William Stanley

Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America

The international community, in its efforts to overcome the security dilemmas that inhibit conflict resolution, need not always offer forceful security guarantees to combatants in civil wars. We argue that noncoercive, liberal international intervention can end civil wars. As suggested by a constructivist perspective and the insights of the democratic peace, the promotion of liberal democracy can successfully resolve civil wars by transforming the identities and institutions of the combatants. We develop this argument by examining the resolution of civil wars in Central America during the 1990s. Of the Central American cases, Nicaragua, the country subject to the strongest security guarantees, has been the least stable of the three. El Salvador and Guatemala, in contrast, have experienced more successful conflict resolution despite the lack of any forceful security guarantees by the international community. The termination of these civil wars can be best explained by the adherence of local actors to liberal democratic norms and institutions in response to a variety of international pressures and opportunities.

Counterinsurgency in El Salvador

Contemporary U.S. policy makers often characterize the U.S. counterinsurgency experience in El Salvador as a successful model to be followed in other contexts. This article argues that these characterizations significantly overstate the positive lessons of El Salvador, and ignore important cautionary implications. During the first part of the conflict, neither the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) nor the U.S. followed the tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine. The FAES killed tens of thousands of non-combatants in 1979 and 1980, before the civil war even began. This repression may have preempted an incipient popular insurrection, but it also locked in a determined social base that enabled the armed left to build a highly effective and sustained insurgency. In 1984, the U.S. had to save the FAES from likely defeat through a major increase in military aid, especially airpower. When the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) switched to a classical guerrilla strategy, the FAES, despite considerable U.S. aid, seldom followed best practices in counterinsurgency. Democratization and redistributional reforms were partial and flawed in implementation. The war settled into a stalemate that would likely have continued indefinitely had it not been for the collapse of the socialist bloc and significant changes in the interests of Salvadoran elites that were largely incidental to U.S. policies.The most important cautionary lesson is that indiscriminate violence against civilians early in a conflict can create dynamics that are very difficult to overcome in subsequent stages.

Military and Police Reform after Civil Wars

A basic goal of any civil war settlement is to reestablish a legitimate state monopoly over the use of force in society, under terms agreeable to the parties in conflict. For all parties, the composition and control of state forces will shape post-war security. Whatever party expects to gain control of the government must consider whether post-war military and police will remain unitary and loyal to the new order. Groups that expect minority representation or limited power sharing within the post-war order must consider their risk of persecution and violence at the hands of the new government forces. In addition to the particular interests of the former civil war adversaries, the long-term stability of post-civil war regimes, particularly those based on liberal democratic models, depends on institutional arrangements that minimize the likelihood that organized coercive forces of any kind will intervene in politics.

Peace mission strategy and domestic actors: UN mediation, verification and institution‐building in El Salvador

The UNs effort to end the civil war in El Salvador is among its most successful to date. While this success was achieved under propitious conditions that are not likely to be repeated anywhere else, there are a number of lessons from the El Salvador experience that can be applied elsewhere. The central challenge in El Salvador, as in other cases, was to influence the behaviour of autonomous domestic actors. Our review of interactions between the UN mission and domestic actors in El Salvador suggests the following lessons: the UN was able to enhance its leverage by combining its three main roles ‐ mediation, verification and institution‐building ‐ in strategic and mutually‐reinforcing ways; an important part of the UNs leverage derived from its ability to confer international political legitimacy on domestic actors; the UN enhanced its leverage through principled action, even when this meant going against bargains that domestic parties themselves were willing to accept; and one of the missions greatest ...

International Tutelage and Domestic Political Will: Building A New Civilian Police Force in El Salvador

Under peace accords signed in January of 1992, a new civilian police force replaced the military as the sole agency responsible for providing internal security in El Salvador. This new institution has the potential to substantially transform the relationship of citizen and state, to improve both human rights and public safety, and, eventually, to reduce tensions in civil-military relations. Despite extensive international participation in and verification of this project, however, implementation proved difficult. Political polarization and lack of political will on the part of the government initially undercut the civilian character of the project, while the international community proved unable or unwilling to provide sufficient material assistance. Significant improvements took place under a new presidential administration, which had greater will to implement the project as designed.

En la mejor de las circunstancias: ONUSAL y los desafíos de verificación y fortalecimiento institucional en El Salvador

espanolNo hay resumenes disponiblesRealidad: Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades No. 56, 1997: 153-185 EnglishNo abstract availableRealidad: Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades No. 56, 1997: 153-185