Susan L. Woodward

Economic aid to post-conflict countries: a methodological critique of Collier and Hoeffler

In the past five years, research sponsored by the World Bank on the economic aspects of civil war1 under the research directorship of Oxford economist Paul Collier has had an extraordinary influence on the subsequent study of violent conflict and civil war and on international policy. The research project has now turned its attention to the problem of countries emerging from civil war and what Collier and his co-author, Anke Hoeffler, call ‘a first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post-conflict growth process.’2 Building on the influence of their earlier research and the lively interest currently in knowledge about and policy on post-conflict strategies, this work is likely to be equally influential on research, thinking, and policy. It is all the more important, therefore, to subject the research to critical examination before it becomes established as conventional wisdom. This note reports one such attempt to analyze some major methodological problems with the study and argues that the research cannot sustain the conclusions they draw or the resulting policy recommendations.

Humanitarian War: A New Consensus?

The NATO bombing operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 represents the final disappearance of the narrowing divide between humanitarianism and politics: a war initiated and justified on humanitarian grounds. Although unlikely to be repeated any time soon, the Kosovo case appears to have cemented an ideological shift on the international right and even necessity of sing military force to protect civilians within sovereign states. Rather than humanitarians acknowledging the political context and consequences of their work, however, the case suggests the embrace of humanitarian principles of universality and neutrality by military organisations. This article discusses some consequences of the new consensus: neglect of the political context (both local and foreign) of such operations, interaction between the operational dynamics of relief operations and the logic of war and the political consequences of using the humanitarian legitimation and mission in such cases.

A European "New Deal" for the Balkans

around in Western policy toward southeastern Europe. With Yugoslav security forces out of Kosovo and the inauguration of the European Unions Stability Pact at the Sarajevo summit of July 30, committing the eu to eventual acceptance of the areas states as members, Western publics are being told that the path has been laid for resolving the decade-long crisis in the Balkans. But nothing could be further from the truth.

Kosovo and the Region: Consequences of the Waiting Game

The internationalisation of the conflict over Kosovo by NATO military action in March-June 1999 was defined and given legal standing according to humanitarian and human rights principles. The Serbian and Yugoslav governments were held to be in violation of international humanitarian and human rights conventions and, by causing a humanitarian crisis that included large population displacement into neighbouring states, posed a threat to regional security and peace. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 recognises the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and its continuing sovereignty over Kosovo, while requiring Serbian and Yugoslav military and civilian authorities to hand over control of the province to a transitional international administration. This is an extraordinary precedent. In contrast to the United Nations Transitional Administrations in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) or East Timor (Indonesia) – where international assistance was considered necessary to protect the human and minority rights of the resident populations during a political transition, but the political status of the territory was settled (reintegration into Croatia in the first case, independence in the second) – the international presence in Kosovo has temporarily deprived a country of the right to rule over part of its territory and population. According to NATO powers and the United Nations Security Council,

Europe and the collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy

number of issues. First, it demonstrates how communist leaders sought to use nationalism to legitimise their governments. Second, it shows that communist ideology did not stop ethnic tensions from impacting the bilateral relations between communist states. Third, the ways in which the Soviet Union used ethnic tensions within its satellite states to its advantage are explored. Finally, the book highlights the manner in which the Cold War limited the outlets available for European ethnic minorities to protect their interests. Perhaps the greatest value of this volume, however, is that it adds new voices (often conflicting) to the debate over whether the Cold War restrained or exacerbated ethnic tensions in Europe.