Anchrit Wille

Deciphering the Dutch drop: ten explanations for decreasing political trust in The Netherlands

The Netherlands has always been the odd case out regarding trust in public institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, contrary to international trends, trust in government remained high and even increased. Suddenly, from 2002 onwards, public trust in government declined dramatically. In this article we examine the plausibility of ten explanations, embedded in the international scholarly literature, and explore whether they are empirically supported or rebutted in case of the Dutch drop. We find that because most of the literature concentrates on the cross-national erosion of political support over a long period within Western democracies, explanations tend to focus on gradual, long-term demographic, social, and political trends. Sudden dips in trust levels, however, require different sets of explanatory factors; they are better explained by political or economic contingencies, such as sudden political or economic crises. In the case of the Dutch drop, the most plausible explanation is a combination of an economic decline, combined with high political instability and contestation during the first Balkenende cabinets. As of 2007, with a new cabinet in office, and an economic recovery in place, trust figures are on the rise again. Points for practitioners Sudden dips in public trust in government are better explained by political or economic contingencies, such as political or economic crises, than by a deterioration in government performance or by long-term demographic, social, and political trends. In the case of the sudden drop in trust in The Netherlands, the most plausible explanation is a combination of an economic decline, combined with high political instability and contestation during the first Balkenende cabinets. As of 2007, with a new cabinet in office, and economic recovery in place, trust figures are on the rise again.

The politicization of the EU Commission: democratic control and the dynamics of executive selection

Since the rise of the narrative on the ‘democratic deficit’, at the beginning of the 1990s, EU governance is expected to be democratic and its executive is expected to be democratically legitimated. Since this issue was forced onto the European agenda, the EU has been in a process of continuous polity building in which the Treaties have been revised every few years by the member states to make – among other things – the holders of political power in the institutions more accountable. This article links the changes in the legal and political framework governing the appointment and tasks of the EU Commission to changes in executive recruitment. It explains how strengthened democratic control and accountability over this part of the EU executive has politicized the selection of EU commissioners. This has become visible in the access and exit procedures of this part of the EU executive, but also in shifts in the demand and supply factors in the process of EU executive recruitment. This change is best characterized as a response and adaptation to the increasingly demanding political environment within which the EU Commission finds itself entrenched – one where the highest political personnel of the EU executive need to address the modern problems of a democratic polity. Points for practitioners The expansion of democratic accountability arrangements in the EU has politicized the appointment of EU commissioners in three respects: in the procedures of appointing commissioners; in the composition of the College; and in the career pathways of commissioners. Democratization has meant that representation and political professionalization have become very significant in the selection of the EU executive.

Western European Civil Service Systems: A Comparative Analysis

According to available geological information, Europe started off as a collection of smaller tectonic plates situated somewhere in the southern hemisphere. Slowly drifting northwards, forces of nature moulded these smaller entities over time into the continent we know. On the basis of this historical geological information, we are relatively safe to presume that Europe has, at least, a geographical identity. Comparing civil service systems during earlier phases in the Civil Service project, it was more or less implicitly taken for granted that Western Europe possesses more than a geographical distinctiveness from other regions. In Bekke and Van der Meer (2000) extensive attention is paid to the historical institutional dimension of Western European civil service systems. The historical paragraphs highlighted many common features in the development of Western European civil service systems, without underestimating existing national particularities. Most Western European civil service systems show continuous reform efforts. Using the framework developed by Bekke, Perry and Toonen (1996) we assess (the implications of) recent empirical research.

Political–Bureaucratic Accountability in the EU Commission: Modernising the Executive

The basic accountability system of the European Commission has changed over the last decade. New structures and rules with a range of ex ante constraints and ex post incentives have combined to provide a system for more control and accountability in and over the Commission. This paper uses two concepts of accountability – a passive and an active one – to analyse the modernisation of accountability at the top of the European Commission. Drawing on documentary evidence of politics during the Prodi (1999–2004) and Barroso I years (2004–09) and on interviews held with senior Commission officials during the Barroso incumbency, it shows how strengthened accountability mechanisms and a shift in the dominant types of accountability have characterised the modernisation of the Commissions executive accountability system. In addition to legal and professional accountability systems, an elaborate mixture of accountability mechanisms was created that stressed political and bureaucratic mechanisms and that have created new expectations of accountability on the part of commissioners and their senior officials.

