Kai-Uwe Müller

Would a Legal Minimum Wage Reduce Poverty? A Microsimulation Study for Germany

In view of rising wage inequality and increasing poverty, the introduction of a legal minimum wage has recently become an important policy issue in Germany. We analyze the distributional effects of the introduction of a nationwide legal minimum wage of € 7.5 per hour on the basis of a microsimulation model which accounts for the complex interactions between individual wages, the tax-benefit system and net household incomes. Simulation results show that the minimum wage would be rather ineffective in reducing poverty, even if it led to a substantial increase in hourly wages at the bottom of the wage distribution and had no negative employment effects. The ineffectiveness of a minimum wage in Germany is mainly due to the existing system of means-tested income support.

Imposed Benefit Sanctions and the Unemployment-to-Employment Transition: The German Experience

We analyze the effect of imposed benefit sanctions on the unemployment-to-employment transition of unemployed people entitled to unemployment compensation on the basis of register data from the German Federal Employment Agency. We combine propensity score matching with a discrete-time hazard rate model which accounts for the dynamic nature of the treatment. We find positive short- and long-term effects of benefit sanctions which are robust for men and women in East and West Germany. The effects diminish with the elapsed unemployment duration until a sanction is imposed. The limited use of benefit sanctions can thus be an effective activation tool if they take place not too late in an individuals unemployment spell.

Distributional Effects of a Minimum Wage in a Welfare State – The Case of Germany

A popular argument for a federal minimum wage is that it will prevent in-work poverty and reduce income inequality. We examine this assertion for Germany, a welfare state with a relative generous means-tested social minimum and high marginal tax rates. Our analysis is based on a microsimulation model that accounts for the interactions between wages, the tax-benefit system and net incomes at the household level as well as employment and price effects on the distribution of incomes induced by the introduction of a minimum wage. We show that the impact of even a relatively high federal minimum wage on disposable incomes is small because low wage earners are scattered over the whole income distribution and wage increases would to a large extent be offset by reductions in means-tested welfare transfers and high marginal tax rates. Taking into account negative employment effects and increases in consumer prices induced by the minimum wage would wipe out any positive direct effects on net incomes of households affected by the minimum wage.

Labor market and income effects of a legal minimum wage in Germany

In view of rising wage and income inequality, the introduction of a legal minimum wage has recently become an important policy issue in Germany. We analyze the distributional effects of a nationwide legal minimum wage of 7.50 € per hour on the basis of a microsimulation model which accounts for the complex interactions between individual wages, the tax-benefit system and net household incomes, also taking into account potential employment effects as well as indirect effects on consumption. Simulation results show that the minimum wage would be rather ineffective in raising net household incomes and reducing income inequality, even if it led to a substantial increase in hourly wages at the bottom of the wage distribution. The ineffectiveness of a minimum wage in Germany is mainly due to the existing system of means-tested income support and the position of minimum wage earners in the income distribution.

Individual and regional determinants of receiving unemployment benefit sanctions in Germany

AbstractThe paper analyzes the individual and regional determinants of unemployment benefit sanctions in Germany. On the basis of an administrative data set a multilevel hazard rate model in discrete time for the transitions into a sanction is estimated, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity on the individual and regional level. It is shown that certain benefit recipients, e.g. younger people, are more likely to receive sanctions than e.g. older, disabled, or skilled individuals. Moreover, the risk of being sanctioned not only depends on individual characteristics but is also influenced by the sanction policies of the employment agencies. ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag untersucht individuelle und regionale Determinanten von Sanktionen, die Unterstützungsleistungen arbeitsloser Leistungsempfänger in Deutschland mindern. Auf Basis von Geschäftsdaten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit wird ein multivariates Abgangsratenmodell für die Übergänge in eine Sanktion in diskreter Zeit spezifiziert, das unbeobachtete Heterogenität auf individueller und regionaler Ebene kontrolliert. Das individuelle Sanktionsrisiko ist neben individuellen Merkmalen und dem Verhalten des Arbeitslosen von der Sanktionierungsintensität der regionalen Arbeitsagenturen abhängig.

Employment Effects of a Sectoral Minimum Wage in Germany: Semi-Parametric Estimations from Cross-Sectional Data

In this paper employment effects of a sectoral minimum wage in the German construction sector are estimated from a single cross-sectional wage distribution using parametric and semi-parametric models. Parametric functional form assumptions seem too restrictive and lead to implausible results. We suggest semi-parametric censored quantile regression models to relax these assumptions and find that employment levels would be 4-5% higher without the minimum wage in the East German construction sector. That the effect for the West is clearly smaller (only 1-2%) is theoretically plausible, since the level of the minimum wage in East Germany was set much higher in relation to the wage distribution. There is heterogeneity hidden in the mean effect: employment losses are mostly borne by young construction workers, employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements and individuals working in small establishments. Although the paper confirms previous findings of a negative employment effect for East Germany, its magnitude is substantially larger than previously estimated.

The Economic Incidence of Social Security Contributions: A Discontinuity Approach with Linked Employer-Employee Data

We estimate economic incidence of social security contributions (SSC) on the basis of cross-sectional earnings distributions. The approach exploits discontinuities in earnings distributions at kinks in the budget set which are informative about tax incidence. Contrary to most research on SSC incidence, it does not rely on policy reforms, panel data, or hours information. When the location of kinks does not change significantly, estimates represent equilibrium incidence and are less affected by short-run adjustment frictions than results based on policy reforms. We refine the framework proposed by Alvaredo and Saez (2007), discuss identifying assumptions and related problems in empirical applications. We also suggest parametric and non- parametric estimators. The approach is applied to earnings caps of SSC in Germany where the marginal SSC rate drops to zero. The linked employer-employee data used provide precise measures of gross and net earnings. Utilizing two separate earnings distributions improves identification in the presence of measurement error. We find substantial negative discontinuities at most earnings caps of SSC in the distribution of observed net earnings. Together with smooth gross earnings distributions around the caps this provides consistent empirical evidence that legal and economic incidence of SSC coincide.

The Family Working Time Model - Toward More Gender Equality in Work and Care

Since the millennium, the labour market participation of women and mothers is increasing across European countries. Several work/care policy measures underlie this evolution. At the same time, the labour market behaviour of fathers, as well as their involvement in care work, is relatively unchanging, meaning that employed mothers are facing an increased burden with respect to gainful employment and providing care. We propose a family working-time model that incentivizes fathers and mothers to both work in extended part-time employment. It provides a benefit in the form of a lump-sum transfer or income replacement for each parent if, and only if, both parents work 30 hours/week. Thus, it explicitly addresses fathers and – contrary to most conventional family policies – actively promotes the dual earner/dual carer paradigm. Combining microsimulation and labour supply estimation, we empirically analyse the potential of the family working-time model in the German context. The relatively small share of families already choosing the symmetric distribution of about 30 working hours would increase by 60 percent. By showing that a lump-sum transfer especially benefits low-income families, we contribute to the debate about redistributive implications of family policies. The basic principles of the model generalize to other European countries where families increasingly desire an equal distribution of employment and care. In order to enhance the impact of such a policy, employers’ norms and workplace culture as well as the supply of high-quality childcare must catch up with changing workforce preferences.