Asle Toje

America, the EU and Strategic Culture : Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain

Introduction 1. Understanding Transatlantic Relations 2. The Transatlantic Bargain 3. The Kosovo War 4. EU and NATO Enlargements 5. The Iraq Crisis. Towards a Bipolar West

The first casualty in the war against terror: the fall of NATO and Europe's reluctant coming of age

In 2003, hardly a keynote speech goes by without Western leaders stressing that the transatlantic bond is as important as ever. This is perhaps true – a timelier question is whether the same can be said for the perception of common values and common threats that used to define this partnership and its sole institutional link: NATO. This essay explores five security policy conundrums that point towards a revised burden-sharing and power-sharing in the transatlantic strategic partnership: the UKs ambiguous role in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); the blocking of the formal bond between NATO and the EU; the implications of a change in US policy towards Europe; NATOs improbable move into soft security and, finally, NATOs invocation of Article 5 in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

Ethics in Foreign Policy: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice

The years following the end of the Cold War have been marked by a renewed interest in ethical considerations, which many believe should be the driving force behind foreign policy. At the same time, a new willingness has been forged in the international community to intervene in other states’ internal affairs using ethical justix8ecations for their actions. Ethics, meaning the application of morals to human conduct, has always been a contested topic, but when linking the term to ‘foreign policy’ one enters a conceptual and practical minex8eeld. This is nevertheless a discussion worth having because it attempts to reconcile interests and ideals, and at the same time contains many paradoxes. In many ways, this discussion also captures the essence of contemporary international relations. The aim of the section is to reconcile theory and practice when studying the role of ethics in foreign policy. To this end, the following articles explore this role in general, and illustrate through particular case studies the limits of an ethical foreign policy. Included within this debate are several in-depth assessments of theoretical issues concerning the role and evolution of ethical norms and their inx8fuence on states, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations. Studies of practical issues of ethical interest, such as landmines and the role of NATO, complement these articles. When Robin Cook added an ethical dimension to British policy in 1997, in many ways he was asking for potential conx8fict. In his contribution, the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs examines what was accomplished during the four years after 1997 when the new Labour government placed the promotion and protection of human rights at the heart of its foreign policy. Mr Cook’s public attempt to anchor policy in morality was a brave and creative step. However, as the contribution from Daniel Thomas demonstrates, ethics and policy have a ‘boomerang’ quality, often striking back at the attempt to link ethics and policy. Such is demonstrated by the contribution by Paul Williams, who assesses the rise and fall of the ‘ethical dimension’ in New Labour’s foreign policy from a more general viewpoint. Still, the ethical dimension to international relations is here to stay. In her contribution, Annika Björkdahl analyses the theoretical aspects of the importance of use of norms in foreign policy. The article demonstrates that the concept of norms is useful as an analytical tool and likely to become a lasting element in international relations theory. Ambassador Dahinden places a key emphasis on non-governmental organisations and the ethical limits of warfare. From this vantage point he goes on to explore aspects of the international response to the worldwide humanitarian crisis brought about by the presence of landmines. From a more pragmatic perspective, Jamie Shea, on the contrary, argues that ethics in international affairs does not end with x8ene principles and stern moral judgements. In his

A Question of Political Will

‘Le meilleur des mondes possibles’, the best of all possible worlds. The phrase used by philosopher Gottfried Leibniz in his attempt to resolve the ‘problem of evil’ comes to mind when confronted with the tepidness of the EU operational capacity and the self-congratulatory manner the EU refers to it.1 In 1993, Christopher Hill published an influential article on what he called Europe’s ‘capability-expectations gap’. In the article, he analysed the international role of the European Community (EC) and identified a gap between what it had been talked up to do and what it was actually able to deliver. Hill saw the capability-expectations gap as having three primary components, namely, the ability to agree, resource availability and the instruments at the EC’s disposal.2

European Defence: The State of the Union

Winston Churchill said of the plans to create a United European Army in 1948: ‘We’re not making a machine, we’re growing a living plant, and we must wait and see until we understand what this plant turns out to be.’1 This still rings true for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the years that have passed since it became operational in 2003 the agenda has been dominated by a continuous stream of new initiatives. Discussion has centred on the strengthening of the CSDP; generating European military capabilities and facilitating intra-institutional cooperation. The agenda is not new. In fact, these three questions have constantly recurred in the debate for two decades. Over that time many initiatives have been launched. Some were successful, many less so. The process has given rise to a new set of propositions aimed at adapting to changed circumstances—in part as a way to find a new transatlantic power and burden sharing equilibrium, but also in terms of gaining greater legitimacy and efficiency in European defence cooperation.

