Christian A. Ruzzier

On the Regulatory Application of Efficiency Measures

The last decade has witnessed a change to more powerful incentive schemes and the adoption by a large number of regulators of some form of price cap regimes. The efficiency frontiers literature tackles the problem of measuring the X factor in a price cap regime with an RPI-X rule. However, that literature has by large focused solely on the theoretical aspects involved in the estimation of an efficient frontier. The empirical application of the theoretical concepts (which is the main interest of regulators) has not yet received equal attention. In this paper we address this issue and try to elaborate upon the applied aspects of efficiency measurement.

The Potential Role of Economic Cost Models in the Regulation of Telecommunications in Developing Countries

Worldwide privatization of the telecommunications industry and the introduction of competition in the sector, altogether with the ever-increasing rate of technological advance in telecommunications, raise new and critical challenges for regulation. For matters of pricing, universal service obligations, and the like, one of the key questions to be answered is: “What is the efficient cost of providing the service to a certain area or type of customer?” As developing countries move forward with their efforts to build up their capacity to regulate their privatized infrastructure monopolies, cost models are likely to prove increasingly important in answering this question. Costs models deliver a number of benefits to a regulator willing to apply them, but they also ask for something in advance: information. Without this vital element no answer can be given to the question posed above. In this paper, we will introduce cost models and establish their applicability when different degrees of information are available to the regulator. The latter is accomplished by running the model with different sets of actual data from Argentina’s second largest city and comparing the results. Reliable and detailed information is generally a scarce good in developing countries, and we establish here the minimum information requirements that a regulator needs to implement a cost proxy model approach, showing that this ‘data constraint’ need not be that binding.

Procurement in Infrastructure: What Does Theory Tell Us ?

Infrastructure has particular challenges in public procurement, because it is highly complex and customized and often requires economic, political and social considerations from a long time horizon. To deliver public infrastructure services to citizens or taxpayers, there are a series of decisions that governments have to make. The paper provides a minimum package of important economic theories that could guide governments to wise decision-making at each stage. Theory suggests that in general it would be a good option to contract out infrastructure to the private sector under high-powered incentive mechanisms, such as fixed-price contracts. However, this holds under certain conditions. Theory also shows that ownership should be aligned with the ultimate responsibility for or objective of infrastructure provision. Public and private ownership have different advantages and can deal with different problems. It is also shown that it would be a better option to integrate more than one public task (for example, investment and operation) into the same ownership, whether public or private, if they exhibit positive externalities.

Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration: Williamson's Hypothesis Reconsidered

A point repeatedly stressed by transaction cost economics is that the more specific the asset, the more likely is vertical integration to be optimal. In spite of the profusion of empirical papers supporting this prediction, recent surveys and casual observation suggest that higher levels of asset specificity need not always lead to vertical integration. The purpose of this paper is to uncover some of the factors driving firms to (sometimes) choose to remain separated, rather than integrate, in the presence of high specificity. Its main economic message is that in a world where outside options matter and investments are multidimensional, high levels of asset specificity can foster nonintegration: a low level of specificity provides the most misdirected incentives when transacting in a market (because the outside option of external trade becomes so tempting), thus making a stronger case for nonintegration when specificity is high.

Are cost models useful for telecoms regulators in developing countries

Worldwide privatization of the telecommunications industry, and the introduction of competition in the sector, together with the ever-increasing rate of technological advance in telecommunications, raise new and critical challenges for regulation. Fo matters of pricing, universal service obligations, and the like, one question to be answered is this: What is the efficient cost of providing the service to a certain area or type of customer? As developing countries build up their capacity to regulate their privatized infrastructure monopolies, cost models are likely to prove increasingly important in answering this question. Cost models deliver a number of benefits to a regulator willing to apply them, but they also ask for something in advance: information. Without information, the question cannot be answered. The authors introduce cost models and establish their applicability when different degrees of information are available to the regulator. They do no by running a cost model with different sets of actual data form Argentinas second largest city, and comparing results. Reliable, detailed information is generally scarce in developing countries. The authors establish the minimum information requirements for a regulator implementing a cost proxy model approach, showing that this data constraint need not be that binding.

Product-Market Competition and Managerial Autonomy

It is often argued that competition forces managers to make better choices, thus favoring managerial autonomy in decision making. I formalize and challenge this idea. Suppose that managers care about keeping their position or avoiding interference, and that they can make strategic choices that affect both the expected profits of the firm and their riskiness. Even if competition at first pushes the manager towards profit maximization as commonly argued, I show that further increases in competitive forces might as well lead him to take excessive risks if the threat on his position is strong enough. To curb this possibility, the principal-owner optimally reduces the degree of autonomy granted to the manager. Hence higher levels of managerial autonomy are more likely for intermediate levels of competition.

Divided we Stand, United we Fall: Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration Reconsidered

Recent surveys and casual observation suggest that higher levels of asset specificity need not always lead to vertical integration, as traditionally stressed by transaction-cost economics. This paper uncovers some of the factors driving firms to (sometimes) choose to remain separated in the presence of high specificity. It shows that in a world where outside options matter and investments are multidimensional, high asset specificity can foster nonintegration: a low level of specificity provides the most misdirected incentives when transacting in a market (because the outside option of external trade becomes so tempting), thus making a stronger case for nonintegration.

Broadband Tariffs in Latin America: Benchmarking and Analysis

We analyze tariffs for fixed broadband services in Latin America and benchmark against tariffs in the OECD. We also develop a new broadband development indicator (the Broadband Performance Index) that compares actual penetration rates with those predicted by our regression model. The results shows that broadband services in Latin America are generally expensive and of poor quality when benchmarked against OCED countries, and that Latin American countries are underperforming in broadband development after wealth, education and demographics factors are accounted for. We also provide price elasticity estimators for broadband demand in Latin America. The results reveal that an average price reduction of 10% would result in an increase of almost 19% in the penetration rate, equivalent to 4.7 million additional broadband connections. Finally we estimate the affordability of broadband services for households in a sample of countries in the region. The results reveal that sharp price reductions would be needed to achieve household penetration rates comparable to the OECD, and that public access initiatives will still be needed to provide services for the lowest-income households.

'Make or Buy' as Competitive Strategy: Evidence from the Spanish Local TV Industry

This paper empirically investigates whether changes in product market competition affect firm boundaries. Exploiting regulation-induced shocks to entry barriers and differences in regulation enforcement across cities to obtain exogenous variation in competition, we establish a negative causal effect of competition (through reduced entry barriers and a larger number of rival firms) on vertical integration in the setting of the Spanish local television industry between 1995 and 2002. We also find that stations located in larger markets are on average more likely to produce their content in-house than stations in smaller markets, and that private stations outsource more.

The Impact of Competition on “Make-or-Buy” Decisions: Evidence from the Spanish Local TV Industry

This paper empirically investigates whether changes in product market competition affect firm boundaries. Exploiting regulation-induced shocks to entry barriers and differences in regulation enforcement across cities to obtain exogenous variation in competition, we establish a negative causal effect of competition (through reduced entry barriers and a larger number of rival firms) on vertical integration in the setting of the Spanish local television industry between 1995 and 2002. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2633. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.