Political and Administrative Leadership in a Reinvented European Commission

Over the past years the European Commission has undergone it most significant changes since its inception. The resignation of the Santer-Commission in 1999 pushed reform to the top of the political agenda of the Commission. A range of internal reform measures transformed the functioning and administration of the Commission and its executive responsibilities. Moreover a long series of treaty revision—Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice—since the early 1990s, changed the legal and political framework governing the appointment and tasks and accountability of the Commission. This all contributed to the transformation of the political and administrative leadership in the European Commission. This paper explores how new rules, recruiting patterns, a change in role interpretations and a transformation in the relationships between political and administrative leaders in the European Commission have emerged.

Civil Service Systems in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis

According to available geological information, Europe started off as a collection of smaller tectonic plates situated somewhere in the southern hemisphere. Slowly drifting northwards, forces of nature molded these smaller entities over time into the continent we know. On the basis of this historical geological information we are relatively safe to presume that Europe has, at least, a geographical identity. Comparing civil service systems during earlier phases in the Civil Service project, it was more or less implicitly taken for granted that Western Europe possesses more than a geographical distinctiveness from other regions. In Van der Meer (2012) extensive attention is paid to the historical institutional dimension of Western European civil service systems. The historical paragraphs highlighted many common features in the development of Western European civil service systems, without underestimating existing national particularities. Most Western European civil service systems show continuous reform efforts. Using the framework developed by Bekke, Perry and Toonen (1996) we will assess (the implications of) recent empirical research.

Political Responses to Dissatisfaction in Russia

This paper seeks to determine how Russian citizens deal politically with the widespread discontent in the Russian Federation. Citizens are not only dissatisfied with their personal life, their job, and their financial situation but their dissatisfaction is also extremely high with government performance on several public problems. To analyze the responses to this deteriorating situation in the Russian Federation, a modified theory of Hirschman (1970) is used.The problems that beset citizens in their daily lives are not translated in political activity. In order to cope with ‘self-located’ problems on housing, job and financial conditions, private rather than political means are activated. However, when we look at ‘socially located’ problems, that are objects of government policy – e.g., employment, rising prices, crime rise – the readiness to voice concerns on these issues through political activities is rather small; citizens that are ready to voice prefer to do this by means of voting.Citizens that do not consider the voice alternative as a reaction to their dissatisfaction, cannot be equated to loyal citizens. Silent non-voice lumps together two phenomena. One form of silence may be loyalty, the other form of silence can be covered by the concept of neglect. Political ‘neglect’ – in the literature sometimes under the label of ‘political alienation’ or ‘political apathy’ – is a serious alternative, that deserves a place next to Hirschmans options of active opposition (voice) and diffuse positive support (loyalty). Empirically, the phenomenon of neglect appears to be a widespread response to political dissatisfaction in the Russian Federation.The voice and loyalty response – although treated as alternatives in Hirschmans theory – are different sort of variables. Loyalty is an attitude, whereas voice is an action. Both are related. Loyalty can activate voice, whereas neglect can hamper the operation of voice. Although neglect and loyalty can be treated as mutually exclusive attitudes, voice can manifest itself in combination with both feelings. Voice can thus manifest as a loyal voice and a cynic voice. It is shown in the analysis that if people are ready to voice in Russia it is a voice of the latter kind, with little hope on future improvement.

