Michèle Knodt

International embeddedness of European multi-level governance

The focus of this article is to find out how governance functions in an expanded multi-level system. The aim is to analyse institutional change within the EU which is caused by the EUs international embeddedness. The paper develops and empirically tests the hypothesis that embeddedness of the EU within an international context does not only affect the formal organization of the European decision- making process. It includes effects on routines, guiding ideas and concepts of legitimate order as well. The World Trade Organization (WTO) serves as a case to analyse these effects. The empirical research covers the overall European institutional changes within the different issue-areas of WTO (GATT, TRIPS and GATS), including its dispute settlement system, as well as the discussion about the involvement of civil society in the WTOs decision-making and its effects on the EU.

Instruments of the EU's External Democracy Promotion

Promotion of good governance and democracy is a central element of the EUs external policy towards third countries. The choice of the instruments for democracy promotion by the EU is an under‐researched topic. Factors for the choice of a certain instrument can be located in the third country (existence of a civil society), in the EU and in the relationship between both (trade relations, neighbourhood). Analysing the determinants of the EUs usage of EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights) allocations, Partnership Agreements and sanctions, we find that the usage of each instrument is determined by different factors, indicating that there is no single process underlying instrumental choice.

Regieren in internationalen Institutionen

„Regieren“ gehort zweifelsohne zu den Begriffen, die in den letzten zehn Jahren Karriere gemacht haben. „Regieren“ wird dabei verstanden als „die Herbeifuhrung kollektiv verbindlicher Entscheidungen, um in unterschiedlichen Politikfeldern ... bestimmte Ziele zu erreichen“ (Kohler-Koch Knodt 1999: 239). „Wesensmerkmal von Regieren ist, das bewust eine politische Zielbestimmung vorgenommen und gezielte Anstrengungen unternommen werden, die sicherstellen, das sich das Verhalten der ... Akteure danach ausrichtet“ (Kohler-Koch 1993: 116).

Territorial and Functional Interest Representation in EU Governance

Abstract This special issue starts from the assumption that, in contrast to the mainstream view, a convergence can be detected in strategies of interest representation across different actor types of functional and territorial interests, despite differences which remain. The question is posed here as to whether a European model of interest representation in European governance is detectable across categories of actors? It is assumed that the convergence over actor characteristics is due to the main characteristics of the European Union as an interactive and communicative system of multi-level governance which provides a special political opportunity structure to the different actors. The contributions of the issue compare territorial and functional interest representation regarding actor types, national embeddedness, policy field, and resources (financial and human resources, competences, capacity to act, learn and interact) with respect to the emergence of a highly complex European model of interest representation with cross-sectoral, intersectoral, and some intrasectoral, characteristics.

Regions in Multilevel Governance Arrangements: Leadership versus Partnership

Long before the Forward Studies Unit of the EU Commission launched the debate on new forms of governance, important ingredients to that concept had already been implemented and tested on the ground in a number of policy fields. Structural and R&D policies belonged to the most important of these. This paper will argue that the spreading, diffusion and eventual acceptence of these ideas is subject to a number of constraints (and opportunities) that cannot easily be overcome by deliberate action.

Konzepte der politischen Steuerung in einer globalisierten Welt

Es besteht ein weitgehender Konsens, das effektive und demokratisch legitimierte Politik in einer globalisierten Welt veranderte Ordnungsstrukturen und Strategien verlangt. Dabei ist davon auszugehen, das es keine „neue Weltordnung“ auf Grundlage einer akademisch gefertigten Blaupause durch hegemoniale Oktroyierung oder multilaterale Neuverhandlung der Vereinten Nationen geben wird. Vielmehr sind inkrementale Veranderungen zu erwarten, die sich aus dem Handeln einer Vielzahl von Akteuren ergeben, die uber unterschiedliche Machtressourcen verfugen. Auch ihr Handeln folgt keiner Blaupause und zielt unter Umstanden nicht einmal bewust auf ordnungspolitische Veranderungen ab. Dennoch kann davon ausgegangen werden, das „implizite Theorien” dieses Handeln lenken und sich somit auf die Entwicklung politischer Ordnungssysteme niederschlagen.

