Joachim Boldt

Newtons of the leaves of grass

Certain ethical implications of synthetic biology research go beyond those of genetic engineering.

Swiss watches, genetic machines, and ethics

Emerging technologies have a history. They do not emerge out of nothing but develop gradually and continuously. Synthetic biology is no exception. It is rooted in genetic engineering, and many observers maintain that synthetic biology is no more than a new label for just that: genetic engineering.

Der Herstellungsbegriff in der Synthetischen Biologie

Abstract In den Publikationen der Synthetischen Biologie und in Darstellungen dieser neuen Biotechnologie finden sich häufig Begriffe des Herstellens, Konstruierens, Erschaffens und Kreierens. Im folgenden Beitrag wird dieses Begriffsfeld auf der Basis von technikphilosophischen und kunsttheoretischen Ansätzen systematisiert. Es wird erstens untersucht, inwiefern sich die verschiedenen Forschungsrichtungen in der Synthetischen Biologie mit diesem Begriffsinstrumentarium angemessen beschreiben lassen; zweitens wird analysiert, welche ethischen Fragestellungen mit den unterschiedlichen Begriffen des Herstellens und Erschaffens im Fall der Synthetischen Biologie verbunden sind.

The Interdependence of Care and Autonomy

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the principle of autonomy has come to be regarded as the cornerstone of medical ethics. Older principles of medical ethics, such as beneficence and non-maleficence, both of which can be subsumed under the concept of “care”, have correspondingly decreased in importance. Drawing on hermeneutic analyses of the constitutive interrelations between autonomous will-formation on the one hand, and well-being and social embeddedness on the other hand, it will be argued that a proper understanding of autonomy necessarily incorporates attention to well-being and care, and vice versa. The true ethical challenge is not to determine whether autonomy or care ought to take precedence, but to understand respecting autonomy and providing care as two aspects of one and the same ethical demand to attend to and help other individuals.

Leben zum Selbermachen

Mit der synthetischen Biologie wollen Forscher Organismen produzieren, die es bisher so in der Natur nicht gab. Neben Problemen der okologischen Sicherheit wirft dies auch Fragen zur Rolle der Wissenschaft und ihrer Verantwortung auf.

Understanding Care: Introductory Remarks

Care is among the most important concepts in healthcare. It is not only a descriptive concept, but it also conveys a normative orientation. Approaches to the ethics of care have shown that care can indeed be understood as an overarching normative concept that integrates different normative orientations. Nonetheless, determining what constitutes good care is usually a matter of finding reasonable compromises. In healthcare settings, a typical compromise involves finding a balance between optimal care for individuals on the one hand and the institutional demands of providing care to many care receivers over long periods of time as well as the limits of what can legitimately be asked of individual care providers on the other.

Machine metaphors and ethics in synthetic biology

The extent to which machine metaphors are used in synthetic biology is striking. These metaphors contain a specific perspective on organisms as well as on scientific and technological progress. Expressions such as “genetically engineered machine”, “genetic circuit”, and “platform organism”, taken from the realms of electronic engineering, car manufacturing, and information technology, highlight specific aspects of the functioning of living beings while at the same time hiding others, such as evolutionary change and interdependencies in ecosystems. Since these latter aspects are relevant for, for example, risk evaluation of uncontained uses of synthetic organisms, it is ethically imperative to resist the thrust of machine metaphors in this respect. In addition, from the perspective of the machine metaphor viewing an entity as a moral agent or patient becomes dubious. If one were to regard living beings, including humans, as machines, it becomes difficult to justify ascriptions of moral status. Finally, the machine metaphor reinforces beliefs in the potential of synthetic biology to play a decisive role in solving societal problems, and downplays the role of alternative technological, and social and political measures.

Conclusion: Asking the Right Questions

The dyadic relation between a person in need and a person who provides help is one of the core elements of care. Nonetheless, identifying core elements of care alone cannot supply simple solutions to the challenges that are rooted in the ambivalences and tensions of the notion of care in healthcare. Care practices are extensive, situated, and complex. Questions concerning ambivalences and tensions within care include: Can care practices include coercion? Is care compatible with exclusion? Can it be passive or invisible? Can it be incorporated into standardised and regulated routines? Can care and its vocabulary be adjusted to clinical procedures and medical terminology?

Are older people a vulnerable group? Philosophical and bioethical perspectives on ageing and vulnerability

The elderly are often considered a vulnerable group in public and academic bioethical debates and regulations. In this paper, we examine and challenge this assumption and its ethical implications. We begin by systematically delineating the different concepts of vulnerability commonly used in bioethics, before then examining whether these concepts can be applied to old age. We argue that old age should not, in and of itself, be used as a marker of vulnerability, since ageing is a process that can develop in a variety of different ways and is not always associated with particular experiences of vulnerability. We, therefore, turn to more fundamental phenomenological considerations in order to reconstruct from a first person perspective the intricate interconnections between the experiences of ageing and vulnerability. According to this account, ageing and old age are phenomena in which the basic anthropological vulnerability of human beings can manifest itself in an increased likelihood of harm and exploitation. Thus, we plead for a combined model of vulnerability that helps to avoid problems related to the current concepts of vulnerability. We conclude first that old age as such is not a sufficient criterion for being categorized as vulnerable in applied ethics, and second that reflections on ageing can help to develop a better understanding of the central role of vulnerability in human existence and in applied ethics.

Genetics, Epigenetics and Forms of Action. About the Ethical Ambivalence of Epigenetic Knowledge

Epigenetics can be considered as a continuation of genetics. Even if it includes environmental factors in its analyses, the focus remains on the cellular-molecular perspective on the organism. However, epigenetics expands the spectrum of what is known from the discussion about ethical aspects of genetics in two regards. First of all, the inclusion of environmental factors causes the relationship of the individual that is provided with predictive diagnoses to change with this knowledge. Secondly, this correlation leads to the question as to how the instrumentally useful epigenetic findings for the patient can be embedded in the applicable context of social-communicative action that is relevant for the patient’s everyday life.