Peter Spáč

The Role of Ballot Ranking Preferential Voting in a Nationwide Constituency in Slovakia

This article deals with ballot order effect in preferential voting in general elections in Slovakia. Previous research in this field has primarily focused on countries whose elections are based either on single-member districts or on lists with fewer candidates. This article aims to analyze a case of a different nature. Slovakia uses a proportional representation list system with a single nationwide constituency where all 150 members of parliament are elected. Hence, most of the political parties create lists with a high number of candidates, which according to theory should enhance the influence of ballot ranking. Using data from Slovak general elections between 2006 and 2012 with a sample of 7,587 candidates, this study provides strong evidence of the impact of ballot order on the results of preferential voting. The analysis in this article shows the existence of both the primacy and recency effects, that is, a positive bias of voters towards candidates listed at both top and bottom positions on a list. What is more, the multilevel models used in this article demonstrate that support for top-ranked candidates significantly increases as the size of the list increases. For the bottom-listed candidates, this trend is rather the opposite. These findings represent a valuable contribution to the debate in this area as they provide insight into the role of ballot order in electoral systems that use lists composed of numerous candidates.

Does the freedom of information law increase transparency at the local level? Evidence from a field experiment

The paper studies how Freedom of Information (FOI) laws work and assist citizens in their demand for information at the local level. To examine this, we ran a field experiment and sent emails to all 2,928 municipalities in Slovakia and asked them to provide us data from local election, inaccessible in any other way. Results show that mentioning FOI law in the request increased the response rate, while a moral appeal had no effect at all. The found effect is, however, moderated by population size. While in less populated municipalities the FOI requests led to substantially higher responsiveness of public bodies, the form of the request becomes less relevant with increasing population. Higher compliance was also found for municipalities led by independents. On the other hand, areas with a predominance of an ethnic minority had lesser responsiveness, possibly due to a language barrier.

Pork-Barrel Politics on the Regional Level: Public Subsidies in the Municipalities of the Central Bohemia Region

Politicky motivovane rozdělovani veřejných prostředků, zname tež jako politika vykrmovani, se objevuje z řady důvodů. Jednim z nich je odměňovani politických spojenců a znevýhodňovani oponentů. Navzdory sirokemu rozsiřeni tohoto jednani jestě nebyl ve středni Evropě proveden výzkum tohoto problemu na jine než centralni urovni veřejne spravy. Existujici literatura se věnuje zejmena narodnim dotacnim programům, zatimco distribucni procesy na urovni nižsich administrativnich jednotek zůstavaji opomenuty. Tento text se zaměřuje na rozdělovani dotaci obcim ve Středoceskem kraji v letech 2014 – 2016. S využitim binarni logisticke regrese text analyzuje faktory vedouci k podpoře podane datacni žadosti a za pomoci negativni binomialni regrese pak odhaluje faktory ovlivňujici výsi ziskane dotace. Výsledky analýzy ukazuji, že stranicke vazby významně ovlivňuji sanci ziskat dotaci. Výse ziskane dotace je timto faktorem ovlivněna pouze před volbami, jinak stranicke vazby výsi ziskane dotace přilis neovlivňuji.

Slovakia: The Unbearable Lightness of Regionalization

An analysis of national and regional elections reveals that elections are highly nationalized in Slovakia. However, the nationalization of regional elections does not translate into second-order election effects. Due to radically different electoral systems used for regional and national elections, political parties are induced to form alliances in regional but not in national elections and electoral alliances crossing the government-opposition divide are abundant in regional elections. Another notable and important regional election dynamic is the growing success of independent candidates. This trend can be interpreted as ‘departyisation’ of regional politics rather than regionalization. Regional elections may be conceived as ‘barometer elections’ whereby voters do not use their vote to punish parties in national government. Rather, the regional vote indicates the electoral prospects of parties in the upcoming national election.

Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia

Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. In addition, allocated grants have the potential to increase the prospects of incumbents when seeking reelection. This paper elaborates on these expectations and it studies a governmental program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. The results show that better access to resources is given to towns led by mayors with closer ties to the central cabinet. In coalition governments, however, this advantage is provided primarily to municipalities with mayors supported by the ruling party that directly controls the distribution. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection. A greater number of grants awarded during one term or grants distributed at the end of the electoral cycle help local incumbents to an even greater extent. Hence the paper demonstrates that a program paid for by all taxpayers may operate as a mechanism fueled by political and partisan interests with an impact in the electoral arena.

For the Game, for the Loyal Partisans: Distribution of Sport Grants in Slovakia

Abstract Distribution of resources is at the core of politics. Although this activity is primarily economic in nature, the existing research shows that political representatives often use the allocation of public money to reward their allies at the expense of their rivals. This paper analyses a 2015 governmental programme of local sport grants in Slovakia that aimed to build sport facilities for children and young people. In order to avoid any political bias, the programme was established as a neutral mechanism with an anonymous evaluation of grant requests. The results of analysis, however, provide substantial evidence that the subsidies were given primarily to towns with closer political ties to the government while municipalities led by mayors from the opposition were nearly fully ignored. In addition, the presented social and economic aims of the funding programme were not effectively pursued. The paper thus represents a valuable contribution to the discussion of distributive politics, in general, as it shows that, despite the respective legal framework, the allocation of resources may still end up as a process fuelled by partisan interests.