Andrej Zaslove

How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters

The sudden and perhaps unexpected appearance of populist parties in the 1990s shows no sign of immediately vanishing. The lion’s share of the research on populism has focused on defining populism, on the causes for its rise and continued success, and more recently on its influence on government and on public policy. Less research has, however, been conducted on measuring populist attitudes among voters. In this article, we seek to fill this gap by measuring populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences. We distinguish three political attitudes: (1) populist attitudes, (2) pluralist attitudes, and (3) elitist attitudes. We devise a measurement of these attitudes and explore their validity by way of using a principal component analysis on a representative Dutch data set (N = 600). We indeed find three statistically separate scales of political attitudes. We further validated the scales by testing whether they are linked to party preferences and find that voters who score high on the populist scale have a significantly higher preference for the Dutch populist parties, the Party for Freedom, and the Socialist Party.

Gender and populist radical-right politics: An introduction

Populist parties have become a prominent and permanent feature of contemporary politics. Although populism is not a new phenomenon, it has been on the rise across the globe in recent years. Contemporary manifestations of populism include the late Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and the Tea Party in the United States. In Europe, particularly populist radical-right (PRR) parties began to appear in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, becoming arguably the most successful ‘new’ political party family in decades. There is no shortage of scholarship on the PRR. The focus is generally on defining it, on why PRR parties are successful, and on their influence on governments, party systems and public policy. Despite this abundant literature, research rarely focuses on the relationship between gender and the populist radical right. To be sure, there are a few important studies on the topic. The most extensive survey of the literature is provided by Cas Mudde in the chapter ‘Männerparteien’ in his 2007 book Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Here Mudde discusses a few studies on the topic, most notably one by Helga Amesberger and Brigitte Halbmayr that, he argues, is one of the few proper studies of the relationship between populism and gender. However, given that the study was published in German, its impact has been limited. More recently, a number of studies have been published that examine how the

Italy: a case of mutating populism?

Italy is often presented as a showcase of populist parties. In the 2013 parliamentary elections, half of the Italian electorate voted for a party that has been labelled populist. During the 1994–2011 period, Italy witnessed four coalition governments dominated by populists. In line with the framework guiding this special issue, Italy thus offers a unique opportunity to trace the reactions of political and societal actors to populists in government. We propose that it is necessary to examine not only how populisms opponents react, but also how fellow populists respond. Indeed, we observe in Italy, on the one hand, what we will call mutating populism and, on the other hand, a peculiar mixture of paralysis, antagonism, and imitation by their opponents. This contribution is structured as follows: first, we describe Italian populism in the context of the end of the Italian First Republic and the emergence of the new party system under the Second Republic. In the process we discuss events under the four Berlusconi governments (1994–1995; 2001–2005; 2005–2006; 2008–2011). In each phase, we distinguish between populist and anti-populist contenders. We also describe the reactions abroad to governing Italian populists, especially within the European Union.

Gendering the vote for populist radical-right parties

ABSTRACT Why do more men than women vote for populist radical-right (PRR) parties? And do more men than women still vote for the PRR? Can attitudes regarding gender and gender equality explain these differences (if they exist)? These are the questions that Spierings and Zaslove explore in this article. They begin with an analysis of mens and womens voting patterns for PRR parties in seven countries, comparing these results with voting for mainstream (left-wing and right-wing) parties. They then examine the relationship between attitudes and votes for the populist radical right, focusing on economic redistribution, immigration, trust in the European Union, law and order, environmental protection, personal freedom and development, support for gender equality, and homosexuality. They conclude that more men than women do indeed support PRR parties, as many studies have previously demonstrated. However, the difference is often overemphasized in the literature, in part since it is examined in isolation and not compared with voting for (centre-right) mainstream parties. Moreover, the most important reasons that voters support PRR parties seem to be the same for men and for women; both vote for the populist radical right because of their opposition to immigration. In general, there are no consistent cross-country patterns regarding gender attitudes explaining differences between men and women. There are some recurring country-specific findings though. Most notably: first, among women, economic positions seem to matter less; and economically more left-wing (and those with anti-immigrant attitudes) women also vote for the PRR in Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland; and, second, those who hold authoritarian or nativist views in combination with a strong belief that gays and lesbians should be able to ‘live their lives as they choose’ are disproportionately much more likely to vote for PRR parties in Sweden and Norway. Despite these findings, Spierings and Zaslove argue that the so-called ‘gender gap’ is often overemphasized. In other words, it appears that populist radical-right parties, with respect to sex and gender, are in many ways simply a more radical version of centre-right parties.