Introduction and Basic Arguments

William Butler Yeats’ (1865–1939) words provide a fitting point of departure for a work about the European Union (EU) coming into being as a power with passions, needs and interests. Since 1999 the EU has gradually and purposefully developed a capacity to act: diplomatically, economically and, most importantly, militarily. It is in its ability to coerce that the EU departs from the ranks of international organisations and becomes something different, something with a ‘self’. The Union is a relatively young political entity, having found its economic, social and political form as late as 1992. The principal purpose of its first incarnation, the EEC, was to help foster economic prosperity in Europe. A second purpose, was to reduce the risk of war among European states by encouraging an indissoluble, economic interdependence among them, beginning with the heavy industries that were key sources of military power in the twentieth century. The third ambition, to act as a Union when dealing with the rest of the world, is little more than a decade old.

The Anatomy of EU Security

The symbolic importance of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, formerly ESDP) goes beyond its actual and potential real-world impact; it is the vanguard of the EU’s international presence. No initiative more clearly symbolizes the ambition to develop a political union than the CSDP. Anne Deighton described it as breaking ‘glass ceiling of Europe’s self-denying ordinance on EU access to military competencies’. Javier Solana concurred that the CSDP is seen to be the ‘teeth’ of the Common Foreign and Security Policy—‘with the CSDP we are giving ourselves the tools to deliver’.1 The currency of hard power has changed little over the centuries. The ability to conduct foreign policies, maintain independent relations with other powers depends in the final instance on the ability to raise and command armies.2 For this reason the CSDP is the best indicator of whether a new power is indeed rising in Europe. Hence the book’s focus on security and defence policy.

The European Security Strategy Revisited

The EU security policy was a leap in the dark. It was constructed under an agreement that the EU should have such a policy, but not what it should be about. On 12 December 2003, the leaders of the European Union approved the first-ever European Security Strategy, the ESS, proclaiming an intention to ‘share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.1 The ESS summons up the EU’s external dimension, in a manner that transcends the metaphorical ‘pillars’ intended to visualize the workings of the Union. It encapsulates foreign and security policy—from the development and neighbourhood policies of the European Commission, via the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), under the auspices of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to police and judicial cooperation.

The European Union as a Historical Phenomenon

In a vintage bookshop in Stockholm, I happened upon a book by fellow Scandinavian Konrad von Schmidt-Phiseldeck. The 1821 bestseller Europa och Amerika is an account of Europe’s place in a multipolar world.1 The book also offers insights into the idea of Europe. The book is all the more interesting since the arrangements put in place after the end of the Napoleonic wars were showing strains. To gain the gift of hindsight it helps to read Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored which covers the same period as a running commentary.2 Schmidt-Phiseldeck favoured a united Europe, but at the same time he was concerned that integration might weaken Europe’s ‘warrior spirit’, its will to power and was concerned how territories beyond Europe might affect the great power concert that guaranteed peace. Schmidt-Phiseldeck was, in addition to his many other accomplishments, a leading foreign policy thinker of his day and his analysis does not come across as quaint; on the contrary they seem highly relevant, if somewhat overly sentimental for the sensitivities of the modern reader.

Conclusion: The Purpose of European Power

In 1928 the world’s great powers, including Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the US, signed a treaty where they agreed to outlaw war. The Kellogg-Briand pact, named after the American and French ministers behind the initiative was intended to deliver perpetual peace. It did not. Instead it has been standing as the high-water mark of the Idealist movement of the interwar years. There are apparent similarities to post-Cold War intellectual climate—the ceaseless summiteering, the disarmament efforts, the many treaties without enforcement mechanisms and the romantic ideas of the benign influence of mass public opinion on international politics and the most obvious one, the widely held belief that great-power conflict is a thing of the past—all echo a similar sense of opportunity to change the way international relations operate. When sorting through the remains of the period the EU security policy represents a particular challenge: will the plant that was sown under much milder conditions survive in the changed climate under multipolarity?