Margaret Doxey

The Case of South Africa

Chapter 4, which dealt with United Nations sanctions, sketched the record of the UN in regard to South Africa up to the end of 1985 and noted that as a result of heightened concern about deteriorating race relations in the Republic, and with the encouragement of Security Council Resolution 569, the United States, European Community and Commonwealth members imposed some political and economic sanctions in the autumn of that year. US measures banned the export of computers for use by the South African security forces as well as exports of nuclear goods and technology (except as required by IAEA rules on health and safety); prohibited most government loans to the South African government; and proposed a ban on the import of Krugerrands. EC measures ended military co-operation and banned new collaboration in nuclear sectors; banned the export of oil to South Africa and the export of sensitive equipment for use by the South African police; discouraged cultural agreements and froze sporting and security links. Commonwealth sponsored measures were similar to those imposed by the United States.

International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa

This paper falls into two main parts. In Part I an attempt is made to develop a simple framework which can be used for analyzing the role of sanctions, with special reference to international sanctions.1 In Part II this framework is used to investigate the status of the United Nations as a sanctioning body and, in particular, the relationship between the UN and Southern Africa where Rhodesia has been subjected to international economic sanctions since 1965 and South Africa has been under threat of similar measures since the early 1960s.2

United Nations sanctions: Lessons of experience

Despite the apparent virtues of UN sanctions in terms of legitimacy and universality, attention in recent years has focused on their questionable achievements and adverse consequences. In particular, the cost of imposing sanctions is unevenly spread, while comprehensive measures harm the civilian population in the target and spare those responsible for the offending policies. This article discusses the merits of UN sanctions in the context of the membership and practice of the Security Council and looks closely at flaws in sanctions programmes and in their administration. Experience suggests careful review of alternative means of pressure as well as reform of existing procedures.

United Nations Sanctions

Despite the elaborate enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, and forty years of life, the UN record of sanctioning is sparse. As far as mandatory sanctions are concerned, the only important case is Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe); a minor instance is the embargo on arms sales to South Africa which has been in force since 1977. Other measures have been adopted voluntarily, pursuant to recommendations made by UN organs. In the Korean case the Security Council made the initial recommendations for military measures and there have also been Security Council recommendations for a ban on the sale of arms to Portugal for use in its overseas territories, on arms sales to Rhodesia prior to the imposition of mandatory sanctions and for voluntary economic sanctions against South Africa. In other instances the General Assembly has been the source of encouragement for sanctions imposition. In 1946 it recommended that members should sever diplomatic relations with the Franco regime because of its pro-Axis stand during the Second World War, and subsequently there were recommendations in respect of North Korea and the People’s Republic of China, but the main focus of attention has been Southern Africa: Portugal till 1974; Rhodesia until 1980, and South Africa as a continuing issue.

Independence Years: The Selected Indian and Commonwealth Papers of Nicholas Mansergh

This volume offers a historical commentary on the events leading to Indian independence and some subsequent developments. It also includes several essays on the influence of the new Asian members in the Commonwealth in the 1950s and 1960s.

League of Nations Sanctions

The procedures outlined in the League Covenant for the imposition of international sanctions were persistently debated, interpreted and reinterpreted during the first 15 years of the League’s existence, revealing members’ disinclination to be committed in advance to action of this kind. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 did not lead to League sanctions although a Commission of Enquiry sent by the League Council to study the situation in the Far East reported that Japanese military measures had been unjustified. Recognition of the state of Manchukuo set up by Japan was withheld by the United States and the League but there was no further action. The prolonged Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia (1928–38) could also have provided an occasion for a League response but the maximum achieved was a recommendation for an embargo on the sale of arms to both sides.

Rule Observance and Rule Making: Growing Problems of Authority and Control for the United Nations

new phenomenon. Early dissatisfaction with the Security Council, where action was usually blocked by the Soviet veto, was extended to the General Assembly once majority control of that body passed to Third World states, and in the 1970s the image of the United Nations as an uncongenial forum for the successful pursuit of United States political and economic foreign policy goals gave way to an even more negative view that it was a body generally hostile to United States and Western interests. Since President Reagan took office in 1981 there have been clear indications of a rejection of multilateralism in a number of important issue-areas: refusal to sign the Law of the Sea Convention; withdrawal from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; reduction of United States contributions to United Nations programmes; cancellation of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (icj); and withdrawal from the proceedings of the court in the Nicaragua case. And while the United States has looked to its allies, particularly fellow members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for support in various foreign policy initiatives, it has also shown a propensity to take unilateral action, using economic, political, and even military means.

International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective

Preface - The Sanctions Problematique - Major Cases of Sanctions 1935-1995 - Contexts and Frameworks for Sanctions and the Intentions of Senders - Costs and Burden-sharing - Problems of Implementation - The Impact on Targets: Vulnerability and Response - Sanctions Revisited - Notes and References - Select Bibliography of General Works - Index

Costs and Burden-Sharing

Willingness to incur costs, according to David Baldwin, is ‘widely regarded as a standard indicator of one’s resolve’.1 In other words it reflects depth of feeling or degree of concern. There is certainly no doubt that anticipated cost as well as expectations of benefit will play a role in all sanctioning decisions, whether they are made unilaterally or in concert, inside or outside organizational frameworks. In some circumstances sanctions can produce economic gains: withholding of foreign aid, the capture of markets vacated by the target, ‘rewards’ from allies. But costs are generally a more important consideration and Lisa Martin’s careful study supports the proposition that in multilateral sanctioning they ‘have a substantively and statistically significant impact on the level of cooperation’.2 Indeed it might not be too far-fetched to include minimization of cost as a secondary objective for senders.

Contexts and Frameworks for Sanctions and the Intentions of Senders

This chapter explores the rationales and contexts for sanctions in the United Nations and in organizations and groups with limited membership and seeks to disentangle the variety of motives and intentions which prompt national governments to adopt collective measures inside or outside institutional frameworks. Chapter 1 made the point that the concept of international sanctions in the twentieth century was a departure from the traditional use of economic measures as a prelude or supplement to war, as retaliation for injury, or to gain advantages from other states. League of Nations sanctions — President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘economic, silent, deadly remedy’1 — were intended to replace military means of checking aggression by serving as a deterrent and if necessary as a corrective. Collective security optimistically envisaged the principle ‘one for all and all for one’ working to make the world a more peaceful place.