The evolving EU accountability landscape: moving to an ever denser union

This article aims to bring the accountability of the EU executive out of the shadows by tracing the development of the current accountability landscape around the main EU’s executive actors. It looks at the development and the diversification of accountability forums (and mechanisms) in the EU: what forums and arrangements have come into being for holding the EU executive powers accountable? Instead of focusing on single individual accountability branches, this article examines the development of accountability in the EU by treating it as a complex landscape. And rather than assuming equilibrium, a starting point is the evolving nature of this landscape. On the basis of this exploration, the article seeks to understand the way in which the EUs institutional accountability framework has evolved through a patchwork of arrangements, and how this contributes to the emergence of a complex, multilayered governance landscape in order to fit within today’s presumptions about how power should be controlled and accountability achieved. Points for practitioners The landscape of accountability institutions in the EU is slowly becoming denser. The shift from national, state-based policy-making to the EU level and the continuous expansion of the executive sphere in the EU is accompanied by a growing concern about how to organize democratic accountability in the complex multi-level web of European governance. The establishment of new watchdog institutions (such as an ombudsman, an anti-corruption office, ethical committees, auditors, a whistleblower protection act) and strengthened scrutiny points to the increased relevance of accountability and control over the EU executive.

The Field of Eurocracy: Mapping EU Actors and Professionals

fragmentation and limitations due to a top-down institutional structure. The second part of this volume starts with Maurizio Carbone’s analysis of the EU’s donor coordination and division of labour over recipient ownership, often resulting in ‘policy evaporation’ (Chapter 7). Along similar lines, Gordon Crawford demonstrates the rhetoric–reality gap in the EU’s attempt to promote democracy and human rights in Africa and explains it by a gradual process of norm diffusion, the significance of the nature and quality of the partnership, and by the negative influence of certain African autocratic leaders (Chapter 8). Focusing on Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs), Christopher Stevens indicates limitations to the EU’s ‘hard power’, even in negotiations with a group of weak and EU-dependent developing countries (Chapter 9). Also focusing on economic relations, in Chapter 10 Alan Matthews determines decisive improvement in terms of the EU’s coherent agricultural and fisheries policies towards Africa, as ‘the African exporters have broadly tariff-free access to the EU market for unlimited volumes of agri-food exports’ (205). Amelia Hadfield examines the emergence and evolution of an energy– development policy nexus in EU–Africa relations and claims that due to Africa’s uneven energy distribution ‘some areas and states will become prominent energy actors and other will remain as importers or transit states’ (232) (Chapter 11). In the following chapter, Simon Lightfoot argues that policy coherence helps the EU to be ‘ahead of the game’ in promoting adaptation to climate change in Africa. The same conclusion is drawn by Tine Van Criekinge, who analyses migration policy (Chapter 14). Chapter 15 proceeds with Jan Orbie’s contribution to the social dimension of EU–Africa relations, demonstrating poor implementation as a result of a lack of political will and capacity problems. Michael Smith’s concluding chapter (15) reflects on three assumptions of the EU’s involvement in Africa and summarises the findings of this volume. The majority of authors underline the interrelated nature of these assumptions, explaining them by the EU’s institutional framework and policy-making processes. Stemming from ‘path dependency’, the EU’s incoherent approach towards Africa results in dealing with ‘several Africas’. Similarly, the mixed nature of policy-making and diverse negotiating arrangements (Joint Africa–EU Strategy, the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs) further contribute to the asymmetrical EU–Africa partnership which is complicated by the emergence of significant competitors, thus undermining the EU’s status as an African power. As this volume delivers a comprehensive analysis of EU–Africa relations since the beginning of the twenty-first century, its findings will be of great interest not only to EU scholars, but also to anyone involved in international relations, regional and development studies.

Holding Executive Power to Account: The EU Administration’s Accountability Challenge(s)

The of t-heard complaint that Brussels-based bureaucrats exercise extensive executive powers with no accountability is one of the critical issues in debates about EU governance. The EU administration is characterized either as a ‘leviathan’ or as a set of unelected ‘eurocrats’. As a leviathan, it is depicted as ‘a monolithic and virtually uncontrollable force eating away at personal liberties and economic resources’ (Peters, 2010, 266). As eurocrats, they are stereotyped as a set of zealous bureaucrats bound with red tape and rule books, who forge useless interventionist policies ‘such as the size of strawberry or the curve of a banana’ (Curtin, 2009, 104). These opinions of the Brussels bureaucracy, by politicians and academic commentators, suggest that the rapid growth in the reach and influence of EU governance arrangements is unchecked and uncontrolled. It qualifies EU governance as relatively unaccountable.