln and Magdeburg in Germany, or from Vichy to Vitrolles in France, become increasingly obsolete. The third factor to bear in mind is that contemporary right-wing radicalism is a complex phenomenon. The ongoing specialization and compartmentalization in the social sciences, such as discourse analysis, party and electoral research, and youth sociology – to name but a few of the approaches applied to the radical right – fail to do justice to the complexity of the subject. Clearly, the many faces of right-wing radicalism require clear analytical distinctions, but ultimately they need to be approached in a truly interdisciplinary way.

Politik und Religion

Einleitung: Politik und Religion im 21. Jahrhundert - I. Zur Theorie des Verhaltnisses von Politik und Religion - II. Muster institutioneller Regulierung von Religion - III. Religiose Parteien und Organisationen als Akteure der Politik . IV. Politisch-religiose Konfliktkonstellationen - V. Does religion matter? Der religiose Einfluss auf public policy - VI. Religion im Kontext gesellschaftlicher und politischer Transformation - VII. Religion als Faktor der internationalen Beziehungen

The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004

In the new EU member states, the European Parliament elections in June 2004 were anticipated with particular anxiety because of the role of anti-EU, nationalist, and extreme right-wing parties, which in some countries had scored signifi cant electoral successes in the recent past. But also in some of the old member states, the radical right was watched closely, in particular, after the French Front Nationals historic performance in the 2002 presidential election. Since the radical right feeds on the economic and social crisis and feelings of anxiety raised by EU integration, by globalization, and by anti-establishment feelings, many observers expected a general rise in support for these parties, especially in light of the growing complexity of the expanded EU. This article analyzes the electoral outcome for the radical right in the 2004 elections and discusses country-specifi c characteristics as well as regional patterns. It also looks at the role the radical right played, if any, in the votes on the new EU constitution in various member states. The article shows that, regarding the radical right, the European elections proved to be surprisingly unsurprising. Clearly, EU membership was not the only issue involved. Rather, larger issues of national identity, the strength of nationalist traditions, and some particular features superseded narrow foreign policy concerns and explain, more or less, the electoral success achieved by the radical right. Compared to the EU elections, the referenda on the EU constitution in several member states provided little to no opportunities for the radical right.

Repression and reaction: militant democracy and the radical right in Germany and France

ABSTRACT Minkenberg tackles a variety of issues in the debate about state repression and examines them in relation to the contemporary radical right in western democracies, particularly Germany and France. He addresses concepts developed mostly in research studies of movements, and reviews more theoretical accounts in an attempt to advance an analytic framework for examining the effects of repression on the radical right. Does the application of state repression have the desired effect on the radical right? Or is state repression rather counter-productive and, if so, under what circumstances? Minkenberg attempts to provide a tentative answer as to whether state repression reduces radical right-wing mobilization (as some have argued) or provokes resistance and a sense of solidarity that undercuts the intended effects (as others have suggested). The case of the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (and the failure of an attempt to ban it)—which provides evidence both of the organizational and strategic flexibility of the non-party radical right and of ghetto-formation and a hardening of ideology—raises serious questions about the usefulness of state repression against the radical right. It seems that the damage to democracy outweighs the benefits of state control, particularly when the fight against the radical right is limited to the institutional level of ‘militant democracy’. Instead, alternatives within civil society need to be strengthened both because they can affect the radical right on their own and because they can ‘embed’ state action and thereby render it more effective.

Context and Consequence: The Impact of the New Radical Right on the Political Process in France and Germany

International comparisons of new radical right-wing parties usually focus on differences in electoral fortunes, party organizations, and leadership styles and conclude that Germany stands out as a special case of successful marginalization of the new radical right. Explana tions for this German anomaly point at the combined effects of Ger man history and institutional arrangements of the Federal Republic of Germany, of ideological dilemmas and strategic failures of the various parties of the new radical right, and the efforts of the estab lished political parties to prevent the rise of new parties to the right of them. By implication, this means that, whereas in countries like France or Austria the new radical right plays a significant role in pol itics to the point of changing the political systems themselves, the German counterpart has a negligible impact and has little or no effects on politics and polity. This article chooses a different angle for comparing the new radi cal right in two major European countries by focusing on impact but de-linking it from categories like seats in parliament or size of right wing electorates. Instead, it highlights the role of the French and German new radical right parties in the political process. More specifically, the essay focuses on the interplay between the rise of these parties and their environment. Based on a process model of radical right-wing mobilization and interaction, the hypothesis to be studied here is that in both France and Germany, the new radical right (regardless of its particular electoral entrenchment) had signifi cant effects on the political environment in general, and on the established political parties in particular by pushing their agenda to