The impact of populist radical right parties on foreign policy: the Northern League as a junior coalition partner in the Berlusconi Governments

Despite the populist radical right’s (PRR) popularity among political scientists, little scholarship has focused on its influence on foreign policy. This lack of study is due, in part, to a general lack of attention to the role of political parties in foreign policy, both in comparative politics and international relations (IR). This is unfortunate because, due to Europeanization and globalization, the domain of foreign policy has expanded, making foreign policy increasingly a domestic concern and, most importantly, touching on major themes of PRR parties. Combining insights from comparative politics and IR, we theorize the mechanisms, which may facilitate the impact of such parties on foreign policy. Subsequently, we examine whether the Italian Northern League (LN), as a prime example of a PRR party participating in a coalition government, has had an impact on Italy’s foreign policy and, if so, what accounts for this (lack of) influence. This paper concludes that, unlike common understanding, the PRR is not persistently anti-internationalist/anti-EU; rather, its position depends on the extent to which international politics helps or hinders the promotion of ‘the people’. Second, despite the LN’s strong coalition position, it pursued an effective foreign policy mainly regarding immigration policy. Third, IR theories of junior coalition partners and foreign policy should address the nature of the party system and how inter-party electoral competition affects the strength of a junior coalition partner. Fourth, these theories need to acknowledge that party preferences are sometimes trumped by national concerns, as suggested by more systemic IR theories.

Conclusion: Dividing the populist radical right between 'liberal nativism' and traditional conceptions of gender

As noted in the introduction to this special issue, there is no shortage of scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR). This research, in part, examines the role of women, focusing on gender and the sex gap. Given the predominance of male leaders, the traditional and family oriented ideology of PRR parties, and their disproportionate male support, at first glance, it does not seem unreasonable to refer to the PRR as Männerparteien. However, as noted, in the introduction, Cas Mudde questions the degree to which this label is empirically correct as well as the degree to which the socalled maleness of the parties, when compared to mainstream parties, is in fact an exaggeration. These questions lie at the core of this special issue. The focus of the articles is on the (linkage between the) demand—voters— and supply—ideology and leadership—sides of PRR politics; on whether it is possible to identify patterns that hold across the party family (and across time) or whether the issue of gender is more idiosyncratic and specific to the political context; and on whether the shared gender characteristics of PRR parties distinguish these parties from other party families, such as conservative liberals or Christian democratic parties. In line with the literature on the PRR, each of the articles focuses on PRR parties in Western Europe, the heartland of this party family. In addition, this special issue compares the PRR with other parties, such as Latin American leftwing populist parties, neoliberal populist parties, mainstream conservative parties, left-wing and centre-right parties, and Eastern European PRR parties.

Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

Abstract Empirical studies have demonstrated that compared to almost all other parties, populist radical right (PRR) parties draw more votes from men than from women. However, the two dominant explanations that are generally advanced to explain this disparity – gender differences regarding socio-economic position and lower perceptions regarding the threat of immigrants – cannot fully explain the difference. The article contends that it might actually be gender differences regarding the conceptualisation of society and politics – populist attitudes – that explain the gender gap. Thus, the gap may be due, in part, to differences in socialisation. The article analyses EES 2014 data on voting for the populist radical right and the populist radical left in nine European countries. Across countries, the gender gap in voting for the PRR is indeed partly explained by populist attitudes. For populist radical left parties, the results are less clear, suggesting that populism has different meanings to voters on the left and on the right.

'Sexually modern nativist voters': Do they exist and do they vote for the populist radical right?

ABSTRACT Populist radical right (PRR) parties have attracted anti-migration voters by claiming to serve the interests of nationally defined in-groups. Recently, several European PRR parties have shifted focus from protecting traditional values to protecting so-called modern Western values, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights. Here, we study whether PRR parties managed to attract voters who hold these modern values. In contrast with previous research, we do not position these voters with ‘modern values’ as necessary opponents of nativist voters. European Social Survey data linked to 29 elections demonstrate that the likelihood to vote for PRR parties is somewhat lower among lesbian and gay rights people, but not for those who have strong anti-migration attitudes. However, this effect differs across countries and in some cases, the ‘sexually modern nativists’ have the highest PRR voting likelihoods. This is not directly related to the parties’ position on modern family values, but to the party system and alternative right-wing parties present.