Externe Demokratieförderung der Europäischen Union - die Instrumentenwahl der EU aus vergleichender Perspektive

Das Thema der externen Demokratieförderung durch die Europäische Union steht zur Zeit ganz oben auf der politischen Agenda. Indem die Wertegemeinschaft Europäische Union ihr Modell legitimen demokratischen Regierens in Drittstaaten exportiert, hat sie Begriffe wie Demokratie, Menschenrechte, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und ‚good governance‘ zu Referenzgrößen ihres auswärtigen Regierens gemacht. Entsprechend dieser Entwicklung hat sich nun auch die Forschung dem Thema der externen Demokratieförderung zugewandt. Der überwiegende Teil dieser Forschungsbemühungen verbleibt jedoch in Einzelfallstudien zu unterschiedlichen Drittstaaten1 respektive Drittstaaten innerhalb einer Region.2 Systematisch vergleichende Studien finden sich im Vergleich unterschiedlicher externer Demokratisierer3 oder im Bereich der EU-Beitrittskandidaten.4 In diesem Beitrag wird die EU-Demokratieförderung in Nichtkandidatenstaaten einer vergleichenden Analyse unterzogen. Die bisher in der Literatur vorherrschende Erklärung zur Strategie der externen Demokratieförderung geht davon aus, dass die Europäische Union im Sinne einer ‚Innen-Außenanalogie‘ ihre internationale Umwelt nach denselben Werten und Prinzipien gestalten will, die im Inneren der Gemeinschaft gelten.5 Um dieses Ziel umzusetzen, machte sie die Demokratieförderung zur Querschnittsaufgabe aller Bereiche ihrer Außenbeziehungen: Handelspolitik, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, auswärtige Kulturpolitik sowie Außen-, Sicherheitsund Verteidigungspolitik. Insofern kann man von einem ‚democracy mainstreaming‘ sprechen, das sich unter anderem in sogenannten Demokratieklauseln manifestiert, die die Europäische Union seit 1995 in alle ihre Abkommen mit Drittstaaten einfügt. ‚Democracy mainstreaming‘ bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass die klassischen Instrumente der Demokratieförderung – politische Konditionalität, politischer Dialog sowie finanzielle Anreize und ‚capacity building‘ – von der Europäischen Union in allen Ländern in gleicher Weise eingesetzt würden. Vielmehr zeigt die eingehende Analyse vor allem der neueren Abkommen, dass sich die Fassungen der Demokratieklauseln bezüglich ihrer Schärfe und Verbindlichkeit erheblich voneinander unterscheiden. Zudem variiert die Demokratisierungspolitik der Europäischen

Strategies of Territorial and Functional Interests: Towards a Model of European Interest Intermediation?

Abstract Research on interest representation in EU governance has addressed different kinds of actors in somewhat different and independent discourses. This contribution will start from the specific requirements is demanding as well as opportunities the European multi-level system is offering to territorial and functional interest representation. The main question will be whether differentiations or similarities can be found in the comparison of functional and territorial interest representation. The contribution will elaborate on this question in the following section and assume that there are more similarities than differences within the use of strategies by territorial and functional interests. The contribution elaborates two explanations for the similarities and differences found. Empirical evidence is given in the second part of the contribution. It will be shown that we even find convergence within territorial and functional interest intermediation and how actors have learned from each other. In addition it will be revealed that other factors than the type of interest are responsible for persistent differences. A third short chapter points out that both types of interests work with complementary strategies to succeed within the European multi-level system. All in all, the contribution will speculate about whether it is possible to identify certain elements of a European model of interest intermediation across the different actor categories.

Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS

This paper examines a supranational actor, the European Union (EU), as a producer of energy diplomacy. This study uses a comparative analytical framework of state-centred vs. multistakeholder diplomacies to explore EU energy diplomacy towards the ‘emerging’ powers of Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BICS). It also elaborates the multistakeholder model by advocating the inclusion of a new element – a consumer of diplomatic actions – into its conceptualization. In this way the paper suggests a new synthesis of the concepts of multistakeholder and public diplomacies. Advancing the notion of energy diplomacy, our analysis suggests that this type of diplomacy goes beyond state actors as producers of diplomatic outcomes, and is no longer confined to the norms of security of supply and competitiveness; EU energy diplomacy is a complex blend of multistakeholder and state-centred diplomacies, participants (producers and consumers) and communication modes. This comprehensive approach to diplomacy – led in the EU’s case by norms of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – is a response to the challenges of global governance, multipolarity and multinational cross-sectoral networks.

Perceptions of the EU’s Role in the Ukraine-Russian and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts: A biased mediator?

This article focuses on how the European Unions (EU) mediation activities during the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts are perceived by local elites. Our analysis is based on recent interviews with decision makers in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine. Consistent with this special issue, we investigate perceptions of EU roles, strategies and effectiveness. We suggest that the EUs relation to the parties may affect their perceptions of EU conflict mediation efforts. Specifically, we expect that the EU is perceived as a biased mediator in both cases due to perceived close relations to one or more conflict parties. However, contrary to our expectations and widespread assumption in mediation theory, while such a bias exists, we found it is not perceived as a main cause of EU ineffectiveness. Other factors, including the prominence of other mediators and internal EU disunity, are perceived as more detrimental to EU efficacy.