Staat und Kirche in westlichen Demokratien

Staat und Kirche gehoren zweifellos zu den altesten Institutionen der Menschheit, die politikwissenschaftliche Erforschung des Verhaltnisses von Staat und Kirche ist dagegen, zumindest auserhalb der USA, eine sehr junge Angelegenheit. Die Beschaftigung mit dieser spannungsreichen Beziehung wurde bisher den Historikern, Soziologen und Rechtswissenschaftlern uberlassen (vgl. Robbers 1995; Zippelius 1997). Erst in jungerer Zeit sind auch verstarkt politikwissenschaftliche Ansatze hinzugekommen (vgl. z.B. Gill 1998; Meyer u.a. 2000; Monsma/Soper 1997; Warner 2000). Ein Grosteil der Literatur ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass Unterscheidungen zwischen drei Rechtstypen von Staat-Kirche-Beziehungen herangezogen werden: das Staatskirchensystem (als Prototyp gilt hier oft Grosbritannien), das entgegengesetzte System strikter Trennung (mit Frankreich als Paradebeispiel) und ein „Mischtyp“, wo sich der Trennungsgedanke mit einer partnerschaftlichen Verschrankung von Staat und Kirche verknupft (z.B. Deutschland). Diese Einteilung ist stark an verfassungsrechtlichen Kriterien orientiert und wird der politischen Qualitat des Staat-Kirche-Verhaltnisses nicht gerecht. Ein zentrales Anliegen dieses Beitrags ist es daher, die verschiedenen Konzeptionalisierungen des Staat-Kirche-Verhaltnisses aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht auf den Prufstand zu stellen und einen neuen Vorschlag zur Konzeptionalisierung zu entwickeln.

Religion and Euroscepticism: Cleavages, Religious Parties and Churches in EU Member States

Taking into account the attempts to render the European integration process a new cultural and value-based quality on the one hand, and the prevalence of sceptical positions on the other, the role of religion as a factor shaping the process of European integration and its accompanying features such as Euroscepticism deserves special attention. It may be argued that the entire EU is a project inaugurated and pushed along primarily by Christian Democratic forces and inspirations. However, the EU is currently characterised by an advanced state of secularisation in most of its member states and high levels of religious and cultural pluralisation. This article raises the question to what extent religious, in particular Christian, actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from this integrationist past and contributed to Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the second question is whether a confessional pattern of Euroscepticism can be identified. The paper addresses these questions by empirically and comparatively analysing the positions and influence of religious actors on Euroscepticism in a selected group of EU member states.

The New Radical Right in the Political Process

In 1989, a new radical right-wing party made headlines in Germany and beyond. With more than two million votes, or 7.1 percent, in the European parliamentary elections, the Republikaner (Republicans, or REP) seemed on their way to joining the French Front National (National Front B, or FN) and other European right-wing parties as a new and durable element in Western party systems. Their leader Franz Schonhuber and FN chief Jean-Marie Le Pen met in the fall of 1989 in the Bavarian towns of Berchtesgaden and Bad Reichenhall, where they publicly demonstrated their sympathy for each other and formed a parliamentary group of the radical right in the European parliament in Strasbourg that also included the Belgian Vlaams Blok, or Flemish Block (see Osterhoff 1997, 172). One year later, Schonhuber and other REP delegates left Strasbourg because of growing tensions between the FN and the Republikaner and internal conflicts within the REP group in the European parliament. While Schonhuber’s dream of German unification was (partially) fulfilled in late 1990, his party suffered a rapid electoral decline in the federal elections of December 1990 and after. Since then, with several ups and downs of the Republikaner in subsequent elections and Schonhuber’s resignation as party chairman in 1994, the paths of both parties and their leaders have diverged continuously.