Olga Pomerantz

Correcting US Imbalances

The US current account deficit is in excess of 6 per cent of GDP, and is leading to an accumulation of debts. We use NiGEM to evaluate the causes of the decline, and suggest that domestic absorption in the US has increased markedly. Nominal realignments and monetary expansions elsewhere are shown to be only short term palliatives. A sustained change in the current account must come either from a real realignment associated with a rise in risk premia on US assets or from a change in domestic absorption in the US and elsewhere. Any adjustment must be associated with a significant change in eth US real exchange rate to induce expenditure switching as well.

Are we Saving Enough? The Macroeconomics of the Savings Gap

We assess the adequacy of saving in the United Kingdom from a macroeconomic perspective. We present conditions needed for wealth to grow in line with income and discuss the circumstances in which capital gains can represent a substitute for saving. We show that reference to balance sheets can be misleading because they fail to identify the cost of future consumption. A savings gap of between £16.5 bn and £66 bn is identified before taking account of the effects of demographic change. The outcome depends on whether one regards rising house prices as a consequence of fixed supplies of land or as the outcome of failing to invest enough in housing with the upper figure arising in the latter case. Policy measures to reduce the savings gap are discussed. These include appropriate use of fiscal policy and taxation of credit.

Dollars and Deficits - The US Current Account Deficit and its Exchange Rate Consequences

In the past three years the US dollar has been declining whilst the US current account deficit has expanded, and these two developments are clearly linked. However, the causes of the decline in the dollar and the solution to the US deficit may not be as closely related as at first may appear. The emergence of a sustained deficit does not automatically necessitate a fall in the exchange rate, and a fall in the exchange rate may not correct such a deficit. Deficits can exist if the currency moves above its sustainable real exchange rate, and a real depreciation can remove such a deficit. Deficits caused by exchange rate movements are likely to be more temporary than those that either emerge for long-term structural reasons or result from structural imbalances in the economy. A structural deficit can be the consequence of low domestic saving or high domestic government borrowing. If domestic investment is very profitable then even high levels of domestic saving may still result in a savings shortfall, and the high returns may induce a structural capital inflow which will produce a sustainable current account deficit as a consequence. All these factors have influenced the increase in the US deficit in the past decade, and it is difficult to see how a correction to the deficit can occur without one of the domestic drivers changing in some way. Here we present a set of simulations using NiGEM to examine the impacts of alternative adjustment scenarios and their global implications. Before adding to the debate about the possible remedies, we will attempt to establish the sources of the current conjuncture, as the alternative adjustment paths for deficits and for the dollar depend on the sources of misalignment.

The Impact Of Emu On Real Exchange Rate Volatility Of Eu Countries

There is only a sparse literature on the determination of real exchange rate volatility, and little attention has been given to the possible impact of EMU on volatility of real exchange rates of EU countries. A number of papers suggest a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on investment or growth, for advanced as well as developing countries, although we note that price and wage adjustment that might link to real exchange rate volatility is also part of the adjustment mechanism to macroeconomic shocks in EMU. We assess whether an effect of EMU on conditional volatility of real effective exchange rates can be detected, both for EMU and non EMU members. We find that the advent of EMU was accompanied by a reduction in conditional real exchange rate volatility for most EMU countries, as well as Sweden and Denmark that did not join EMU, but did not lead to a reduction in real rate volatility for Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, nor, outside EMU, for the UK.